Actors, Institutions and Change: Perspectives on Africa by Sabbi, Matthew et al.
 BAYREUTH 
 
Actors, Institutions and Change 
Perspectives on Africa 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          works! 
 
 
Editors 
Matthew Sabbi  
Jane Ayeko-Kümmeth 
   
Bayreuth  African  Studies  Working  Papers  No. 13   
BIGSAS Working Papers 5/2015: Actors, Institutions and Change: Perspectives on Africa   I  
Bayreuth African Studies Working Papers 
 
The “Bayreuth African Studies Working Papers” report on 
ongoing projects, the results of current research and 
matters related to the focus on African Studies at the 
University of Bayreuth. There are no specific requirements 
as to the language of publication and the length of the 
articles. 
 
Contributions to this series may be submitted directly to the 
editors; they can also be submitted via university lecturers 
and professors or via the Institute of African Studies. 
Acceptance is decided by the editors. 
 
The “Bayreuth African Studies Working Papers” is chronicled 
on the EPub document server at the university library: 
https://epub.uni-bayreuth.de/ 
 
An electronic version of each volume is available on the IAS 
website: 
 https://epub.uni-bayreuth.de/view/divisions/310008.html 
 
 
Institute of African Studies 
Executive Director: Dieter Neubert  
Vice Director: Rüdiger Seeseman 
 
 
Address: 
Universität Bayreuth 
Institute of African Studies  
95440 Bayreuth 
GERMANY 
Phone: +49 (0)921 555161  
Fax: +49 (0)921 555102 
IAS@uni-bayreuth.de 
  
 
  
BIGSAS Working Papers 5/2015: Actors, Institutions and Change: Perspectives on Africa   II  
Bayreuth International Graduate School of 
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Since the year 2007, BIGSAS is part of the competitive ‘Excellence 
Initiative’ by the German Research Foundation (DFG) and the 
German Council of Science and Humanities (WR). The basic aims of 
BIGSAS are to bring together excellent young African and non-
African scholars to work jointly in the field of African Studies and to 
offer a centre of creative and innovative PhD training and research. 
On 15th June 2012, BIGSAS was one of the successful DGF funded 
‘Centers of Excellence’ which were granted support for the next 5 
years. BIGSAS has more than 100 junior fellows from 25 African, 
American, Asian and European countries. BIGSAS builds on this 
experience and offers a multi- and interdisciplinary research 
environment based upon three clearly defined general Research 
Areas which are:  
 
A. Uncertainty, Innovation and the Quest for Order in Africa  
B. Culture, Concepts and Cognition in Africa: Approaches 
through Language, Literature and Media  
C. Negotiating Change: Discourses, Politics and Practices of 
Development  
 
The Research Areas allow for challenging theoretical studies 
sensitive to emerging basic problems; they also take into account 
practical questions and problems of the African continent. Thus, the 
BIGSAS Research Areas encompass basic, strategic and applied 
research. BIGSAS also contributes to the creation of an African 
universities’ network. It brings together African and European 
networks and fosters partnership not only between the University of 
Bayreuth and universities in Africa but also between the universities 
in Africa themselves. Six African Partner Universities, namely the 
University of Abomey-Calavi, Cotonou (Benin), Moi-University, 
Eldoret (Kenya), Université Mohammed V-Agdal, Rabat (Morocco), 
Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, Maputo (Mozambique), the 
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research with a multidisciplinary mentorship; specialist academic 
training with a cross-disciplinarily focus; clearly structured Individual 
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offer of employment-oriented transferable skills, individual career 
planning, early integration into the international academic community, 
shorter time-to-degree with structural and financial encouragements 
or specific support of female Junior Fellows.  
 
Over the past 20 years Bayreuth has amassed considerable 
experience in co-ordinated research programmes, integrating various 
disciplines into a stimulating research in the field of African Studies. 
The Institute of African Studies (IAS) promotes 63 researchers and 
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university. 
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BIGSASworks! 
With BIGSASworks! we aim at offering Junior Fellows at the 
Graduate School of African Studies a platform for publishing 
research-related articles. This new online-working paper series 
provides an excellent platform for representing and promoting the 
idea of BIGSAS. It opens a space for showcasing ongoing research, 
creating transparency of the work carried out by Junior Fellows and 
providing a space for present articles and working jointly on them 
towards further publication. Each issue focuses on a certain thematic 
field or theoretical concept and Junior Fellows from any discipline are 
invited to submit papers, enabling common interests beyond the 
predetermined BIGSAS research areas to flourish. At the same time 
BIGSASworks! offers its workgroup participants deeper insights into 
and practical experience of what it means to be an editor. Last but 
not least BIGSASworks! makes BIGSAS and its research(ers), (i.e. 
us!), visible before our theses are published.  
 
The name BIGSASworks! had various implications when we first 
chose it. First and foremost it is an abbreviation of “BIGSAS Working 
Papers!” Secondly, it is meant to show the work of our BIGSAS “work 
groups”, so indeed it is the works that are resulting from a structure 
like BIGSAS. Thirdly, taking “works” as a verb, it demonstrates the 
work that we as BIGSAS Fellows carry out, with BIGSASworks 
guaranteeing us a visible output in addition to our theses.  
 
Bayreuth, May 2015 
Matthew Sabbi and Jane Ayeko-Kümmeth
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Foreword 
 
 
The idea of institution-building is as old as the notion of development 
policy. And the question of functioning institutions was and is a truism 
in development research. In this debate institutions are usually seen 
as state institutions, including administrations and the judiciary. 
Therefore one may ask, why another volume on institutions and 
development? To understand the aim of this volume, it is helpful to 
take a look at the history of development research on institutions, 
especially in Africa. 
 
One important task of post-colonial development was to “Africanize” 
the leading positions in state institutions that had been held by 
foreign colonial officers, lawyers and technicians. During this phase, 
institutional development was a question of staff training. Indeed, for 
a long time, foreign staff was part and parcel of the administration 
and especially in the juridical system foreign judges were often active 
for decades, at least in the high courts. A second phase of 
institutional development focused on the devolution of state 
institutions and decentralization as the backbone of more effective 
service provision. The focus was on the restructuring of institutions. 
Even at this time, when the question of implementation came up, 
institutions were mostly seen as formal structures that had to be set 
up and scheduled in an effective way.1 It was only in the eighties that 
financial institutions and the financial system came into focus. But 
again the focus was on the structures of the system. 
  
However, the impact of all these efforts was limited. Analysis of the 
“failure” of institutions pointed to one main factor: “corruption”. 
Institutions were seen to have been corrupted by greedy politicians 
and administrators. Institution-building was marked by the fight 
against corruption and a lack of transparency and accountability. 
Good governance was presented as a solution. The restructuring of 
institutions and good governance are still on the agenda but data 
from Transparency International and other databases show that the 
progress is often limited. In addition, some of the East Asian 
countries that are presented as development successes were corrupt 
at the time when the main advances in growth and development took 
place. 
                                                 
1
 E.g. Cheema, G. Shabbir/Rondinelli, Dennis A. (eds.), 1983. Decentralization and 
development. Policy implementation in developing countries. Beverly Hills: Sage. 
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The papers in this volume follow a different path. They are influenced 
by actor-centered analysis. They refer openly or indirectly to the work 
of Norman Long2. His interest is in the actors in- and outside the 
institutions, their specific perspectives and interests and their 
particular rationale of action. This approach was developed in the 
1980s. The studies published at that time and in the 1990s were 
mostly interested in what Long called the interface between state and 
development institutions on the one hand and the local people and 
their local institutions on the other. Surprisingly, in development 
studies this very productive perspective has hardly been applied to 
the administrative structures themselves. German governance 
studies with their focus on the Global North have shown that this is a 
highly productive enterprise.3  
 
The actor perspective is closely linked to ethnographic research and 
to a sociological definition of institutions as stable, persisting patterns 
of social relations based on shared legitimate concepts of order and 
practised in everyday life. This definition goes far beyond state 
institutions and includes social institutions of different kinds, including 
particular local institutions. At the same time, this understanding of 
institutions is compatible with the definition of institution given by the 
institutional economist Douglas North “as a set of rules” (see 
Sabbi/Ayeko-Kümmethin this volume).  
 
Against this background of a wider definition, this volume combines 
actor-centred studies of institutions and development with a focus on 
state institutions and institution-building with studies of local 
institutions in the context of change and development. One 
interesting feature of the volume is that the authors come from 
diverse national and disciplinary backgrounds. But different from the 
ordinary conference setting and the loose interaction between the 
authors that is typical of classical edited volumes, the authors of this 
BIGSASworks! issue formed a working group and developed a 
common ground in an interactive process that is reflected by a 
shared analytical approach. The papers provide a map of the actors 
involved in institution-building or in practical performance. This is an 
eye-opener for understanding the everyday practice of institutions 
                                                 
2
 Long, Norman, 2001. Development sociology. Actor perspectives. London, New 
York: Routledge. 
3
 Mayntz, Renate, 1998. New challenges to governance theory: Jean Monet; 
Scharpf, Fritz, 1997. Games real actors play: Actor-centered institutionalism in 
policy research. Boulder: Westview Press. 
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that reaches well beyond formal legal procedures or a simple 
dichotomy between good governance and corruption. 
 
 
Bayreuth, May 2015 
Dieter Neubert 
 
 
Dieter Neubert is professor of Development Sociology at the University of 
Bayreuth. His research areas include sociology of Africa (including social 
structure), sociology of violent conflicts, social change, and development policy. 
His regional research focus is on Africa particularly East Africa. He has also 
conducted research in Southeast Asia (Vietnam and Thailand). 
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Introduction: Actors, Institutions and Change 
 
Matthew Sabbi and Jane Ayeko-Kümmeth 
 
 
 
 
This issue of BIGSASworks! is underpinned by the outlook and daily 
practices of public institutions in developing regions particularly in 
sub-Saharan Africa. In fact, the nature of state institutions in these 
settings makes it all the more important in confronting and 
interrogating why, for example, public bureaucracies remain visible 
but their output in terms of goods and service provision are often 
deemed poor by citizens who utilize those services. The ‘weakness’ 
of state bureaucracies and their inability to provide public goods is an 
oft-cited critique for the nature of governance in the Global South 
(see North, 1995; Nissanke & Aryeetey, 2003). It also informs the 
ambivalent notions on these institutions’ orientation towards change 
in which they are presented as legitimate institutions but instead 
perform something else (Meyer & Rowan, 1991; Meyer, 2005). The 
weakness of the state bureaucracies at the same time provides the 
rationale for international actors to come in and help (Romeo, 2003). 
Indeed, over the last few decades, development discourse and 
practice have prioritized institution-building as reflected in the amount 
of development aid and technical assistance that are sent to the 
developing regions.4 Yet institutions in the developing world 
especially in sub-Saharan Africa remain multi-faceted and sometimes 
their outputs depend on how actors implement these institutional 
changes. The dilemma for development actors pursing institutional 
change has been the arduous task of reconciling these institutional 
complexities in the Global South with those of the Global North 
where the very idea of institution-building emanates. Despite 
engaging the attention of international scholars, practitioners and 
local actors, very little is still known about the institution-building 
processes.5  
 
Two key questions warrant our attention in this discussion on 
institutions namely: what exactly are institutions and what do they do 
in our lives? How important are they for social change processes? 
Before interrogating the questions further, we note also that although 
the phrase ‘institution-building’ is widely applied in international 
                                                 
4
 For details on development expenditure see for example Easterly (2006).  
5
 Smoke (2003), for instance, points to the limited knowledge on decentralization 
processes especially in developing countries notwithstanding the attention the concept 
enjoys in international debates.  
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development discourse, it remains somewhat ambiguous because 
the concept of institution has quite different meanings in economics, 
sociology and political science. As one of the common concepts 
found in economics and political science, an institution is seen to be 
brought about mainly by a legal process or through the introduction 
of some ‘incentives’. This differs quite widely from the understanding 
in sociology where institutions (seen as interactive meanings) are 
taken as forms of ‘cognitive structures’ and based on societal 
consensus whose production or establishment do not depend on 
command (e.g. third party enforcement) institutions (see Habermas, 
1989 and also Luhmann, 1986). Notwithstanding the different 
conceptions, the overarching concern of these disciplines, as regards 
the use of institutions in the development and change discourse, 
points closely to North’s (1990) idea of institutions from which the 
institutional economics approach emerged. Following North (1990), 
institutions are defined as rules and regulations that constrain and 
shape human interaction; they may be formal written rules 
(constitution, laws, bylaws, property rights, regulations, etc.) as well 
as unwritten codes or norms (customs, taboos, traditions). Although 
informal institutions are found in both developed and developing 
countries, they are predominant in the latter given the ‘undeveloped’ 
nature of formal institutions in those settings (Jütting, 2003). Rules, 
whether formal or informal are never perfectly enacted and thus 
require institutional change which entails processes and programmes 
that seek to alter the nature of these rules, often with expectation of 
making them better. This change process rather begins from the 
everyday practices associated with the enactment and performance 
of a given institution.  
 
That institutions may be related to change itself poses the question: 
what sort of change are we talking about? By change, we mean 
social change which may broadly refer to socio-economic 
improvements in the living conditions of people in developing 
countries e.g. productivity growth, expansion in education, improved 
health and life expectancy (Weizel, Inglehart & Klingemann, 2003). 
This conception reflects what much development cooperation does: 
the transfer of resources between ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ countries with the 
objective of social and economic improvement in the lives of the poor 
in the partner countries (Rauch, 2009, p. 12). Therefore, change as 
we conceive, is a process that entails the ability of citizens to access 
their basic daily needs; the provision of these needs which is 
contingent on the social, political, and economic institutions offered 
by the state. After the disappointments and failures in the 
international development system (see Neubert, 1996) and the post-
development critique that followed (see Escobar, 1995), a renewed 
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interest in development emerged. In particular, it sought to build state 
and service institutions that will pursue models of change from within 
the local context. The idea was and still is that no change strategy 
works if institutions in themselves are weak and dysfunctional. 
Despite the institution-building efforts, outcomes seem far and wide.  
 
Critical to the discussion on institutions and their change is the core 
premise which underlies institution-building; two notions of 
bureaucracy often inform such change: the process-oriented 
approach from the Weberian tradition and the results-oriented 
approach proffered by the New Public Management (NPM) practices 
(see Hirschmann, 2011). Yet it is also noted that in developing 
country contexts such as obtains in sub-Saharan Africa, the 
Weberian approach is difficult to apply based on it being an ideal-
type and thus different from practical experiences as well as its over-
reliance on formal rules (Bierschenk, 2010, 2014).6  On its part, the 
results-oriented approach from the NPM is limited in application due 
to its preference for private sector rules and profit motivations that 
are less popular in public sector domains.  
 
Another complexity in the discussion on institutions is that some 
scholars take the extra step to establish some causal link between 
institutions, institutional processes and economic growth. This 
linkage has spurred further debates on the relative importance of 
institutions vis-à-vis trade and geography in socio-economic 
development. One group of scholars, on the one hand, predicate the 
dominant role of institutions often with the important phrase 
‘institution trumps everything else’ (see Rodrik, 1999; Rodrik et al., 
2002). Others (e.g. Sachs, 2003) rather emphasize geographic 
factors as ultimate in explaining differences in growth rates. Further 
and more pointedly, some researchers (e.g. Halperin et al., 2005; 
Feng, 2003) link democratic institutions to socio-economic 
development. On their part, Przeworski et al. (2000) argue that 
despite the importance of political institutions, regime type does not 
necessarily influence social change. Thus, that linkage generally 
remains inconclusive and contested (Menocal, 2007; also Jütting et 
al., 2005). Jütting (2003) therefore cautions that such debates have 
the tendency to influence the use of ‘proxy for institutions’ by 
employing variables that highlight only the quality and performance of 
institutions instead of describing how the institutions in themselves 
work. One could, for instance, talk about, the use of perceptions to 
measure institutional performance (e.g. Transparency International’s 
                                                 
6
 Bierschenk (2010) notes that the Weberian model is not only an ideal-type model that 
limits its application in institutional settings, it is also overly adheres to formal rules with 
no room for informal norms. 
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Corruption Perception Indexes). Therefore, given the ambiguity and 
inconclusiveness of the democratic institutions and their link to social 
change in the face of empirical evidence, we approach that unsettled 
debate with more caution.7 What remains striking is that the way in 
which actors interact with institutions and the environment to enact 
their processes and outcomes are often not prioritized. Institution-
building processes are essentially difficult, as Lowndes (2005) points 
out, because actors have some penchant to resist change and cause 
the perpetuation of the system to their own benefits.  
 
A caveat worth pointing out in these debates is that institutions in 
themselves do not necessarily bring about social change; institutions 
might even resist change as structures of stability. They can also 
facilitate the creation of enabling environments for change to occur. 
We note, therefore, that the nature and the operations of state 
bureaucracies, their application of the rules, and their consequences 
are institutional dimensions whose effect could create the platform for 
change to occur. As already alluded to, change could take different 
dimensions: economic, political and social. In this regard, the 
different papers presented in this issue of BIGSASWorks! discuss 
institutional processes in domains such as post-conflict 
reconstruction, local government systems, land tenure management 
schemes, and women empowerment and family processes in sub-
Saharan Africa. Instead of explaining their outcomes simply as 
institutional failures, we attempt to analyze the former as the unique 
outcomes of the embeddedness of the local institutional environment 
and the actors in larger global processes. Our analytical approach 
calls for an appreciation but also a critique of the wider concept of 
institution and institution-building processes not as some ‘magic 
bullets’ in the social change process albeit very necessary for the 
latter as a whole. The papers, therefore, point out the wider notion of 
the concept of institution which goes beyond state and service 
institutions in the fields of politics and economics to socio-cultural 
                                                 
7
 Some authors argue that institutions and their processes provide the missing link in 
the change process across developing countries. Jütting (2003) cautions that change 
outcomes emanate from multiple variables from the institutional environment to the 
actors that build the institutions. While we appreciate the inroads institutions make in 
the pursuit of policy and economic development, we find that empirical data do not 
clearly reveal a causal link and that institutions may only serve as catalyst in the 
change process; thus institutions may act as means to an end but not an end in 
themselves. Again, there are states in which institution-building processes are poorly 
organized but have been successful in improving the lives of their citizens. In contrast, 
there are states which have made greater strides in their institution-building processes 
e.g. democracy, human rights, etc. but living conditions of the people have worsened. 
Thus, different political regimes remain capable of producing similar policies that may 
engender economic prosperity (see Menocal, 2007). 
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spheres such as family, marriage, and indigenous land arrangements 
in sociological and social anthropological domains. All these facets of 
institutions simultaneously produce opportunities and constraints in 
the pursuit of social change. 
 
From political science background, Alžběta Šváblová discusses 
institution-building processes in a post-conflict setting in Liberia. The 
paper highlights the subtle tensions between two key institutions 
crucial for bringing the state back to work namely the Land 
Commision and the Governance Commision. The author argues that 
although land remains vital to the institution rebuilding processes in 
Liberia, governance is equally important. Yet, despite several 
attempts to ensure that the latter institution works, it is rather the 
former which has received tremendous support and participation 
from both local and international actors. Therefore, the disinterest in 
the activities of the Governance Commission has affected the morale 
of its own staff and threatens the prospect of building critical 
governance structures for the country. 
 
Competing interests of actors and institutions in the making of local 
bureaucracies is the subject matter of the paper from Matthew Sabbi. 
This paper, situated within the debate in organizational and 
development sociological approaches, explains how the processes of 
institution-building in the Ghanaian local government system is 
shaped by multiple institutional and personal interests of local and 
national actors. The author discusses the seemgingly conflicting 
notions about local government institution-building; the promise of 
participatory development which is rather held ransom by the 
competing individual and political interests. The paper concludes that 
despite the numerous institutional reforms towards improving the 
provision of local public goods and service, outcomes have been far 
and wide and residents’ hopes of local development through the local 
public administration have dissipated. 
 
Jane Ayeko-Kümmeth’s paper extends, further, the discussion of 
local government institution-building and policy making processes to 
the Ugandan context. The paper, from a political science perspective, 
discusses the hybridity that obtains in the Ugandan local government 
system between state and non-state actors even if the former refuses 
to officially accept the direct involvement of the latter. The author 
argues that despite the apparent oversight by the constitution, non-
state actors remain active players in local government policy 
decisions and in the implementation of projects. Most importantly, it 
is when the non-state actors are involved in the policy decision 
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making processes that the provision of public goods and services at 
the local level properly takes place.  
 
From legal anthropological perspective, Lamine Doumbia discusses 
the competing claims to land title and ownership in Bamako, Mali. 
Within the framework of institutional conflict between the municipal 
authority and the local institution of land rights, the author provides a 
thick description of the daily struggles of ‘slum’ inhabitants against 
eviction by the municipal government. It also highlights the 
inhabitants’ strategies and techniques to resist the decisions of the 
municipal authority. The residents use claims of entitlement such as 
first occupants, judicial decisions from the Supreme Court as well as 
their own ‘watch dog’ committees to put off any eviction attempts 
from the Bamako city authorities. The resistance strategies by the 
‘slum’ inhabitants question the limits of state institutions and law in 
‘imposing’ legal definitions on the inhabitants who also define, in their 
own terms, their customs and practices which form the ‘legal’ basis 
for occupying the land. 
 
The products from institution-building processes have outcomes for 
specific individuals and groups and other institutions. Evam Kofi 
Glover discusses a wider concept of institution from marriage 
perspective by setting out the disjoint between the pursuit of higher 
education and the cultural goal dynamics among middle-class 
women. From social anthropological background, the author’s main 
argument is that women who pursue higher education in order to 
enter top managerial and leadership positions quite often confront 
marriage squeeze. This is because they spend many years in pursuit 
of higher academic laurels. However, these highly educated middle-
class women resort to meeting the cultural expectation of marriage 
and childbirth by entering into polygynous marriages. This marriage 
arrangement is spurred, in part, by the legal pluralistic environment in 
the Ghanaian juridical landscape. The author concludes that planned 
interventions (women empowerment) through education do not 
necessarily change the marriage institution as set out in the change 
programmes because the actors shape the changes in their own 
terms. 
 
These papers, despite coming from different disciplinary 
perspectives, reflect the multi-disciplinary framework of BIGSAS, 
converging particularly within the subfield of politics and practices in 
negotiating change. Indeed, the aims of the different articles intersect 
on broad topics such as institution-building and governance 
(Šváblová, Sabbi, and Ayeko-Kümmeth), and constraints and 
outcomes of planned change (Doumbia and Glover). Thus, although 
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different in perspectives, the papers present how actor processes 
and interests occur in and shape the everyday functioning of 
institutions as well as their change over time. 
 
To conclude, the papers in this issue of BIGSASworks! are nowhere 
exhaustive as regards the discussion on institutions and their 
everyday manifestation in sub-Saharan Africa. Nonetheless, the 
insights offered by the papers contribute immensely to unraveling the 
multiple, complex and iterative institutional domains within which 
public bureaucracies work and the entanglements of the local within 
larger global affairs. Therefore, as we learn from the papers, 
institution-building is no guarantee of social change despite the 
intentions and expectations of planned interventions; rather the 
occurrence of social change depends on how actors therein choose 
to implement institutional provisions in their unique contexts as well 
as recipients’ ability to shape the changes in their own right.  
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Institutional Arrangements in Post-Conflict Contexts: 
Land Commission and Governance Commission in 
Post-War Liberia 
 
Alžběta Šváblová 
 
Abstract 
This paper analyzes the place of the Land Commission and the Governance 
Commission in the post-conflict institutional and political landscape in Liberia. 
Problems related to land still have a high conflict potential in the country and are 
interconnected with different fields and aspects of peacebuilding and development. 
Bad governance is frequently mentioned as one of the causes of the civil war, and 
governance reform is a large-scale, ambitious project with a crucial impact on the 
way the country will be administered in the future. Both issues are highly sensitive 
and belong to the very core of state sovereignty. The paper focuses on the 
similarities and differences in the functioning of these two bodies in the context of 
power relations that shape the current political landscape in Liberia, especially with 
regard to the involvement of internal and external actors. 
 
Keywords: institutions, post-conflict context, Liberia, land, governance reform 
 
 
Introduction 
Post-conflict contexts represent an excellent setting to observe the 
creation and functioning of political institutions. Old institutions are 
being reformed, new ones being established. There are many 
different actors involved in the shaping of the institutional landscape 
– internal (national government, civil society) as well as external ones 
(UN, international community, foreign governments, donors, or 
INGOs). Institutions represent arenas where these actors meet and 
interact, and the institutional environment is at the same time 
affected by their interests and the power relations between and 
among them. This contribution analyzes the place of the Land 
Commission (LC) and the Governance Commission (GC) in the post-
conflict institutional and political landscape in Liberia. Land issues 
still have a high conflict potential in the country, and are closely 
interrelated with different aspects of peacebuilding and development. 
A crisis of governance is frequently mentioned as one of the causes 
of the Liberian civil war (Ellis, 2007; Sawyer, 2005) and governance 
reform is a large scale, ambitious project with a crucial impact on the 
way the country will be administered in the future. Both issues touch 
on the very core of state sovereignty, which makes them highly 
sensitive in the context of the peacebuilding exercise; a project to a 
large extent led by international agencies according to the premises 
of the ruling liberal paradigm. This paper focuses on the similarities 
and differences in the functioning of the Land Commission and the 
Governance Commission, especially with regard to the involvement 
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of internal and external actors in the context of power relations that 
shape the current political landscape in Liberia. The analysis is 
written from the perspective of new institutionalism (Powell & 
DiMaggio, 1991). More specifically, it adopts the actor-centered 
approach that pays attention primarily to the actors acting and 
interacting in an institutional framework. The actors are usually 
corporate entities and their decisions are examined to explain policy 
outcomes (Mayntz, 2003). The analysis of actors’ behavior has to 
take into account both structures and institutions in which these 
actors operate. Neither of them is primordial, on the contrary, they 
mutually influence each other (Mayntz & Scharpf, 1995 pp. 38-44). 
After an overview of the theoretical debates about the post-conflict 
reconstruction and its institutional aspects, we will have a look at the 
past and present situation in Liberia. Then, we will discuss the place 
and the relevance of the governance and land issues in Liberian 
context, describe and analyze the institutional arrangements around 
them, and see how different actors negotiate and assert their 
interests in these fields. Finally, we conclude by drawing some 
remarks on similarities and differences between the GC and the LC, 
and on how they negotiate their ways in the context of power 
relations among the actors at the Liberian political landscape. The 
primary data for this paper was collected as a part of my PhD 
research on the actor-interaction and institution-building in post-war 
Liberia during five months of field work in 2012 in Monrovia, Liberia. 
They stem from 25 expert interviews with the representatives of the 
UN, Government of Liberia, local and international NGO staff and 
civil society representatives, as well as from numerous informal 
conversations and observation of the institutional environment of the 
Land Commission.8 
 
 
Post-conflict reconstruction: general debates 
The concept of post-conflict reconstruction emerged in the early 
1990s, referring to the processes of capacity-building, reconciliation 
and societal transformation after a violent conflict. In the Agenda for 
Peace, UN Secretary General Boutrus-Ghali defined the term as an 
“action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen 
and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” (Agenda 
for Peace, 1992). The concept of post-conflict reconstruction is 
usually employed interchangeably with the term peacebuilding, in 
both cases referring to “building confidence among previously 
                                                 
8
 Thanks to the kind support of the staff of the LC, I was able to attend several 
meetings of the Policy Taskforce and Land Dispute Resolution Taskforce from April to 
June 2012. The GC holds no comparable meetings that one can attend, so the 
information about the GC comes only from the interviews.  
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warring parties, developing the social, political, and economic 
infrastructure to prevent future violence, and laying the foundation for 
a durable peace” (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006 p. 11). As Jeong argues, 
the process of post-conflict reconstruction should “enhance public 
security, generate economic recovery, facilitate social healing, and 
promote democratic institutions” (Jeong, 2005 pp. 12-13). The 
concept has been recently criticised for its indiscriminate promotion 
of the liberal-democratic perspective, market-based economy and 
good governance as panaceas in post-conflict societies (see e.g. 
Paris, 2010; Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2009) and even accused of 
neo-imperialism from the side of international agencies and rich 
countries of the Global North (Newman, Paris & Richmond 2009). 
The critiques, however, have not provided any viable alternative to 
the current model. 
 
Apart from the changes at the macro-level (e.g. in economy or 
governance), the peacebuilding exercise also aims to achieve a 
transformation at the personal, individual level, to change people’s 
behavior in how they deal with conflict. As such, peacebuilding can 
be perceived as an ambitious social engineering exercise (Sharon 
Abramowitz, informal conversation, September, 2012). The literature 
on peacebuilding has so far focused on the single actors (UN and 
peace-keeping forces – Adebajo, 2002; Richmond, 2002, 2004; 
Chesterman, 2004); the role of NGOs (Neubert, 2004; Gaer, 2003). 
Another focus is on particular aspects of the reconstruction process 
and regulatory institutions such as elections (Belloni, 2004; Call and 
Cook 2003); security governance, DDR9 (Smith-Höhn, 2011; Alden, 
2002; Knight & Ozerdem 2004; Bryden & Hanggi, 2005); transitional 
justice (Lambourne, 2009, Campbell-Nelson, 2008; Laplante, 2008; 
Kerr & Mobekk, 2007); etc. in general. There are also case studies 
with the focus on suitability and compatibility of institutions with the 
local context (e.g. Sriram, Martin-Ortega & Herman, 2011 for 
examples from Africa). However, despite the substantial role national 
institutions and the actor interaction within them play in the 
implementation of the peacebuilding reforms, little attention has been 
given to them. This paper aims to fill part of the gap by focusing on 
two fields of reform: land and governance as well as the respective 
institutional arrangements around them in Liberia. 
 
Liberia: Background Information 
The civil war in Liberia started in 1989 when the forces led by 
Charles Taylor marched to Nimba County from neighbouring Côte 
                                                 
9
 Demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration. 
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d’Ivoire. The conflict lasted till 200310 when the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in Accra.11 Since that time, the 
post-conflict reconstruction process under the guidance of the 
international community, most importantly the UN, has been in 
progress. After the common initial focus on the demobilisation, 
disarmament and reintegration of former combattants, the broad 
process of peace consolidation began with a wide range of objectives 
in the fields of security, governance, rule of law and general socio-
economic development. A peace-keeping mission, United Nations 
Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) has been deployed in the country since 
2003, functioning as the main security provider. The mission is 
currently in the middle of a “reconfiguration”, downsizing the military 
element and preparing for their future withdrawal. Liberia faces 
similar challenges to any other post-conflict country. Most of the 
infrastructure was destroyed during the war and over 1.8 million of 
the Liberian population was displaced or fled to other countries.12 
Health care and basic services are slowly recovering13 but the 
situation is impeded by overwhelming unemployment and 
widespread poverty.14 The reconstruction process is further 
complicated by a limited national budget and an extreme scarcity of 
qualified professionals on the Liberian side. Although there are 
financial resources and foreign professional staff pouring from the 
international community, these resources are largely missing on the 
domestic scene. 
 
Governance and Peacebuilding 
A lot has been written about the importance of good governance 
reform in the post-conflict situations, especially with reference to 
Africa (Sriram, Martin-Ortega & Herman, 2011; Jeong, 2005; Doyle & 
Sambanis, 2006). Good governance, a concept increasingly popular 
since the 1990s, generally refers to “the manner in which power is 
exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social 
resources for development” (World Bank, 1992). The World Bank 
                                                 
10
 The conflict is usually divided into the first and the second Liberian civil war. The first 
one ended by a peace accord from Abuja in 1996 and was followed by an election won 
by Charles Taylor. In 1999, the fighting resumed and lasted till 2003. 
11
 For a classic work with an excellent analysis and detailed history of the conflict, see 
for example The Mask of Anarchy by Stephen Ellis (2007), or Morten Bøås (2005). 
12
 The displacement reached its peak in 1994, where there were estimated 1.1 mil of 
IDPs and 780,000 refugees. World Refugee Survey, cited in Sawyer (2005). 
13
 The recent outbreak of Ebola in the region are difficult to estimate, but will certainly 
deal a heavy blow to the country’s recovery. 
14
 According to the estimates of the European Commission, in 2012 76% Liberians 
lived under the poverty line of US$ 1 per day, 52% in extreme poverty under US$ 0.50 
per day (http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/country-
cooperation/liberia/liberia_en.htm) 
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further defines the term as including elements of transparency, 
accountability, government effectiveness, rule of law, and 
independence of the judiciary (Kaufman, Kraay & Zoido-Lobatón, 
1999). Governance reform has become an inseparable part of post-
conflict packages (Jeong, 2005; Doyle & Sambanis, 2006). However, 
Sawyer notes that especially in post-conflict countries with the social 
fabric torn by violence, the initiatives to build state capacities are 
inappropriate for the situations where the state has often been a part 
of the problem (2005). Implemented in a hasty, un-coordinated 
manner, governance reforms can lead to the replication of old orders 
or “pursuing great ideals without framing them in appropriate 
institutional arrangements” (Sawyer, 2005 p. 139). In addition, the 
concept is related to a specific notion of politics and state, derived 
from the Euro-American political tradition, promoted as a model 
suitable for other countries, regardless of their history, political 
culture of socio-economic context. Bad governance is frequently 
mentioned as one of the causes of the Liberian civil war (Ellis, 2007; 
Sawyer, 2005; interviews in Monrovia, April-June 2012). The 
concentration of power in the hands of a small Americo-Liberian 
elite15 in the capital, the neopatrimonial practices of governance, the 
plundering of natural resources, financial mismanagement, 
marginalization and exclusion of large segments of the population – 
all this contributed to the growing frustration that eventually led to the 
violent conflict.  
 
The history of 150 years of highly centralized and autocratic 
presidential rule has left Liberians with a monocentric mindset, with 
the state viewed as a provider and producer of development for its 
anonymous beneficiaries (Sawyer, 2005). The beginning of the 
presidency as a personal cult can be traced back to President 
Tubman’s time in office (1944-1971). Samuel Doe, who overthrew 
President Tolbert in a coup d’état in 1980, introduced the military as 
a political force in Liberia, and installed a rule of brutal dictatorship. 
His successor Charles Taylor continued in the same direction. 
Compared to her predecessors, the current President, Ellen 
Johnson-Sirleaf, represents a return to democratic rule, although the 
regime is still far from being a show-case of liberal democracy. 
Endemic corruption, lack of transparency in management of public 
funds, and widespread nepotism are the most cited shortcomings of 
the current government (see e.g. Freedom House Report 2014 that 
rates the country as “partly free”). 
 
                                                 
15
 The Americo-Liberians are the offsprings of the freed slaves from the USA, who 
came to Liberia at the beginning of 19th century. 
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The Governance Commission 
Governance reform was first proposed in the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) in 2003. Article XVI of the CPA established the 
Governance Reform Commission (GRC), a predecessor of today’s 
Governance Commission. GRC’s tasks were envisaged as the 
promotion of the principles of good governance, ensuring 
transparency and accountability, plans for the reform of public sector 
management and decentralization. The general objectives in the field 
of governance and rule of law were later listed in the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy (2008), a framework document setting the outline 
for the post-conflict reconstruction.16 The goals in the governance 
sphere include enhancing participation, building effective and 
efficient institutions, and other goals more closely related to the rule 
of law (Poverty Reduction Strategy, 2008). 
 
The support of good governance is in focus of many programs and 
projects led by the international partners. However, the Liberian 
government, or, more specifically, the GC has the main word in the 
design of the whole reform and choice of priorities. The GC functions 
as a think tank for the executive, providing recommendations and 
suggestions for new policies. The enforcement of the changes, 
however, depends on the executive and legislative branch of the 
government. In 2007, an Act of the Liberian National Legislature 
established the Governance Commission to continue the work of the 
Governance Reform Commission in maintaining “a holistic system of 
good governance that is inclusive, participatory and just, and which 
promotes national oneness, sound public sector management, 
efficient and fair allocation and use of resources, and a culture of 
honesty and integrity” (Governance Commission, 2013). There are 
28 professionals working for the Commission, with five 
Commissioners17 working in their respective mandate areas: political 
and legal reform, national integrity, civic engagement, public sector 
reform, and monitoring, evaluation and research. Most of the agenda 
of the Commission requires a long-term engagement and is therefore 
at the beginning. The most advanced project of the Commission is 
currently decentralization. The decentralization policy has been 
                                                 
16
 The Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) served as a roadmap for the development of 
the country. It was put together by the Government of Liberia in collaboration with 
international agencies and was subjected to a consultative process throughout the 
country before its final approval. In 2012, the “Vision 2030” succeeded and replaced 
the PRS as a long-term strategy with an objective to achieve a status of a middle-
income country in 2030. 
17
 The Commissioners are appointed for four years by the President with the advice 
and consent of the Senate, with a possibility of one reappointment. Moral integrity, 
professional competence of the candidates, geographical and gender representation 
should be taken into account in the nomination process (Republic of Liberia, 2007).  
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completed since 2010, waiting to be passed into law. However, the 
path from policy to law, and finally to its implementation is not always 
a short one – the “Local Government Bill“ was passed to the 
President in August, 2013 and is still waiting to be discussed in the 
Parliament (Zanker, 2014). The chairman of the Commission, Amos 
Sawyer, has been involved in the political and reform processes in 
Liberia since the 1970s and is also engaged in academic work. He 
represents a figure credible for the external actors, as well as for 
Liberians. Following a clear vision in the work of the Commission, he 
emphasizes the inclusiveness of the process and consultation of 
stakeholders. In his academic work, apart from tracing the evolution 
of the Liberian autocracy (1992), he presented the idea of a suitable 
political order for the country, based on the theory of shared 
sovereignty and polycentric governance (2005). 
 
The main challenge the Commission encounters seems to be the 
scope of its project in combination with the lack of financial and 
human resources. The body also has very little political power and 
influence. Similar to the Land Commission, its task is to provide 
recommendations and policies, not to make decisions or to 
implement them. Although the GC reports on its work directly to the 
President, the level of explicitly articulated political support is far 
lower than in the case of land issues. The position of the Commission 
is further complicated by its unpopularity with the legislature. The GC 
works on sensitive issues, in many cases touching and pointing to 
existing practices in politics, which sometimes means “stepping on 
people’s feet” (Interview with a GC employee, Monrovia, November, 
2012). A typical example showing the position of the GC in the 
political system is the approval of the Code of Conduct – a document 
submitted to the legislation in 2007 that was passed into law only in 
May, 2014.18 There is also a sense of animosity from the side of the 
ministries, who feel threatened by the suggested reforms, since the 
reforms are often perceived as attempts to interfere in their exclusive 
sphere of influence (Sawyer, 2009). 
 
Civil society represents an important ally for the GC. The 
Commission is trying to establish a partnership with civil society 
organizations (CSOs), in order to become stronger in the dialogue 
with the Government. At the same time, the GC tries to strengthen 
the relationship between the Government and civil society, so that 
CSOs could be consulted when policies are developed and decisions 
made in their respective fields of expertise. However, civil society in 
                                                 
18
 The Code of Conduct is a guide for public servants created in order to serve as an 
“integrity check” and to prevent unwarranted behaviour. Among other things, it prohibits 
appointed officials’ engagement in political activities. 
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Liberia is still weak, and due to the lack of resources, in many cases 
pursues a donor-driven agenda. Concerning the role of external 
support in the field of governance, international partners sponsor 
specific projects, whereas the Government funds the basic 
infrastructure and functioning of the Commission. The foreign 
presence within the GC is marginal. There are international 
consultants occasionally sent by the World Bank or the UN but apart 
from those, the institution is entirely in Liberian hands. As one of the 
Commissioners said: “It is a Liberian institution. A Liberian problem 
needs a Liberian solution” (Interview with Elizabeth Mulbah, 
Monrovia, November, 2012). There are no international observers or 
representatives of development agencies, as is the case in the LC.  
 
Land and Peacebuilding 
The complexity of land issues in Liberia stems not only from the 
aftermath of the civil war; it has its roots in the pre-war system of land 
governance as well. There are three types of land ownership in 
Liberia: private, public, and the customary one. However, there had 
been no clear definitions of these categories19 until 2013, when the 
Land Policy filled this gap. Traditionally, the land belonged to the 
people who settled it, who “cleared the bush” (Corriveau-Bourque, 
2010). Members of the community could cultivate and use the land 
for farming or building, but the land would not become their private 
property in the “modern” sense, defined by the statutory system. It 
would still belong to the community and, in the absence of the owner, 
could be claimed by other members of the community.20 This 
principle has been problematic especially in the aftermath of the 
conflict, where it clashed with the policy of the “right to return” – an 
approach, asserted by humanitarian agencies, based on the 
assumption that displaced people or refugees were still entitled to the 
land they had left during the war (The Pinheiro Principles, 2005). 
Even today, over eleven years after the war, land is still a sensitive 
issue with a high conflict potential in Liberia. As one of my informants 
put it: “If we are to go back to war, and I pray not to, it would be 
because of land. The conflict over land is huge and it can spark 
violence in any moment” (Interview with an NGO employee, 
Monrovia, June 2012; see also Unruh, 2009; ICG, 2009; etc.). The 
                                                 
19
 Private land is all deeded land. Public land should be all the rest but this category is 
not legally defined anywhere. Customary land rights are a special arrangement from 
the era of two legal systems in the country, one for the “civilized“ people and another 
one governing the “indigenous“ in the Hinterland. At that time, the Government used 
the system of indirect rule, with the traditional (customary) authorities in the hinterland 
administering the land on behalf of the state. The customary land rights are mentioned 
in the Constitution but there is no definition either. 
20 This practice was developed in a context where access to land was relatively easy. It 
was labour, rather than land, that represented a scarce resource. 
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Poverty Reduction Strategy puts land among the six key areas that 
“require focused attention (...) to mitigate their potential to mobilize 
groups for violent action” (2008 p. 21). It states explicitly, that issues 
related to land and property ownership pose a security threat, and 
that the security of land tenure is one of the cornerstones of the 
economic revitalization of the country. In Liberia, land disputes are 
primarily not related to the shortage of land. Many of the issues are 
consequences of mass displacement during the civil war. However, 
there are also other types of grievances related to the boundaries 
between towns and communities or between the communities and 
companies that were granted large segments of land through 
concessions.21 Geographically, the regions most prone to land 
conflict are the hinterland counties – Lofa, Nimba and Grand Gedeh. 
Ethnicity, as another factor that often comes into play in situations of 
conflict, does not generally play a significant role in Liberia, with the 
exception of Lofa County and tensions between the Loma and 
Mandingo people (Corriveau-Bourque, 2010).22 
 
In the literature as well as among practitioners, there is a broad 
agreement that managing land issues fosters the creation of a 
durable peace. As such, it is widely recognized as a crucial element 
in the peacebuilding process (Unruh & Williams, 2013). Land has 
been at the origins of many conflicts recently. Even in the countries 
where it is not the case, it is often an issue that becomes pressing 
when the conflict is over. Refugees and internally displaced persons 
(IDPs), who fled to avoid the violence are coming back and often find 
their property occupied. Natural resources are being exploited to 
finance the war. The conflict transforms social relations on which the 
system of land use and tenure has been based. In Liberia, all these 
aforementioned issues are relevant. About half of the population was 
displaced or fled to other countries. Conflict over diamonds fuelled 
the fighting in neighbouring Sierra Leone. The war undermined the 
authority of the traditional leaders (chiefs and elders), a major force 
in land management before the conflict. The situation was further 
complicated by perceived injustices in the land administration and 
distribution from the time before the conflict, discriminating certain 
                                                 
21
 Unruh and Williams offer useful categorizations of land conflicts according to 
different variables. The one particularly relevant and applicable to Liberia is based on 
the parties of the conflict: individuals (e.g. the returned IDPs and squatters), individuals 
and the state, and individuals versus companies (including the large-scale land 
acquisitions). For other possible categories, see Unruh and Williams (2013 p. 546). 
22
 The cleavage matches a difference between the full members of the community and 
“strangers“, who cannot access land under the same conditions (Corriveau-Bourque, 
2010). Apart from the Mandingo people, seen as “strangers“, another group excluded 
from access to land are the Lebanese, who cannot own land according to the 
Constitution. 
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social and ethnic groups, which led to a deep distrust from citizens, 
leaving the state with little legitimacy in the post-war era (Corriveau-
Bourque, 2010).  
 
There are four broad categories of problems that commonly arise in 
post-conflict situations with regard to land: legal ambiguity (non-
clarity about who governs the land, disputes about access, 
ownership), legal pluralism (different types of law that can be applied 
– e.g. customary and statutory), land disputes and land recovery.23 In 
order to make the right institutional choices in the peacebuilding 
phase, it is crucial to understand the political dimension of land 
issues and disputes. It is argued that the international community 
should take into consideration the local political landscape and 
contextualize the arrangements in it, especially to assure their 
acceptance.  The actors involved in reforms of the land sector should 
understand the situation in order to see if the problems are related 
only to land itself or are expressions of broader issues such as land 
scarcity or an inadequate land management system (Van der 
Auweraert, 2013). 
 
The Land Commission 
In the case of Liberia, the Land Commission is the body at the center 
of the institutional arrangement. Its origins can be traced back to 
2006, when the need to create an institution dealing with all sorts of 
land issues became clear during the discussions over the National 
Forestry Reform Law (Interview with an LC employee, Monrovia, 
June, 2012). Shortly after that, the Governance Commission gave 
birth to the Land Commission, established in 200924 as a free-
standing autonomous body with a mandate of five years.25 The 
Commission consists of seven Commissioners appointed by the 
President with the consent of the Senate. There are about 30 people 
working for the LC, Liberian nationals, as well as short- and long-
term international consultants (Interview with a GC employee, 
Monrovia, June, 2012). There are several projects going on in 
different program areas – policy and law reform, conflict resolution, 
outreach, land use management and administration, etc. Apart from 
                                                 
23
 Post-conflict restitutions of rights to housing, land and property has become a 
common part of the peace agreements already. A concrete manifestation of these 
rights are the UN Pinheiro Principles – United Nations Principles on Housing and 
Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons. Available on-line at: 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/pinheiro_principles.pdf (accessed 15th 
July 2014).  
24
 It was launched in the spring of 2010 (Land Commission, 2011). 
25
 This particular institutional form was recommended by an international consultant, 
based on experience with existing models in other countries (Interview with an expert 
on land issues, Monrovia, June, 2012). 
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the policy reform, the biggest ongoing projects are the establishment 
of the Land Coordination Centers (LCC) and collection of Tribal 
Certificates26 throughout the country (Land Commission 2012).  
 
From the perspective of the post-conflict peacebuilding, there are two 
main lines of relevant activities in the work of the Commission: the 
conflict-related one, and the policy one. Concerning the latter, the 
land policy was finished in 2013. Apart from providing definitions of 
the categories of land and land rights, it represents a major step in 
recognizing and lifting up the customary ownership of land to the 
same level as the private one (Land Commission, 2012). At the time 
of my fieldwork, the Policy Taskforce was still operational, working 
mainly on the definitions of the three types of ownership. The conflict-
related line of activities of the LC revolves around the Land Dispute 
Resolution Taskforce – a more general forum, a place of coordination 
and information-sharing about the projects and activities of the 
Commission in the field of dispute resolution. The Taskforce meets 
regularly and brings together different governmental, civil society, 
and international actors. It consists of around 20 members, including 
representatives from UN-HABITAT, Ministry of Lands, Mines and 
Energy, the Center for National Records and Deeds Agency 
(CNDRA), the Carter Center, the Norwegian Refugee Council and 
civil society organizations, such as Slum Dwellers Association (Land 
Commission, 2012). The Taskforces, as fora that bring together 
actors from the Government, civil society, and international agencies, 
are a particular arrangement, not commonly seen in other fields of 
peacebuilding in the country.27 The Land Commission is unique 
among the other governmental agencies in Liberia also in other 
respects. The first difference is in the level of financial support. With 
the budget that amounts to one and a half million US dollars,28 the 
LC is comparatively well equipped and financed. 
  
                                                 
26
 Tribal certificates are an expression of economic interest, a kind of permission from 
the authorities for a stranger to use a piece of land. They represent the first step in 
acquiring an officially registered piece of land, however, they do not have any legal 
bearings (Corriveau-Bourque, 2010). Their collection should be the first step in the 
process of establishing the national cadastre. The system of land registration and most 
of the records were destroyed during the war. 
27
 There is a similar arrangement at the Ministry of Gender and Development. 
28
 The Government of Liberia is the main contributor with circa 1 mil USD. Other 
partners, such as the World Bank, UN Peacebuilding Fund, Swedish Development 
Agency, or Norwegian Refugee Council, add about US$ 300-500 000 to the 
Commission’s budget (Informal conversation with a GC employee, November, 2014). 
The Government supports the core staff and operations, other partners’ particular 
projects. The website of the GC has been suspended since summer 2014 and 
therefore it was not possible to obtain more accurate figures.  
BIGSAS Working Papers 5/2015: Actors, Institutions and Change: Perspectives on Africa  21 
 
 
Another peculiarity, tangible for a researcher, is the access to the 
staff and information about the Commission’s work which is rather 
official and regulated, only illustrating the delicacy of the issue they 
are dealing with.29 Similar to the Governance Commission, the LC 
also demonstrates the importance of strong leadership for the work 
of an institution in Liberia. The Chairman, Dr. Cecil Brandy, is an 
astute politician who, apart from the good relations with the 
President,30 is also said to have the right personal and professional 
qualities for leading the Commission and a clear vision about what it 
should accomplish. His position is facilitated but also complicated by 
the level of donor interest in land issues. Such interest brings the 
necessary resources that are the sine qua non of proper functioning 
of the Commission. However, it is sometimes hard to limit donors’ 
influence in situations where they tend to drive the process according 
to their expectations or when it comes to a conflict between them. On 
the other hand, the high level of donor interest also gives the luxury 
of keeping the line and purpose of the Commission close to the 
Chairman’s vision, as he can afford to say no to the projects or 
approaches that contradict it. There is an unsurprising, strong and 
explicitly articulated interest to have the decision-making firmly in 
Liberian hands. Land policy, as the PRS states, is “one of the most 
sensitive and important policies” for economic growth but also for 
security consolidation (2008 p. 67). Although land is such a sensitive 
issue and there is an extreme emphasis on national ownership of the 
process, there is also an unprecedented level of foreign presence in 
the LC. Apart from the national staff, there are short- and long-term 
international consultants coming for specific projects. The UN-
HABITAT is very much involved, participating in the majority of the 
meetings and taskforces. They also have their seat located directly in 
the same compound as the Commission, unlike all the other civilian 
UN agencies, residing in Mamba Point area in the town.  
 
Apart from the international institutions, there is one bilateral country 
partner with a strong engagement – the US. They have established 
their presence in the Commission through the USAID Institutional 
                                                 
29
 My first informal contact was to an international consultant, who insisted on the 
confidentiality of our meeting, assessing the situation where “two expats discuss purely 
Liberian issues“ as potentially problematic (Interview Monrovia, May, 2012). When I 
approached the Liberian Program Officer, I was asked to present my letter of reference 
and detailed information about my project. After the documents were examined and the 
Officer got the consent of her senior executive, I was asked to send my questions per 
email and finally granted an appointment for an interview. Other ministries are quite 
informal and in order to get an interview, it is often enough to come and ask for an 
appointment. 
30
 The political system in Liberia is based on the US presidential model. The President 
appoints and recalls all the ministers and important functionaries. 
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Policy Support Program, mirroring the structure of the Commission, 
and providing basic support in the functioning of the body. Such level 
of foreign presence is not to be seen in any other ministry or 
governmental agency. One of my informants compared it to a 
“shadow Land Commission” (Interview with an expert on land issues, 
Monrovia, April, 2012). This arrangement certainly gives a lot of 
space for potential influence over the work of the Commission. Other 
actors involved in the work of the Commission by attending meetings 
of the Taskforces are the representatives of line ministries, 
governmental agencies and civil society organizations. Although the 
Government is the main contributor to the budget of the LC and 
publicly acknowledges the importance of its work, representatives of 
the line ministries and agencies rarely appear at coordination 
meetings. This might be caused not only by lack of interest but also 
by lack of time combined with the workload, or even by a general 
fatigue of never-ending meetings without clear conclusions. A related 
problem lies in the capacities of the personnel, concerning especially 
middle-level bureaucrats, who are largely missing. There are 
qualified, competent people at the top level, but “the layer is as thin 
as a paper, you pierce it and there is nothing underneath” (Interview 
with an international consultant, Monrovia, November, 2012). 
 
Liberian civil society organizations and NGOs are often referred to as 
“implementing partners”, which is an apt description of their role. 
Their knowledge of local realities and grassroots presence is used 
and appreciated by the agencies and organizations based in 
Monrovia, having little outreach beyond the capital. The usual 
advocacy role of civil society, as an actor standing between the state 
and private sphere (Cohen & Arato 1992; Habermas, 1998), is not 
the case in Liberia. In the Land Commission, as well as in other fora, 
their level of participation is high; they attend meetings regularly and 
participate actively. The meetings are not only a means of staying 
informed about what is going on but also an opportunity to network 
and a chance to be included in the projects of “bigger players”. Two 
international actors, the Carter Center and the Norwegian Refugee 
Council, have observer status in the taskforces of the Commission. 
Although non-Liberian, they are included because of the well-
appreciated work they do in the field of dispute resolution.31 They are 
invited to the meetings and consulted, they give advice on request, 
but do not lead the process. Despite political support for the land 
reform, adequate financial resources and the availability of qualified 
personnel, the LC still has little political power. Similar to the GC, it is 
                                                 
31
 The Carter Center, in cooperation with the American Bar Association, leads 
alternative dispute resolutions projects; the NRC is active at the grassroots level in the 
mediation of land disputes.  
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a body designed to give policy recommendations but has to rely on 
other branches of power to enforce the results of its work. It is also 
unlikely that its tasks will be accomplished within its mandate time of 
five years.32 
 
Roles, Interests and Perspectives: Diverse and Complementary 
Representatives of all the three groups stated unanimously that the 
principal role of the Government of Liberia in peacebuilding is to set 
priorities and to lead the process (Interviews and informal 
conversations, Monrovia, 2012). According to the opinion of external 
actors, the Government is very clear and assertive in this regard. 
Concerning its relations with the institutions in our focus, we have 
already mentioned the explicit support of the LC that signals 
Government’s strong commitment also to international partners 
heavily involved and interested in the work of the Commission. The 
GC, on the other hand, as a body that might act against the interests 
of the Government (e.g. to limit its powers as a part of the envisaged 
reforms), and is not in the spotlights of international agencies, 
receives far lower level of support. Although the lesser engagement 
could be interpreted as a strategy to weaken the institution, this is 
rather the case with other bodies (e.g. the Anti-Corruption 
Commission), not with the GC. The relation to the Governance 
Commission only illustrates the situation where the Government 
decides of a plethora of issues that are much more pressing and 
higher on the list of priorities than the GC’s agenda. 
 
Civil society in Liberia is far from being an opponent of the 
Government engaged in advocacy work.33 It often implements 
programs and policies of the Government, which means a complete 
twist of its function. CSOs try to establish more presence and 
connection to the decision-making level and both Commissions 
support them in this regard mainly by coordinating and sharing 
information, but also by including CSOs as an important stakeholder 
in their own agenda. Civil society is also engaged in outreach 
activities and sensitisation on government policies, often funded by 
international donors. The principal role of international partners is to 
bring expertise, financial and human resources to the country. These 
commodities are often perceived as inducements for the Liberian 
political representatives to accept the neo-liberal agenda that comes 
                                                 
32
 For the time after the expiration of its mandate, there are plans to transform the LC 
into the Land Administration Authority (Informal conversation with a GC employee, 
September, 2014). 
33
 One of the reasons for not opposing the policies is that they are often engaged in 
drafting of the policies and advocating for their enactment (Informal conversation with a 
GC employee, September, 2014). 
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with them (Informal conversation with a GC employee, September, 
2014). International actors work mainly on the middle level, 
translating the general goals set by the Government into smaller 
tasks and projects, ready for implementation. They insist that their 
task is limited to a mere support and that they respect national 
ownership of the peacebuilding process. On the other hand, they 
acknowledge that the capacities on the Liberian side are often 
completely missing, which offers a large space for leading the 
process in practice.  
 
The UN agencies, as the most visible representatives of this group 
with a country-wide presence, strive to maintain impartiality and the 
ethos of serving solely for the purpose of reconstruction of the 
country. However, there is a certain rivalry among them in the 
background, often described as an aspiration to “put up a flag” 
(Interview with a UN employee, Monrovia, June, 2012), where each 
agency seeks recognition for the work it has done. Rather than to the 
other actors engaged in the peacebuilding process, the potential 
competition is therefore directed inwards, to the other members of 
the UN family. These relations, touching upon competition on 
different levels and the theory of multi-level governance, reach far 
beyond the scope of this paper but represent a highly interesting field 
for further research. As mentioned above, there is just a minor 
international presence in the GC, that might be explained by the 
nature of the Commission’s agenda: a complex, long-term 
endeavour, unlikely to yield measurable results in a near future. The 
Land Commission, on the contrary, represents an attractive field of 
involvement, dealing with issues with a high conflict potential, that 
can be mitigated by accomplishing a technical task of creating a legal 
framework and a system of land registration and management.  
The direct, strong involvement of the US, the most important bilateral 
partner on land issues, through the Institutional Policy Support 
Program hints at the potential vested interests in this field. The well-
known interconnectedness of land with business and investment 
through agricultural, logging and mining concessions in Liberia only 
amplifies this aspect.34 
 
There are no apparent signs of competition or conflict among the 
actors in our focus. The division of their roles seems to be accepted 
by all parties, their interests do not intersect, there are no places of 
                                                 
34
 The involvement of private sector in fragile states has often been perceived 
negatively with infamous examples of trade with conflict diamonds, illicit logging, or 
large scale land acquisitions. The situation starts to change slowly, as the private 
companies also begin to see themselves as possible agents of change in the field of 
Peacebuilding. For more details on the topic see e.g. Sandole and Staroste (2014). 
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serious friction. The community of people involved in the 
reconstruction process or, more generally in development business 
in Liberia, is quite small, which contributes to a better coordination 
and reduction of overlaps in the implementation of the projects. A 
competition among the institutions on the domestic level is also 
insignificant. There are some feelings of resistance or objections 
from the executive, Ministries and governmental agencies towards 
the Governance Commission, as a reaction to Commission’s efforts 
to change some of the established patterns and practices in 
politics.35 However, it is not grave enough to be called a conflict. As 
regards the Land Commission, there are no hints of competition or 
conflicting relations to other institutions either. The Ministries tend to 
have a reserved stance, with sporadic participation at meetings of the 
taskforces but this can be explained by other factors, such as a 
heavy workload or meeting fatigue rather than by competition. 
Generally, conflicts often occur in settings, where financial resources 
are limited and perceived as a zero-sum game. Although this is the 
case in Liberia, the nature of agenda of both Commissions and its 
scope, far beyond the capacities of any other institution, renders 
potential feelings of rivalry or “stepping on people’s feet” largely 
irrelevant. Although the absence of open conflict definitely 
contributes to a smooth course of the reconstruction process, it 
cannot be overestimated and seen as the principal determinant of a 
successful peacebuilding exercise. There are other factors with much 
more significance, such as domestic, regional or international 
security situation, political stability, availability of financial resources, 
or external factors completely beyond human control, e.g. the recent 
outbreak of Ebola in Liberia and its closest proximity. 
 
Conclusion 
The aftermath of a conflict, as a period of profound changes in all 
spheres of politics and society, represents an opportunity to 
implement a wide range of reforms that would otherwise be 
unimaginable. The political and institutional landscape is being 
reshaped and the institutions represent arenas where various 
domestic and international actors pursue their interests and interact 
with each other. This space for change, in the case of our analysis, 
for a reform of the system of governance and land tenure, however 
involves latent dangers as well. One of them is the potential 
replication of patterns or orders at the origins of the conflict. Another 
one can be particular interests of certain actors shaping the reform 
process according to their objectives and needs. Liberia does not 
                                                 
35
 The implementation of the governance reforms depends to a large extent on the 
cooperation and support of the affected line ministries and agencies. This is often 
missing and therefore makes the implementation of the reforms problematic. 
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step out of line with regard to implementation of peacebuilding 
programs and general arguments presented by the critiques of liberal 
peacebuilding apply to the Liberian case in the same way as to other 
post-conflict countries. The country follows the path of liberal reforms 
without alternatives or obvious resistance. The government in 
collaboration with international agencies sets the broad framework 
for the reconstruction process at macro-level, whereas national 
institutions, in our case the GC and the LC, try to change the 
structural conditions at meso-level in order to facilitate the change at 
the grassroots. However, this change is not explicitly defined as a 
primary goal. 
 
By examining the Governance and Land Commission, this paper 
brought some insights into the practice of peacebuilding and its 
institutional aspects. The strong emphasis on national ownership of 
the process clashes with the lack of human and financial resources. 
The need for financial support opens the door for donors’ influence 
on the reform agenda. Similarly, international or foreign personnel 
that fill the capacity gap can significantly affect the everyday work of 
institutions and the policy-making process. In the absence of stable 
institutional and bureaucratic structures, the importance of 
personalities and leadership increases. Both Commissions have 
strong leaders with a clear vision and sufficient personal and political 
influence for its implementation. However, both LC and GC are 
bodies without executive power so the final outcomes of their work 
depend entirely on the decisions of the legislative and executive 
branches. In this respect, the GC has a more complicated position, 
due to the nature of its task, inherently raising concerns and even 
animosity from other players on the domestic political scene. 
Governance reform is proclaimed as a necessary part of post-conflict 
peacebuilding and is one of the prerequisites for the financial support 
from international institutions. The latter tend to present governance 
reform as a purely technical task although its nature is, with no doubt, 
inherently political. Despite the fact that governance reform tries to 
address the issues that led to the war in Liberia, the GC does not 
receive adequate financial resources and political support, neither 
from the national, nor the international level. This lack of interest in 
the work of the Commission indicates that governance reform is in 
fact not in the primary sphere of interest of the international agencies 
nor the government. This can be explained by the scope and 
complexity of the envisaged reform that is of a long-term character, 
unlikely to yield fast, measurable results. The reform goes beyond a 
technical task, such as a creation of a policy or a cadastre, for it 
includes a transformation of a mindset as a prerequisite for profound 
change of the political system. 
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Another critique related to governance, the fact that the reform is 
linked to a specific understanding of politics, rooted in the Euro-
American tradition of liberal democracy, does not seem applicable in 
Liberia. Firstly, there are no voices calling for an alternative 
arrangement. Secondly, Liberia from the very beginning of its 
existence declares its adherence to the political system inspired by, 
and modelled along the US model. Land issues, contrary to 
governance, represent an attractive field that generates a lot of donor 
interest and explicit political support from the executive and the 
international level. This can be related to the fact that arrangements 
concerning land have direct consequences for business such as 
logging, mining, or agricultural concessions. Land also has a more 
obvious and imminent conflict potential that is easier to mitigate, and 
reforms can bring results in a comparably shorter time than in the 
case of governance. The findings imply that external actors can play 
much more significant role than the one visible at first site. Although 
respecting the opinion of the domestic political elites, they still set the 
general framework, which determines the process of post-conflict 
reconstruction significantly. Secondly, their engagement is often 
driven by factors other than addressing “root causes of conflict”, as 
the peacebuilding doctrine proclaims. 
 
Concerning the involvement of the other actors in focus, the 
Government is, in both reform areas, rather reserved unlike civil 
society that uses participation in different fora as an opportunity to 
establish its presence and connection to the policy-making level. The 
US, as the most significant bilateral partner with a special relation to 
Liberia, is prominently engaged in the everyday functioning of the 
Land Commission. The Liberian case shows quite clearly that the 
significance of a particular sector for the building of a stable peace in 
the country does not coincide with the level of the political 
involvement. The nature of the peacebuilding exercise and, more 
generally, of international as well as domestic politics, determines the 
engagement in such a way that aspects such as imminent conflict 
potential, business interests or the possibility of yielding tangible 
results in a relatively short time, prevail over pursuing long-term 
changes and fundamental transformation in an abstract field of 
governance. A potential clash with the interests of the domestic ruling 
elite only adds to the other factors named above.  
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What Changes when Formal Organizations reform their 
Structures? Local Governments and their 
Substructures in Ghana 
 
Matthew Sabbi 
 
 
Abstract 
An often held assumption is that when complex organizations embark on structural 
reforms, they purposely make constructive changes aimed at efficiency and 
effectiveness in the performance of tasks at their structures and substructures. 
However, for public bureaucracies especially in developing countries, this 
assumption does not always hold true. In most instances, while the reform efforts 
might seem substantial in outlook, they subtly move towards furnishing stability and 
legitimacy which are crucial for their very survival as organizations. Using data from 
two local administrative structures in Ghana, the paper shows how such attempts 
towards stability and legitimacy are influenced in part by a complex interplay of 
competing interests of multiple political and institutional actors but also by the 
financial inducement from international development organizations working in the 
Global South in support of the core tasks of the local governments. Therefore, the 
everyday practices of the substructures tend to focus on qualification for donor 
funds for development projects. However, since the promise of development 
through these substructures is untenable, local actors become frustrated. This 
frustration, while dissipating further the trust in public institutions also deepens the 
negative attitudes towards the local government and its grandiose concept of 
bottom-up participatory development. 
 
Keywords: local government, reform, institutions, legitimacy, interests  
 
 
Introduction 
Institution-building processes in developing countries have garnered 
much prominence in recent decades as a model for good 
governance structures and greater participation of the citizenry 
(Wunsch, 1991; Blunt & Collins, 1994). In Ghana as elsewhere in 
Africa, institutional reforms have become important especially in the 
public services aimed at improving their governance and service 
provision. In this regard, reforms in the local government structure 
have significantly sought greater involvement of local actors in the 
formulation and implementation of development policies peculiar to 
their localities. Reforms in the local government structure are thus 
numerous; what often starts as a review could end up with major 
ramifications (Tonah, 2009) yet their promise of change and 
participatory development remains dismal (Wunsch, 1991) or at best 
modest (Crook, 2003). There is no dearth of research on the 
processes of change in the local government structure (e.g. Ayee, 
1996, 2001; Thomi, 1999, 2000a/b; Awortwi, 2011; Crook, 1999) but 
these studies present a restricted perspective by emphasizing 
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efficiency and effectiveness dimensions of the reform programmes. 
They therefore miss a very important aspect of organizational change 
processes; they neglect how local and institutional actors negotiate 
their interests and how that shapes institution-building processes and 
outcomes.  
 
In Ghana, the local government structure comprises admixtures of 
bureaucrats, elected representatives and appointed members from 
the central government. These actors conduct the everyday tasks of 
the local administration and its reforms but sometimes the reforming 
actors enact institutional processes and exploit ambiguities to their 
advantage. The organization thus remains quite the same (Lowndes, 
2005) despite attempts towards change. While most of these 
manipulations may aim at institutional stability and legitimacy on 
which they survive (Meyer & Rowan, 1991; Meyer, 2010), they are at 
the same time shaped by interests of organizational participants 
(Scharpf, 1997, 2008). In this paper the attempt is made to analyze 
how these latent motivations and the general political setting shape 
the content of reforms in local public administration in Ghana. For the 
remainder of the paper, reforms of the local governments are 
discussed and situated within institutional perspective. A brief 
description of methods and data follows after which change 
processes in the local government system, its promise of 
participatory development and their illusions, utility of the 
substructures and public perception of the local state are explored. 
 
Local Government and Institutional Reforms in Ghana 
Local government and decentralization are concepts that have been 
used interchangeably but to appreciate the issues set out in this 
paper, we distinguish the two to reflect local government as the 
structure that defines the roles and expectations of participants in 
local public administration while decentralization, simply put, is the 
policy that gives political and administrative authority to manage the 
activities of the former (see Olsen, 2007). The units under the local 
governments therefore thrive on the decentralized authority devolved 
from the center. It is this devolution that allows them to make 
autonomous economic, social and financial decisions (Johnson, 
2001). Although advocates of decentralization often claim that the 
process seeks to promote local democracy and development through 
increased participation, critics (Crook, 2003; Crawford, 2009) show 
that such arguments are often unquestioned and not properly 
analyzed. In fact, the critics argue that outcomes from 
decentralization have been deficient in promoting local democracy 
and development per se. Despite the shortcomings, the promise of 
local democracy and development through devolved authority 
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continues to influence the international development and institution-
building processes. Indeed, the rhetoric of development through 
increased local participation has engaged the attention of most 
developing countries pursuing decentralization reforms since the 
1980s (see Wunsch, 2001; Crook, 2003; Crawford, 2009).  Ghana’s 
local government system, a decentralized one, takes its roots 
retrospectively from colonial administration when it was organized 
around chieftaincy administrations (Gilbert, Hugounenq & 
Vaillancourt, 2013). It is reasonable, however, to argue that the local 
government structure took on a ‘modern’ character in the post-
independence era at which time different political administrations 
made efforts to decentralize authority to the sub-national and local 
levels. In practice, though, these programmes largely focused on 
devolutions at the regions and districts in a highly centralized 
manner. Local communities were rarely involved and local 
government services were poorly delivered. 
 
As part of the comprehensive decentralization programme proffered 
by the Bretton Woods Institutions in 1988 (see Table 1), local 
government institution-building intensified. This was spurred by the 
enactment of the Local Government Law, 1988 (PNDCL 207) 
(Thomi, 1999; Kumi-Kyereme, Yankson & Thomi, 2006) and was 
supported by the 1992 Constitution and other legislations such as the 
Local Government Act, 1993 (Act 462), the Civil Service Law, 1994 
(PNDCL 327), the National Development Commission Act of 1994 
(Act 479), the National Development Planning Systems Act, 1994 
(Act 480), and the District Assemblies Common Fund Act, 1993 (Act 
327). The reform was unprecedented and sought to shift authority 
from a centralized structure and devolve power and decision-making 
competences to the local level under the supervision of the local 
government ministry. One-hundred and ten District Assemblies (DAs) 
were created at the time and successive political administrations 
have sought legislative measures to either increase the number and/ 
reform the structures. Presently, the number of DAs stands at 216 
although the myths and ambiguities that characterize the structure 
and its administration remain largely intact. These ambiguities give 
rise to the suspicion that they are created for patronage gains at the 
expense of decentralized development policy making (Gilbert et al., 
2013; Ayee, 2012; Green, 2010).36 
 
                                                 
36
 There are competing views about the creation of new district structures by 
successive governments to appease voters in areas where they get their most votes 
and in swing areas. A critical perspective on this patronage-like approach to that 
debate must be situated in the local government from the post-independence era. The 
current paper does delve into that debate. 
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Table 1: 
Key Reforms of the Local Government Structure  
Year Reform Type  Key Legislations* 
1988  Local Government Reform  Local Government Law 
(PNDCL 207) 
1992  Civil Service Reform  
Local Government Reform  
Constitution of the Republic of 
Ghana 
LG (Amend.) Inst. (LI 1508 & LI 
1503) 
1993  Civil Service Reform  
Local Government Reform  
Civil Service Law (PNDCL 327) 
Local Government Act (Act 
462) 
1994 Local Government Reform  
 
National Dev. Plan. Systems 
Act (Act 480)  
 
2003  Local Government Reform  Local Government Service Act 
(Act 656) 
2004 Local Government Reform  LG (Est.) (Amend.) Instruments 
for AMA, LI 1804; KMA, LI 
1805; SAEMA, LI 1806 
2009   Local Government Reform  Local Government (Dept. of 
District Assemblies) 
(Commence) Inst. (LI 1961) 
2010  Local Government Reform  LG (Urban Councils, (Est.) Inst. 
(LI 1967); LG Creation of New 
Dist. Inst.  (LI 1983) 
Sources: Author’s construct based on selected legislations, 2013; 
Parliament of Ghana. * Note: LG: local government; DA: district assembly. 
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The Local Government Nomenclature  
The structure of local government (as depicted in Figure 1) 
comprises three main institutions namely the Regional Coordinating 
Council (RCC) at the apex (i.e. the regional level), the District 
Assembly at the intermediate level, and sub-district structures 
comprising sub-metropolitan district councils, town-zonal-urban-area 
councils and the unit committees at the bottom.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Institutional reforms in 2003 and 2009 (see Acts 656 & LI 1961 in 
Table 1) make the local government ministry and its under-
secretariat, the local government service, the central bodies to 
provide technical and administrative support as well as oversight 
responsibility over the local government structures. At the sub-
national levels, there are ten (10) regional coordinating bodies for the 
local government structure but these are mainly deconcentrated 
administrative institutions headed by a chief director. The decision-
making body which is the RCC with its mandate derived from the 
Regional Coordinating Council 
Ministry of Local Government 
 
Municipal 
Assembly 
Metropolitan 
Assembly 
District Assembly 
Sub-Metro Dist. 
Council 
Town 
Council 
Urban 
Council 
Town 
Council 
Area 
Council 
Unit Committee 
                                                                                                                              
Zonal 
Councils 
 
Local Government 
Service 
Civil Administrative Units 
 
Figure 1: Structure of Local Government in Ghana since 2012  
Source: Author’s construct based on legislations in use 
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1992 Constitution and the Local Government Act, 1993 (Act 462) is 
composed mainly by central government appointees such as the 
regional minister and deputies; all district chief executives of the 
assemblies in the region; two chiefs from the Regional House of 
Chiefs. In addition, there are elected presiding members (from the 
district assemblies)  as well as and the regional heads of the 
deconcentrated services of line ministries (ex-officio members). The 
RCCs monitor and supervise the organizational and managerial 
resources and the general performance of the districts within their 
jurisdictions. This main task is undertaken by the regional planning 
coordination unit which coordinates the districts’ planning activities 
with those of the central government. Although, found at the apex on 
the sub-national structure, the RCCs act merely as the link between 
the central government and the district assemblies (Kumi-Kyereme et 
al., 2006). Unlike the district assemblies, their democratic legitimacy 
is indirect (Gilbert et al., 2013) since they are not political bodies that 
derive and produce autonomous and decentralized development 
public policy. 
 
The District Assembly and its Composition 
Autonomous decisions of local governments rest with the district 
assemblies. The term district in the Local Government Act, 462 
designates a geographic precinct over which the District Assembly 
(DA), exercises control. Three classifications of the DAs based on 
demographic and urbanization indicators are presently given as: four-
tier metropolitan assemblies (6) with population of more than 
250,000; three-tier municipal (56) and district assemblies (154) with 
populations of more than 95,000 and up to 75,000 people 
respectively. Taken together therefore, there are 216 DAs; a 
dramatic increase from 110 in 1993, 139 in 2004 and 170 in 2008. 
The sub-district structures (sub-metropolitan district councils; town-
zonal-urban-area councils; and unit committees) are mainly 
administrative sub-divisions without an independent legal status 
(Ayee, 2000; Crawford, 2009) to make binding decisions which has 
implications for their functions relative to the DAs. The local 
government system has two strands of authority, at least in principle, 
namely the General Assembly (GA) and the District Administration. 
The general assembly, a semi-elected assembly is composed mostly 
of elected representatives (70 percent) while the rest (30 percent) is 
appointed by the president after consulting the traditional authorities 
and other local interest groups (e.g. chiefs, youth groups).37 A term of 
the GA lasts four years and a Presiding Member (PM) is elected 
every two years from among the assembly members. Interestingly, 
                                                 
37
  Members of parliament are non-voting (ex officio) members of the general assembly 
in their respective districts. 
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apart from presiding over the general assembly, the PM’s functions 
are largely honorary and ceremonial (Gilbert et al., 2013). 
  
Power over decisions at the DAs is rather held by central government 
and its representatives who run the Administration. The executive 
and administrative functions of the DA are performed by the 
Executive Committee chaired by the District Chief Executive (DCE).38 
Even the head of the civil service strand, the district coordinating 
director, is secretary to the DCE. The Executive Committee 
coordinates the work of the various subcommittees of the assembly 
such as development planning, justice and security, finance and 
general administration, and executes the development plans of the 
substructures. As representative of the central government and the 
chair of the executive committee, the DCE wields considerable power 
over the assembly. Indeed, the DCE’s power, coupled with the 
percentage of the assembly members appointed by the President 
(30%) makes it difficult for the former’s powers and decisions to be 
challenged by the DA (Crawford, 2009). Nonetheless,  this is the 
source of tension between members of the assembly and as notes 
Thomi (2000a) the full time status of the Administration and 
Executive Committee breeds a sense of domination of the DA by the 
former given the honorary and part-time status of the members of the 
GA; a complexity that is a source of conflict in the local government. 
Partly based on the outlook of the DA as a politically-dominated 
structure, reforms in 2009 (see LI 1961) that sought to organize the 
DA’s services into decentralized departments such as finance, public 
health, agriculture, education etc. are in limbo. The intent was to 
transfer competences from central ministries and departments to the 
districts to form a single administrative entity with responsibility to 
implement public policies. However, many of those departments in 
practice continue to operate as deconcentrated departments sharing 
much of their responsibilities with their parent ministries and regional 
directorates39. In fact, the defiance is partly shaped by the perception 
of the local government system in the public domain.  
 
Development Functions of the District Assembly 
The Local Government Act, 462 empowers the DAs as the principal 
entities responsible for development planning, infrastructure planning 
                                                 
38
 Title designating executive head of a district; Metropolitan and Municipal Chief 
Executives are eponyms for heads of metropolitan and municipal assemblies. The 
DCE is appointed for four years by the president with the approval of two-thirds of the 
assembly’s voting members. 
39
 Attempts to integrate the deconcentrated departments into the local government 
structure have been met with fierce resistance by different professional groups from 
health, education and forestry services. 
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and regulation, delivery of local public goods and services, 
environment and sanitation issues, regulating public auctions, alcohol 
licenses, etc. Development plans (including those of the sub-district 
structures) and budgets of the district are prepared in collaboration 
with the RCC and then submitted to the NDPC for approval (budgets 
subsequently submitted to the Ministry of Finance). Although the DAs 
receive remittances from the central government i.e. the District 
Assemblies’ Common Fund, their ability to generate enough revenue 
internally to meet the development plans and thus address the needs 
of their residents is central to their existence. The DAs are mandated 
to delegate any of their functions to the substructures or any other 
body or person that they may deem fit. Yet the same Act 462 creates 
a gap for the DAs to manipulate their substructures. These bodies 
are supposed to be the local arena for popular participation in 
decision making to wit cataloguing taxable or rate-able individuals 
and items in the locality, raise voluntary contributions to a 
development fund, and make local action plans within the framework 
of the district development plan. However, their lack of independent 
legal status (Ayee 2000) means the functions assigned to them are 
based on the prerogative of the DAs which has reduced them to 
revenue collection units for the local governments. Attempts to whip 
participatory development functions of local (political) actors are 
numerous (see 2010 reforms: LI 1983) but have stagnated. These 
reforms sought to actively involve assembly members and unit 
committee members in the task of the substructures. However, lack 
of clarity on the reforms (discussed below) especially as regards the 
composition of the sub-metro district councils have made the 
changes highly untenable and thus obscuring the notion of local level 
participation. Indeed, most of the sub-metros are dominated by 
political appointees but the rationale for these appointments to the 
substructures has been systematically abused and rather replaced 
by ‘appointment of party foot-soldiers’ (Gyimah-Boadi & Prempeh, 
2007).40 Therefore any discussions about institutional reforms of the 
local government structure tend to be viewed with skepticism and 
non-change.    
 
Local Government Reforms: An Institutional Perspective 
Studies employing (neo-) institutional and actor-centered arguments 
to organizational change processes in the Global South are relatively 
scanty. However, these approaches offer broader perspectives on 
the analysis of institutional change processes and dynamics 
especially as obtain in developing countries. In fact, the very idea of 
                                                 
40
 Professional groups with special expertise such as engineers, lawyers, 
educationists, etc were to complement skills that the elected members of the general 
assembly may not readily possess.  
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local government and its reform, we must point out, is a global idea 
diffused across time and space. Studies on travelling models and 
translation point to the various ways in which these organizational 
change models find specific expression in local settings (see 
Rottenburg, 1996). Others yet point to how these globally diffused 
ideas encounter different frames of reference in their application in 
specific contexts (see Loimeier, Neubert, & Weißköppel, 2005) but 
institutional change in local governments is best explained by neo-
institutional theory.41 The core argument, as set out by Meyer and 
Rowan (1991) is that the diffusion and adoption of organizational 
ideas is in alignment with a global world culture through which ideas 
spread. However, organizations do not adopt these global ideas 
purposely because they seek higher efficiency; rather they do so in 
an attempt to achieve more legitimacy in their environment. Yet 
reforming organizations face a dilemma of being both efficient (based 
on some existing rules) and also adopt new ideas. One way to 
overcome this dilemma is to decouple i.e. adopt the new concepts 
but to deliberately keep them from the action-structure of the 
organizations so they do not affect their decision making. 
Decoupling, it argues, is endemic because the diffusion process 
produces incoherencies and the only way to be both legitimate and 
efficient is to decouple (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). Research 
evidence from the world polity approach (Meyer, 2010) suggests a 
hypocrisy i.e. discrepancy between talk and action on reform policies 
(Brunsson, 1989, 2006) and the tendency for developing countries to 
adopt and over-sell complicated reforms that they cannot implement 
by any stretch of imagination (Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, 2005; 
Christensen, Lægreid, Roness, & Røvik, 2007). Thus, iIn developing 
country contexts where institutional reform efforts are rewarded with 
development grants and assistance, legitimacy and stability concerns 
may hold sway over genuine intent towards reforming for efficiency. 
 
Even so, the decoupling concept does not adequately address one 
variable, interest of institutional actors in the local context which 
greatly influences willingness to reform. This variable is explicated by 
the actor-centered institutionalism approach (Scharpf, 1997, 2008) 
which argues that institutional actors have varied self-interests that 
are tied to specific behaviour strategies based on expected 
outcomes. Actors may opt for outcomes that address their self-
interests when faced with choice constraints between optimal 
                                                 
41
 Travelling models describes the transformations that an idea encounters in the 
process of translation; frame of reference discusses the mindsets by which global 
ideas become reformulated. Neo-intuitionalism is preferred herein because it 
addresses the processes of diffusion and the eventual detachment of the diffused and 
adopted ideas in their local settings.  
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institutional outcomes and individual interests. This tendency on the 
part of institutional actors leads to a situation where change 
processes yield sub-optimum outcomes. Scharpf (2008) has shown 
how actors’ interests have shaped reforms in health and agricultural 
sectors in federal and state governments in Germany and it becomes 
more so plausible in the context of developing countries where 
multiple institutional rules co-exist and overlap. In the subsequent 
sections, (neo-) institutional approach is used to analyze institutional 
change processes in the Ghanaian local government system. 
 
Study Setting, Methods and Data  
The study used the multi-sited approach in two administrative regions 
namely Ashanti and Upper West based on the necessity of 
availability of information and experience (Ayee, 1996) and covered 
two local government structures viz. Kumasi and Wa. The Ashanti 
Region located in the middle belt of Ghana has a long-standing 
experience of civil administration which dates back to the colonial 
period compared with its Upper West counterpart, a relatively young 
region in the northern belt created in 1983.42 Other focal 
organizations included the regional coordinating councils, 
decentralized directorates of agriculture and health, the local 
government ministry and the local government service secretariat. An 
extensive fieldwork was conducted from June to October, 2013 and 
again from August to October, 2014 and employed mixed methods 
including in-depth interviews to understand the interface between 
reforms, actors’ interest and the tasks of the local governments from 
well-informed actors; analysis of existing data and documents on the 
reforms; and a period of internship supplemented the data from 
interviews.43 Following a multi-level approach, the actors 
(summarized in Appendix) came from the district assemblies, 
decentralized departments and deconcentrated departments. Again, 
actors in the sub-metropolitan district councils, and zonal councils, 
town councils and unit committees from the two assemblies were 
interviewed. 
 
Varying Perspectives on Changes in the Local State Structures  
As stated earlier, attempts at local government institution-building are 
numerous but most recent reforms with Act 656 in 2003 and LI 1961 
in 2009 seem to have given impetus to the structures to operate. 
These legislations created a distinct service (independent of the civil 
                                                 
42
 The main study from which this paper is derived compares the regions’ experiences 
in the implementation of civil and administrative reforms. 
43
 This three-month research internship was participatory mainly in the activities of the 
Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly and the Regional Coordinating Councils including 
budget reviews, fee-fixing, mid-year reviews, etc. 
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service) and departments of the assemblies and whipped up 
enthusiasm among some bureaucrats that the participatory promise 
of the local government is on course. Some officials in the planning 
units were enthusiastic as was evident from the following remarks:  
“A lot has changed with the reforms of the local 
government process and what I really like is the 
participation by the area councils and unit committees 
which means that planning emanates from the community 
level. Again, I appreciate very much the participation and 
decision making processes and implementation with the 
involvement of the people. Now if you award a project, the 
community that is awarded this project must be informed; 
when you write a letter to say you are the contractor who 
is supposed to work in the community, the community is 
informed of whoever is working there” [a senior planning 
officer, RCC Ashanti, Kumasi, 16.08.2013]. 
 
Yet, some planning officials seemed somewhat unimpressed that 
participatory decision making which is the raison d’être of the local 
government structures really obtains at the local level. The argument 
is that local development plans tend to be a ‘mirror face’ of national 
ones as regulated by the National Development Planning Systems 
Act, 480. The fact that national guidelines regulate locally-evolved 
development plans by the DAs creates the impression of 
unnecessary centralization of the latter’s task. Some planning 
officials were unimpressed with the national guidelines which to them 
reflected the manifesto of the ruling party, which ever is in power. 
Therefore no specific locally-evolved policies exist. However, since 
regulations are required to bring into harmony the development plans 
of all local governments, one could talk about hybridization of the 
development policy. This view was shared by a senior planning 
official in the Upper West Region: 
“You know the type of planning we do now, they say 
bottom-up but it is not really bottom-up. It is a mixture of 
the bottom-up and top-down because if planning 
guidelines emanate from the top, then naturally some 
people are dictating to you so you cannot be talking about 
bottom-up. The communities have action plans which 
could be galvanized and harmonized at the district levels 
into district plans but now the NDPC evolves guidelines 
such that district plans must be in consonance with the 
national level” [a senior planning official, RCC, Upper 
West, Wa, 28.08.2013]. 
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These contradictory positions held by planning departments working 
in tandem with local actors in the regions and districts follow closely 
from the seemingly (re-) centralization of the local governments 
(Awortwi, 2011) through the persistent manipulation of their 
structures and tasks by central government. This makes local actors 
feel that their development plans are pre-designed for them. Another 
factor is the official rhetoric which consistently follows the bottom-up 
mantra even if the realities of participation suggest otherwise. 
Officials in the central ministry consistently put up arguments 
suggesting that participation in development planning decisions 
evolves from the local communities themselves as remarked by an 
official in the local government ministry: 
“In our recent review of the decentralization and local 
government system, we started from the district level; 
town council meetings, then we went to the regional 
capitals. You know the planning process is bottom-up 
approach which emanates from the district assembly level 
including the town councils, the urban councils and the 
zonal councils. They all make their inputs through the 
assembly system to the national level. What we usually do 
is to issue to them the guidelines as a standard for our 
planning process so their inputs and priorities are 
incorporated into the national plan” [a senior 
administrative official, Ministry of Local Government, 
Accra, 14.10.2013]. 
 
Beyond these rhetoric which, one more often than not encounters, 
the illusions of participation is witnessed even more so at the sub-
structural levels where participatory decision-making should assume 
priority as enshrined in the governing legislations. Indeed, these 
substructures exhibit clear evidence of departure of formal-official 
norms from operative norms. In spite of the reforms to build these 
institutions, their activities create the impression that they serve 
patronage purposes instead of avenues for local level participation.   
 
Illusions of Participation at the Substructures      
The idea of participation for which reason new structures for that 
purpose are created remains dominant but contested in the reforms 
of the local government. Participation is often linked to local 
development in the local institution-building processes (Crawford, 
2009; Ayee, 2003) yet that linkage remains largely rhetorical. 
Bureaucrats from the Upper West Region where these cases are 
pervasive tend to question the rationale for their creation if the 
promotion participation, decision making is not attainable. In most of 
the cases the basic economic activities for raising internally 
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generated funds are not present making them depend on remittance 
from central government; a dependency that further fuels the 
recentralization of devolved powers. The challenges of patronage-
like structures which are widespread across the country were hinted 
by one planning official at the Wa Municipal Aassembly (WMA): 
“(…) some districts have been created, personnel have 
been sent to the districts, but they cannot even get 
residential accommodation over there; it is even not 
possible to have official accommodation so what sort of 
district have we created? Because of politics, they rather 
create districts before thinking of infrastructure and this is 
not good.” [a senior planning official, WMA, Wa, 
31.07.2013]. 
 
Consistent with Thomi (1999), one observes that responsibility were 
created in the DAs without resources which questions the rationale 
for the new structures if what it takes for them to operate as districts 
is not there. From the larger political setting, there exists a persistent 
tendency towards fulfilling political promises for electoral favours and 
incumbents strive to create structures for patronage resources (see 
Green, 2010; Gilbert el al., 2013) even if bureaucrats only see the 
structures as non-viable and unable to produce any genuine 
participatory development objects. Political actors create 
expectations from their local constituents when demanding their 
loyalty (via votes) to represent them and in return, the former 
promises to deliver development goods to the latter. Such 
expectations and the desire to meet them often compel political 
office-holders to create new institutional structures despite the 
obvious non-existence of the basic mechanisms for the new 
structures to work and bring development to their localities.44  
 
As stated earlier, the substructures at the local level are supposed to 
be the arena for participation. Yet, despite the numerous changes 
from 1988 to date, local actors feel distanced from the participation 
promise in the local government system casting further doubts on 
official rhetoric which argues otherwise. Given that the participatory 
development concept remains largely spurious (Ayee, 2000, 2003), 
the dysfunction of the substructures has been a bone of contention 
between assembly members and the administration of the DAs. The 
assembly members generally tend to attribute the weaknesses of the 
substructures to the ineptitude of the bureaucrats who are unable to 
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 This claim is subject to much debate. André and Mesplé-Somps (2010), for example, 
contest such claims arguing that pro-government districts tend to receive less public 
investments because of fears over political instability which force them to seek favours 
from opposition areas by investment in those areas.   
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implement any decisions but rather pursue their interests. An 
assemblyman from the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly (KMA) 
remarked that: 
“The system does not work; the technocrats do not want 
the system to work. In the sub-metro, they do not call 
meetings for us to know what is going on. We are the 
political leaders here and they are supposed to help us but 
they don’t want the system to work. Sometimes they see 
the assembly members as inferior; some think they have 
higher education and are not willing to submit to an 
assembly member because some assembly members 
have lower education levels. They don’t even inform you 
when a project is going on in your electoral area. 
Sometimes you ask, if there is no mischief, why should 
that happen?” [an assemblyman, Suame Sub-metro, 
KMA, Kumasi, 21.08.2013].    
 
This distrust of the administration by the assembly members 
especially the elected ones from both local governments generally 
has roots in the perceived domination of the General Assembly by 
the Executive consistent with observations by Thomi (2000a) and its 
utilization for personal gains of the bureaucrats. However, a careful 
analysis of the issues at the substructures especially the sub-
metropolitan district councils (sub-metros) reveals compelling political 
interests more than administrative tasks. The sub-metros have 
legislative challenge and non-clarity of their composition continues to 
be a politically sensitive issue as pointed out by one assemblyman: 
“There is a problem with the sub-metro structure but the 
appointed NDC members are resisting any solution. Thirty 
percent of the council is to be appointed by the 
government but this is not followed because there is a 
problem with the two LIs, 1614 and 1805. The 1805 does 
not favour them so they have gone for the old one, 1614. 
(…) at Bantama, elected members are eight and the 
appointed members are 22 making up the 30 members so 
if we go there, we the elected members are ‘nothing’; 
definitely, a party man will become the sub-metro chair 
and they use that place as the party office and it cuts 
across; most of the chairmen (of the sub-metros) are NDC 
constituency chairpersons who use the sub-metro 
secretariats as their offices” [an assemblyman, Bantama 
Sub-metro, KMA, Kumasi, 18.09.2013]. 
 
Claims of domination of the substructures by political appointees 
appear factual given that seven out of the nine sub-metros district 
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councils in the Kumasi metropolis were chaired by party constituency 
chairpersons from the NDC.45 Nonetheless, the issues regarding the 
composition of these councils are quite complicated and involve local 
government reforms in 2004 (LI 1805 for the KMA) under the NPP 
government. Table 2 sheds light on the impasse at the appointee-
dominated sub-metro councils which lends support to claims about 
political patronage of the local government structures (Green, 2010; 
Ayee, 2012; Gilbert et al., 2013). 
 
Table 2:  
Composition Nomenclature for Selected Sub-Metros in the 
Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly  
  
Council Composition Sets 
 
Sub-Metro 
Council 
 
Current (LI 1614) 
 
Expected (LI 1805) 
 
*Elect. 
(%) 
 
Appoint. 
(%) 
 
Elect.  
(%) 
 
Unit Com 
(%) 
 
Appoint. 
(%) 
Asokwa 12 (40.0) 18 (60.0) 12 (40.0) 10 (33.3) 8 (26.7) 
Bantama 8 (26.7) 22 (73.3) 8 (26.7) 10 (33.3) 12 (40.0) 
Kwadaso  9 (30.0) 21 (70.0) 9 (30.0) 10 (33.3) 11 (36.7) 
Manhyia 13 (43.3) 17 (56.7) 13 (43.3) 10 (33.3) 7 (23.3) 
Oforikrom 15 (50.0) 15 (50.0) 15 (50.0) 10 (33.3) 5 (16.7) 
Suame 9 (30.0) 21 (70.0) 9 (30.0) 10 (33.3) 11 (36.7) 
Source: Author’s computation based on information from the secretariats of  
the sub-metros. * Elect.: elected members; Appoint.: appointed members; 
Unit Com: unit committee members 
The new LI 1805 meant for 10 sub-metros was criticized by the 
opposition NDC at the time for its lack of clarity (see Ahwoi, 2007) 
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 National Democratic Congress (NDC) and New Patriotic Party (NPP) are major 
political parties in Ghana. Incumbency and domination of district assemblies is not a 
new phenomenon in the Ghanaian political landscape. Its recurrence and effects have 
been extensively discussed (see Crook, 1999; Awortwi, 2011). The Ghanaian 
Chronicle (2011) article on ‘NDC subverts local government system’ highlights that 
theme. 
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and it was obvious the system would be thrown into confusion once 
the NDC government regained power. This certainly happened after 
the elevation of one sub-metro to a municipal status and any attempt 
to make changes in favour of participatory development has been 
resisted. What one observes is the tendency towards re-
centralization that benefits central government politicians and 
bureaucrats but weakens the local government system (Wunsch, 
2001; Awortwi, 2011). It is particularly reflective of the ideals upon 
which the current local governments were founded. Crook (1999) 
notes that the substructures were carved in a populist framework 
devoid of party competition which allowed the central government to 
have a firm hold of the substructures. With the advent of multi-party 
democracy, such virtues have become increasingly untenable and 
incumbent governments have used these practices (e.g. legislative 
ambiguities) as means of dominating the substructures. 
 
Substructures and their Utility 
If the substructures deprive actors of any genuine participation, then 
what purpose do they serve the district assemblies? The reasons are 
inexplicable but one seems apparent: the substructures are used to 
meet other latent ends especially legitimacy and stability concerns. 
The DAs and the central agencies tend to preoccupy themselves with 
funds provided by transnational actors. The funds from the 
international development agencies, their assessment, accounting 
and reporting standards tend to subtly affect the tasks of the local 
governments (see Weilenmann, 2009). The local governments in 
pursuit of these funds put up behaviours and appearances that make 
them appear legitimate recipients. The funds are the District 
Development Facility (DDF) contributed mainly by a group of 
international agencies and the Urban Development Grant (UDG) 
solely provided by the World Bank.46 The award is based on some 
set criteria as was noted by one official at the local government 
ministry: 
“With regard to the support for the capacity of assemblies 
we do a lot. We have an intervention called the DDF which 
is basically a grant from donors; it is a pool in which 
donors put their resources together and we disburse the 
funds to the DAs based on their performance.” [a senior 
administrative official, Ministry of Local Government, 
Accra, 14.10.2013]. 
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 The DDF is contributed jointly by Agence Francaise de Developpement (AFD), 
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Danish International 
Development Agency (DANIDA), Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) and the 
Government of Ghana. It is a capacity building grant to induce the performance of the 
District Assemblies in their service provision. 
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Certainly, between 2006 and 2011, a total of GH¢ 119,928,440 (c.a. 
US$ 54,510,655) of DDF had been disbursed to various districts in 
the country and the two case study DAs had received GH¢ 10 million 
and GH¢ 3.4 million going to Kumasi Metropolitan and Wa Municipal 
assemblies respectively. Only metropolitan and municipal assemblies 
could access the UDG and the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly for 
instance received a grant of US$ 4.2 million in 2012 from the World 
Bank as the best managed metropolis in the country (see Alhassan, 
2012). The criteria for the awards, contained in the functional and 
organizational assessment tool (FOAT), tend to prioritize meetings 
and internal revenue generation which initiate the ‘qualification 
drama’ at the substructures.47 One administrative official in a sub-
metro in Kumasi remarked:  
“In the sub-metro we have all the structures (...) but not 
the authority to implement any decision; it has to go to the 
MCD for approval and until it is approved, we do not get to 
do anything. So we are supposed to meet four times in a 
year but over here even if you call meetings nobody wants 
to come (…) because they think the meetings at the sub-
metro are not effective and do not produce results. As for 
the meetings we do, if we do not, KMA will lose points in 
the FOAT assessment so the MCD will insist we do the 
meetings. We manage to do the meetings anyways and 
write the minutes but as to whether the content will be 
implemented is another thing.” [an administrative official, 
Oforikrom Sub-metro, KMA, Kumasi, 09.09.2013]. 
 
Assembly members generally complained about the neglect of the 
task of the substructures and pointed to the weak revenue base 
since part of the revenue items have been awarded to contractors 
and the substructures retained the rest48. The revenue generation 
challenge accounted for their inability to hold meetings and make 
policies for their respective areas because they lacked the funds to 
pay allowances to participants. However, they were still doubtful 
whether the meetings could influence the district development plans 
at all. The local structures’ ‘production of documents’ to qualify for 
donor funds held much importance to the districts than local actors’ 
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 Municipal and metropolitan assemblies with higher than average scores in the DDF 
assessment qualify for the UDG. Details on the district development fund and the 
urban development grant are provided in the MLGRD (2010). 
48
 The revenue concerns at the substructures were glaring. Even though some of the 
substructures such as the Suame Town Council in Kumasi and Busa Zonal Council in 
Wa remained non-operational during the entire duration of the field research, revenue 
collectors were actively taking tolls for their respective DAs despite having delegated 
that competence to the substructures.  
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participation in development decisions. These pretentious claims 
about the activities of the substructures to earn donor funds reflect 
daily organizational realities contrary to the formal rhetoric on reform 
and participatory development. They also reveal the persistent but 
perhaps unwitting influence of international development agencies 
through their instruments and assessment standards. They divert the 
tasks of local institutions (Weilenmann, 2009) and make legitimacy 
appearances gradually prevail over actual institution-building. That, 
of course, reflects general processes in the international 
development system within which ideal participatory development 
goals are set (Keough, 1998), and how the different institutional 
actors, given their interests, shape the practical goals at work.   
 
Perception of the Local Government 
Some degree of apathy is expressed by the public towards the local 
government set up perhaps in reaction to the way it conducts itself 
among local residents. Local residents more often become 
disillusioned to find out that the departments of the DAs cannot 
provide any help. This provides a channel for their dissatisfaction and 
disinterest in the activities of the assemblies (Thomi, 2000a). 
Informants pointed to this frustration as expressed in local residents’ 
apathy towards forums and durbars especially in urban centers; 
people tend to think that the assembly does not care about them and 
have developed resistance to pay property tax because they thought 
they do not benefit from it. The disenchantment with the assembly 
finds expression in several dimensions of local government tasks.49 
One such dimension is the enthusiasm or otherwise in district level 
election compared with the national election trends. This disillusion is 
clearly elucidated in Table 3. Fact is, whereas voters’ enthusiasm 
seems to surge with the national elections, the reverse is true for the 
local government segment despite the numerous reforms to involve 
more local actors. This goes to express their disappointment with the 
pace of change and development taking place in their localities 
(Crook, 2003). Even beyond the political structure, bureaucrats in the 
local government are perceived with weaknesses and ineptitude by 
technocrats in the decentralized and deconcentrated departments. 
Some of my informants revealed how such local government 
bureaucrat are perceived with some mental images of being local, 
incompetent and ‘never-to-do-well’ intellectuals even though they 
were the same people who manned the civil service before the split. 
 
Nonetheless, technocrats at the decentralized directorates were not 
convinced with the administrative restructuring of the local 
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 Other dimensions include participation in public events of the local state, and their 
willingness to pay local rates and taxes.  
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governments preferring to work with their parent departments. Some 
of their staff continued to receive their promotion from the central 
ministries and some transfers were done from the center unabated. 
 
Table 3: 
Voter Turnout Rates in National and Local Government 
Elections in Ghana (1992-2012)  
National 
Election (Year) 
1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 
Voter Turnout 
(%) 
50.2 78.2 60.4 81.5 69.5 80.2 
Local Gov. 
Election (Year) 
1988/89 1994 1998 
 
2002 2006 2010/11 
Voter Turnout 
(%) 
59.3 29.3 41.6 32.8 44.0 35.3 
Source: Author’s compilation, 2013 based on multiple information sources50  
 
Most of them claim the local governments are political structures and 
could not provide any technical support for specialized departments. 
For those in deconcentrated departments resisting full integration into 
the local government structure, these perceived ineptitude provided 
even stronger arguments for resistance. Based on their professional 
and technical needs, one senior technocrat in a regional health 
directorate hinted that: 
 “We have been told the districts will be going under the 
district assemblies but our fear is that there may be 
problems because you know the districts are not so 
organized to be able to supervise these organizations. 
They may not even have the personnel and most of the 
people in these organizations are (highly) 
educated/trained than those in the district assemblies (…) 
so how can they supervise? If the health service budget 
should go though the district assembly, how sure are they 
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 Electoral Commission of Ghana; Crook (1999); Awortwi (2011); Obeng-Odoom 
(2013). Note the inconsistency in the organization of district level elections in 
1988/89 and 2010/2011. Again, October 2014 elections were postponed and 
interviews with electoral officials revealed further uncertainties even in March, 
2015. Certainly, the elections were suspended indefinitely in February, 2015.  
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to get their money to do the work on time?” [a senior 
health administrator, Ashanti, Kumasi, 10.06.2013]. 
 
Despite the concerns from the deconcentrated departments, some 
senior bureaucrats regard those sentiments as a defensive 
mechanism for guarding against the domain of influence and 
privileges enjoyed under a separate line of authority. There are no 
assurances for those privileges and perquisites under the unified 
local state administration system as was hinted by one senior 
bureaucrat: 
(…) there is some misunderstanding from the 
establishment of the local government service; some 
ministers have not taken the trouble to study the law and 
the transfer of staff from their ministries to the local 
government service so they don’t know. I also think that is 
a ‘territorial jealousy’ because a lot of the ministers and 
civil servants think that they are losing their staff and so 
their area of influence is becoming very limited because 
they get ‘fat’ budgets from international donors and that if 
they come under the local government service they may 
not have them anymore [a senior administrative officer, 
RCC, Ashanti, Kumasi, 28.07.2014]. 
 
True, interests shape the narratives of resistance and are intrinsically 
linked to particular influence and perquisites but they equally shape 
the outlook of the administrative units of the local governments, 
which the local public views as ineptitude and excessively politically-
dominated. Nonetheless, this outlook is better understood from the 
local circumstances and the global entanglements in its creation and 
reform. The adoption of global ideas on local government and fusion 
into a patronage-like political system makes the loose coupling of the 
reforms and outlook less surprising. 
 
Conclusions 
The analysis thus far throws light on the latent manifestations that 
institutional change processes encounter: the complex interplay of 
personal, political interests and legitimacy concerns on local 
government reforms means the promise of participatory decision 
making is taken away from the everyday realities of the local states 
and their substructures. The actor-centered approach encourages us 
to move beyond rational actor analysis of formal policy domains to 
institutional domains to understand how institutional change works in 
order to unpack the discrepancy between official and practical norms. 
This echoes the argument by Lowndes and Leach (2004) on the 
disparity between norms in form and norms in use when institutional 
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change is embarked upon.  In developing countries, this interplay 
becomes profound given the complex interaction of formal and 
informal norms which paves way for manipulation by political and 
institutional actors. While seeking their own interests, they 
simultaneously showcase processes that make them appear 
committed to the ideals of ‘modern’ organizations and worthy of 
development funds. Although the institutional and actor-centered 
approaches are less utilized in the Global South compared with 
studies in the Global North, these approaches provide broader 
perspectives for understanding reforms in developing countries. 
What is revealing in these contexts is how the complex mix of 
institutional rules enables central actors to create (i.e. copy) 
responsibilities that are hardly supported with resources because 
they are able to keep them away from the action-structure of their 
organization (i.e. decoupling). 
  
Regardless of the myths associated with the new structures, the local 
states and their actors tend to accept these structures in order to be 
seen as stable and legitimate while incorporating their own interests. 
This makes the task of local government appear less interesting to 
local residents. Indeed, even though the reforms of the local 
government set up may have structural and administrative effects, 
local people are not really interested in such changes; local 
government, after all, is to bring governance for development to the 
local people. However, as Crooks (2003) points, out the local 
governments have been unable to provide for the expectations of 
local residents hence their disenchantment. Yet, these expectations 
may be far-fetched and beyond the limits of what the local 
governments could ever provide. The globally-diffused idea of local 
government and its reform, as Meyer et al. (1991) point out, often 
goes well beyond what the local institutions could ever provide and 
support. Far from arguing that institutional change may not occur at 
all, one could rather agree with Lowndes (2005) that change in the 
local government will happen not so much from the reforms but 
rather at its own course and pace.   
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Appendix: 
Composite Information on Study Actors  
 Region 
Profile  Ashanti 
(n=77) 
Upper West 
(n=21) 
Gt. Accra 
(n=4) 
Sex                        
                               
Female 
Male 
13 (16.9) 1 (4.8) - 
68 (83.1) 20 (95.2) 4 (100) 
Actor Type            
                               
Political 43 (55.8) 9 (42.9) - 
Technocrat 34 (44.2) 12 (57.1) 4 (100) 
Status                    
                       
Rep. 43 (55.8) 9 (42.9) - 
 Middle Level 17 (22.1) 7 (33.3) 1 (25.0) 
 Senior Level 17 (22.1) 5 (23.8) 3 (75.0) 
Mode of  
Rep. 
Elected 35 (81.4) 6 (66.7) - 
 Appointed 8 (18.6) 3 (33.3) - 
Source: Field Research, 2013-14 (N=102; includes actors in all study 
organizations). Note: Rep= Representation/Representative 
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Institutional Hybridity in Government:  
Non-State Actors in Decision Making 
 
Jane Ayeko-Kümmeth 
 
 
Abstract 
Considering the constitutional framework of government in Uganda, there is a clear 
distinction between state and non-state actors. Non-state actors are herein 
represented by religious and cultural institutions such as kingdoms. 
Constitutionally, non-state actors/institutions are considered apolitical hence are 
forbidden from directly or indirectly getting involved in partisan politics. This implies 
that they should not engage in any executive, legislative and judicial activities. In 
this paper, I explore the extent to which such claims hold ground and/ or can be 
upheld given the socio-economic and political milieu in the country. In order to do 
this, the paper examines the place of these actors in local government decision 
making processes. It examines their involvement in the social service sector which 
many Ugandans perceive as the duty of the government. The research approach 
used is qualitative while specific methods used in data collection include face to 
face interviews supplemented by review of media reports. The paper argues that 
although legal instruments forbid non-state actors from engaging in politics, their 
involvement in the social service sector accords them an avenue to mingle in 
politics and substantially influence decision making on matters of public policy.  
 
Keywords: non-state actors, local government, hybridity, public policy, decision 
making.  
 
 
Introduction 
The concept of Institutional hybridity is increasingly attracting much 
of academic debate. As Tom Goodfellow and Stefan Lindemann 
(2013) argue, those interested in hybrid forms of governance 
emphasise how formal and informal institutions (usually taken to 
mean institutions of the state versus those of non-state 
organizations) ‘co-exist, overlap and intertwine’. On the other hand 
scholars like Volker Boege et al. (2008) suggest that hybridity is more 
or less any situation in which non-state actors play a significant role. 
Boege et al. (2008) emphasise the inclusion of traditional leaders into 
local government. Considering the prevalent revival of traditional 
authorities in Africa, increasing attention has been devoted to the 
manner in which the institutions of the state combine with those of 
non-state authorities. However, much of the debate has been 
focused on the implications for democracy. In this case, this article 
perceives hybridity as an underdeveloped concept considering that it 
does not look into the dynamics of policy decisions at the different 
levels of local government. Taking on from the above authors, 
hybridity is theorised as an agency of multiplicity of state and non-
state actors/ institutions. Such multiplicity reproduces contestation 
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and/ or compromise between state and non-state actors as they seek 
to negotiate their relationship within a ‘constitutionalized’ political 
environment. At the same time, actors internally seek to negotiate the 
multiple identities supplied by competing logics. Hybridity is, thus, 
herein used to demonstrate the interface between state and non-
state actors in decision making in a decentralised Local Government 
(LG) environment as well as to describe the complex dynamics 
therein. In this context, it shows that this interface reduces and/ or 
contravenes constitutional provisions that prohibit non-state actors 
from engaging in executive duties to which the state claims sole 
responsibility. By accepting these actors, LG become intertwined with 
the goals of non-state actors and may lose some of their autonomy. 
  
This paper examines the nexus between the state and non-state 
actors herein represented by traditional and religious institutions in 
the course of making and implementing public policy decisions. It 
does this through an examination of the role played by non-state 
actors given their engagement in the provision of social services 
such as education and health as well as their role as custodians of 
cultural norms but also as ‘political institutions’ of some sort.  The 
paper explores this in consideration of the fact that the constitution 
explicitly prohibits non-state actors from performing roles that the 
state claims exclusive rights such as exercise of any administrative, 
legislative or executive powers of government or LG. In other words 
government has refused to allow non-state institutions a role in 
formal state structures. At the same time none of the parties is willing 
to redefine their roles. Whereas this would translate into obstruction 
of hybridity, looking at the role of non-state actors in decision making 
combined with their influence on formation of national laws, it is 
palpable that institutional hybridity exists. The central argument is 
that multiple institutional logics are available to actors while actors 
may use all the available values to achieve their interests amid 
established formal institutions. In the context of this work, 
development does not depend on the state or what state institutions 
can or cannot do but on social and political structures that exist. In 
other words how actors fulfil the roles that are conventionally 
assumed to be for the state. This reality constitutes what I call 
hybridity. 
 
This paper is based on interviews I conducted in four Ugandan 
districts during fieldwork for my doctoral thesis. The first study took 
place between July and September, 2012 and the second from 
November to December, 2013. Participants were drawn from central 
government and LG units and included both politicians and civil 
servants. The four districts sampled were Pallisa, Kabarole, Wakiso 
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and Mukono. This is supplemented by media reports. The rest of the 
article is structured as follows. The next section briefly introduces 
local government in Uganda. This is followed by an explanation of 
what I mean by non-state actors and their historical background in 
Uganda. Thereafter a theoretical discussion on decentralisation is 
presented followed by presentation of empirical data. The empirical 
data starts with the discussion on the role of non-state actors in 
shaping public policy. Thereafter, their engagement in the social 
service sector and influence on electoral trends is discussed. It is 
important to note that although this paper examines the role of non-
state actors in influencing public policy decisions, I wish to 
emphasise that the discussion is based on the perception of state 
actors or actors within LG on how religious and traditional institutions 
influence decision making. No interview was conducted with non-
state actors as the study targeted actors spelt out in the Constitution. 
 
Local Government in Uganda 
Uganda adopted decentralisation in 1996 and went further to devolve 
most of the functions to LG. Uganda’s LG is not only decentralised 
but also devolved. The aim was to improve the functionality of local 
government. This came after the enactment of the LG Statute in 
1993, promulgation of the 1995 Constitution and enactment of the 
Local Government Act (LGA) 1997. The foundation of 
decentralisation is enshrined in article 176 (1) of the Constitution 
which states that ‘decentralisation shall be the principle applying to 
all levels from higher to lower levels to ensure peoples participation.’ 
Local government consists of five levels known as local councils 
(LCI-LCV). This is accompanied by an asymmetrical division of 
functions and responsibilities among the different levels. Each level 
comprises both administrative and political actors. At the same time 
political actors include democratically elected persons who serve a 
period of five years. The two wings (politicians and administrators) 
complement each other. It is assumed that through decentralisation 
local government would be in a better position to effectively and 
efficiently provide social services and above all steer development.51 
Because of the manner in which power is devolved, it has been 
described as unique and enabling (Ndegwa, 2002). In addition, 
devolution led to the creation of new institutions of governance, 
procedures and practices. This too has been perceived as major 
contribution of decentralisation in Uganda (Villadsen & Lubanga, 
1996). As Nsibambi (1998 p. 8) argues, decentralisation seeks to 
empower people to exercise as much influence as possible on the 
social and economic destiny by reducing the level of bureaucracy 
                                                 
51
 For details of Uganda’s decentralisation see Hansen and Twaddle (1998). 
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often located within the central government thus facilitating efficient 
utilisation of the scarce resources. It is however important to note 
that much as decentralisation aims to increase people’s participation 
in politics, it at the same restricts the involvement of non-state actors 
such as traditional leaders. Article 246 (e) of the constitution clearly 
states that ‘a person shall not, while remaining a traditional leader or 
a cultural leader join or participate in partisan politics’. Part (f) re-
emphasises that ‘a traditional leader or cultural leader shall not have 
or exercise any administrative, legislative or executive powers of 
government or LG.’ This implies that non-state actors shall not 
directly or indirectly engage in policy or decision making since this 
subjects them to partisan politics from which they are forbidden. In 
the context of Uganda’s LG, given the constitutional arrangement, 
decision making is purely the responsibility of policy actors within the 
LG structure. It means that in the process of executing their duties, 
LG may invite non-state actors, but only as passive observers. This 
provision however undermines the role these actors play in the public 
sector, for instance, in the provision of social services. 
  
In Uganda, the provision of social services, albeit involves some non-
state actors such as religious and traditional institutions, is still seen 
as the responsibility of the government. Moreover, decentralisation 
empowered local government to make policy decisions within their 
area of jurisdiction. This included decisions on social services such 
as education, health, making of by-laws, and the creation of local 
administrative units like parishes and sub counties. One of the 
objectives of decentralisation was to bring government closer to local 
communities in order to better understand their needs. This would 
facilitate development since district local governments would be 
transformed into an engine of development and not mere institutions 
of governance.  
 
The History of Cultural and Religious Institutions in Uganda 
To start with, this article uses non-state actors to imply religious and 
traditional institutions, which are equally limited to traditional 
establishments such as kingdoms and chiefdoms and Anglican 
(protestant), catholic and to a small extent the Muslim community on 
the part of religious institutions. This serves to minimise the scope of 
analysis, but also because the primary data covers only these 
institutions. Non-state actors as herein used do not include the civil 
society per se.52 Cultural and religious institutions have a long history 
in Uganda. Traditional institutions for instance existed before 
                                                 
52
 The Constitution separates religious and traditional authorities and assigns different 
roles to them. Again religious authorities are part of civil society. However, for analytical 
purposes, the two are treated as non-state actors in this paper.  
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colonialism. During the colonial era they existed alongside the British 
administration. After Independence in 1962, their existence was short 
lived as the then government led by Dr. Apolo Militon Obote 
subjugated them in 1966 because he allegedly feared that the then 
president, Sir Edward Mutesa, the Kabaka of Buganda, was 
scheming to topple the government using foreign mercenaries 
(Karugire, 1980; and Mutibwa, 1992). Cultural institutions were later 
restored by the current National Resistance Movement (NRM) 
government but soon took on a more vigilant approach to local 
politics. Constitutionally, “traditional or cultural leader means a king 
or similar traditional leader or cultural leader by whatever name 
called, who derives allegiance from the fact of birth or descent in 
accordance with the customs, traditions, usage or consent of the 
people led by that traditional leader” (article 246: 6). Much as 
traditional institutions are legally recognised in the country, they are 
forbidden from directly or indirectly engaging in partisan politics. 
Whereas the constitution is the sovereign law of the country, 
traditional and religious institutions on the other hand have principles 
that govern their operations. Their daily existence and conduct hence 
reflects a mixture of formal institutions and institutional traditions, 
norms and values.  
  
On the other hand, Christian religious institutions in Uganda were a 
result of colonialism, while Islam came in through to Arab trade. The 
strong colonial administration saw Christianity become more 
dominant compared to Islam, although the latter was the first to be 
introduced in the country.  Since then religion has played a significant 
role in shaping Uganda’s social and political landscape. During the 
colonial era, it was a major factor in chief making and recruitment of 
political figures (Mudoola, 1978). According to Mudoola, the colonial 
administration promoted the protestant faith and declared it a state 
religion. As a result Protestant groups assumed more political power. 
As the empirical data will later show, some sections of Ugandans 
have held the view that the country should always be led by a 
protestant president. According to Mudoola (1978), even at the local 
level, religion determined the recruitment of the county and sub-
county chiefs. They have since remained instrumental in providing 
social services, humanitarian assistance and facilitating reconciliation 
in communities devastated by conflict. The Uganda Joint Christian 
Council for example played a key role in negotiations between the 
government and the Lord’s Resistance Army, while the Inter-
Religious Council of Uganda is strongly involved in the campaign for 
electoral reforms. The Council initiated a task force of prominent 
leaders to ensure that the upcoming elections are free and fair. This 
clearly shows the penetration of religious institutions into politics. 
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They can be seen as two organs complementing each other. This 
has also opened up space for non-state actors to influence policy 
decisions. Given that religious leaders are authority figures with the 
opportunity to influence their communities through their teachings, 
they can use their power and position to perpetuate or mitigate 
conflict but also inform people’s choices, for instance, during 
elections. Coupled with their involvement in the social service sector, 
non-state actors can be drivers of development within or outside the 
framework of formal institutions. 
 
The Discourse on Decentralisation and Devolution   
Decentralisation is ‘the restructuring or reorganisation of authority so 
that there is a system of co-responsibility between institutions of 
governance at the central, regional and local levels according to the 
principle of subsidiarity, thus increasing the overall quality and 
effectiveness of the system of governance, while increasing the 
authority and capacities of sub-national levels’ (UNDP, 1999). 
According to Rondinelli and Nellis (1986 p. 5) it is ‘the transfer of 
responsibility for planning, management and the raising and 
allocation of resources from the central government and its agencies 
to field units of government agencies, subordinate units or levels of 
government, semi-autonomous public authorities, or non-
governmental private or voluntary organisations. Devolution is a 
subset of decentralisation and it implies the authority given to local 
governments that allows them to make autonomous policy decisions 
(see Johnson, 2001). Indeed, as Ferguson and Chandrasekharan 
(2005) argue, it refers to the ‘transfer of governance responsibility for 
specified functions to sub-national levels, either publicly or privately 
owned, that are largely outside the direct control of the central 
government’. Devolution thus involves transfer of specific decision-
making powers from one level of government to another in a 
descending manner. Sayer et al. (2004) define devolution as the 
transfer of rights and assets from the centre to local governments or 
communities, but within the context of national laws that set the limits 
within which any devolved functions occur. Through devolution, there 
is almost a total transfer of functions accompanied with decision 
making authority including decisions regarding finance. Other 
decisions may include conducting local elections and recruiting their 
own staff. This implies that local leaders have significant 
discretionary power necessary to create infrastructure that makes 
decentralisation effective, but at the same time remain accountable 
to local communities (Ribot, 2004 p.1). 
 
The consensus within political science and development studies is 
that decentralization and in particular devolution improves the 
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performance of local governments and makes them more responsive 
and effective (Putnam, 1993; Crook & Manor, 1995). This is because 
by shifting more responsibilities and functions from central 
governments to sub-national governments, an adequate division of 
functions and responsibilities between different levels of government 
is considered to be established. Decentralisation is thus a means to 
promote people participation in the management of the day to day 
affairs of their lives that is, to participate in decision making on issues 
that affect their daily lives. By encouraging people’s participation in 
local politics, awareness on political issues is increased and people 
can hold their leaders accountable. As a result LG can perform better 
and effectively (Rondinelli, Nellis & Cheema, 1984). In this way, 
participation is seen as a form of/ pathway to democracy. For 
instance political decentralisation aims to give citizens and their 
elected representatives the power to make and implement policy 
decisions. This implies breaking down the monopoly of the central 
government and increase political participation (Steiner, 2004 p. 11). 
One can argue that decentralisation propagates for horizontal form of 
governance where different actors take part in steering government. 
These actors may be from within or outside government. That, 
however, may be difficult in the face of minimal statutory reforms that 
establish functional institutions which promote a system of checks 
and balances. Without any doubt and indeed as Steiner argues, this 
can only be strengthened when mechanisms are created at the local 
level to facilitate the local level planning process, linking government 
staff to civil society (Steiner, 2004 p. 13). Case studies, however, 
show that most countries including Uganda still lack well established 
and functional institutions. Moreover the involvement of several 
players does not recognise non-state actors as shown in this study. 
In terms of decision making, several factors other than institutions 
come to play making this authority contested. 
  
In some instances central governments have failed to concede 
adequate power to enable LG make decisions. In South Africa for 
example, Galvin and Habib (2003) argue that provisions such as the 
President being the one to appoint provincial prime ministers and 
mayors of major metropolitan areas implies that he (the President) 
also directs their decisions. Such concentration of power at the apex 
of the political system has severe implications on policy decisions at 
lower level.  Galvin and Habib conclude that decentralisation in South 
Africa has taken a state-centric form other than community oriented.  
In Uganda, decentralisation aimed among others to shift 
responsibility for policy decisions and implementation away from the 
central government to the local people. As such it is seen as having 
set the stage for community participation (Nkulubo, 2007). Similarly a 
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shift from central government to sub-national governments 
establishes an adequate division of functions and responsibilities 
between different levels of government (Saito, 2001). The 
Empowerment of local governments to make policy decisions within 
their jurisdiction was based on the  assumption that when those 
closest to where decisions are made are empowered to make 
decisions and given ownership of results, better decisions will be 
made. Increased efficiencies then follow the quality of services 
provided. The United Nations Public Administration Network reports 
that privatisation which was part of decentralisation has significantly 
improved service delivery at local level thus the experience of private 
participation has proven to work (UN, 2001 pp. 37-39). But as shall 
be discussed later, legal instruments do not define the bounds of the 
private sector. In the context of this article, religious and traditional 
leaders may also be part of the private sector. This would blur their 
restriction on engaging in partisan politics since it is also difficult to 
explicitly deter the private sector from politics.    
 
Whereas the creation of new institutions of governance, procedures 
and practices is seen as a major contribution of decentralisation to 
LG, these institutions are not powerful enough to make decisions that 
they can implement. This is further complicated by limited resources 
to facilitate independence from the central government. The gap left 
by lack of resources on the part of LG is filled by non-state actors 
who most often have resources and do not have to depend on 
government funding. That enables them to actively engage in social 
service provision, get involved in politics and subsequently 
influencing decision making (see Neubert, 1997, 2011). In order to 
clearly show how this happens, I have categorised the role of non-
state actors in three categories namely (i) shaping public policy (ii), 
engagement in social service and (iii) influence on electoral patterns. 
I shall now turn to discuss each category separately. 
 
How Non-State Actors shape the Making of National Laws 
As already stated in the introduction, constitutionally, non-state 
actors should not play any role in the making of national laws. An 
analysis of the events that led to the passing of the Anti-Pornography 
Act, the Anti-Homosexual Act and against the stagnation of the 
Domestic Relations Bill demonstrates the role and significance of 
religious and non-state actors in this field. According to my 
informants, the passing of these two bills into Acts of Parliament 
resulted from mounting pressure from traditional and religious 
institutions (NCS2: 14.10.13). The following extracts show how most 
Ugandans perceive these institutions and what implications this has 
for public policy:    
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“Policy decisions are closely related to cultural and 
religious beliefs, therefore, any policy, which is not mindful 
of these factors, would likely fail.” (NCS2: 14.10.13). 
  
“First of all, all our rules are based on our norms and of 
course reflect our religious doctrines. So any attempt to 
undermine those believes will not work. Until a time comes 
when people don’t believe so much in these institutions, 
we as politicians just have to work with them. But it will 
take some time.” (NPlt2: 23.07.12, Kampala).  
 
“You know in countries like Uganda where culture and 
religion are strong and people believe in them, you cannot 
undermine the role of institutions attached to these 
people. These people are very influential and once they 
set their position, sometimes government has no choice 
but to agree to their demands.” (AC1: 30.07.12, Kampala).  
 
“It is because people have strong attachment to their 
culture, so you cannot just detach them from it nor do 
things that are not coherent with it. If you do it or if you are 
seen to support it, it is a danger to your political career.” 
(DCS1: 25.07.12, Mukono).  
 
“I think all Ugandans are happy with parliament’s decision. 
They see it as respecting their cultural values and this is a 
plus for government.” (NPlt4: 11.09.12, Kampala). 
 
On the Domestic Relations Bill, respondents claimed that it was 
shelved because some of its contents flout religious and traditional 
norms as such government failed to reach a consensus with non-
state actors. Respondents argued that the Bill’s contents such as 
divorce, abolition of widow inheritance and bride price went against 
religious and cultural norms. Moreover the proposed bill does not 
recognise the different traditional arrangement since it proposes that 
married women shall be entitled to property including land: 
“In Buganda, land is a special issue. First of all we say 
that, all land belongs to the Kabaka. Today people marry 
from all over, you cannot think of giving the Kabaka’s land 
to a foreigner, even if you want because she is your wife 
(…) if you are not careful, this land issue can even lead to 
death…people will kill each other, widows will be killed” 
(AC1: 30.07.12, Kampala).  
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These extracts illustrate a commonly held position – because of the 
relationship between people and these institutions, their views play a 
pertinent role in shaping political decisions. The extracts present non-
state actors opinion leaders and part and parcel of the public 
discourse. They depict how both the state and non-state actors claim 
legitimacy and authority based on exclusively different factors. The 
state’s claim for legitimacy is based on constitutional provisions, 
while non-state actors derive their legitimacy from history and 
religion, for instance, traditional leaders claim political authority 
derived from the pre-colonial era. With changing political structure, 
levels of education and ‘modernity’, public perception on tradition has 
changed. Yet, traditional institutions are still seen to represent 
indigenous and truly African values and authority. In this instance, 
laws such as AHA and the Anti-Pornography Act, seen to protect 
‘African values’ are propagated for while those that are seen as 
contravening (Domestic Relations Bill) encounter resistance.53 This 
was also the case when Muslim women demonstrated against the 
DRB which they said contradicted the Quran and viewed its passing 
as re-writing of the ‘Holy Book’.54 Using the pretext of preservation of 
culture and religious doctrines, religious and traditional institutions 
are able to position themselves in the political discourse 
consequently influencing political decisions.  
 
The position of the country’s president on this matter further 
illustrates the relevance of non-state actors in the political field. The 
president himself vowed not to support any law that violates cultural 
and religious values—‘as long as the National Resistance Movement 
and myself are still in charge of the affairs of the country, a bad, 
harsh or even insensitive law that tramples the fundamental human 
rights of citizens or affects their harmonious co-existence, will never 
be allowed’ (Uganda Women’s Network, 2013 p. 5). Although the 
President may have the power to pass the bill, his comments 
demonstrated his acknowledgment of the significance of non-state 
actors. Historically non-state actors were part and parcel of 
government. During the colonial era, the British LG administration 
operated alongside traditional institutions. In the pre-colonial era, 
traditional institutions/leaders doubled as political institutions/leaders 
and led the path to development. This illustrates that Uganda’s 
constitutional provision on non-state facilitates the emergence of 
power struggles and/ or competition for authority, as traditional 
leaders feel that their authority is being challenged. Due to direct 
access to their leaders, non-state actors and their procedures of 
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URN. (2011) ‘Church Leaders Oppose New marriage and Divorce Law’  
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 Will Ross (2005) ‘ Ugandan Polygamy Bill protest’ BBC News 29.03.205 
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governance are seen to constitute a form of government that is more 
accessible, participatory and better understood by the people. In the 
case of the Bills herein discussed, my respondents claimed that 
people expressed their views through religious and traditional 
institutions. These leaders then presented this to LG and/ or to 
members of parliament. These findings resonate with Lund’s (2006 p. 
685) observation—public authority does not always fall within the 
exclusive realm of government institutions; in some contexts, 
institutional competition is intense and a range of ostensibly apolitical 
situations become actively politicised. In his article, ‘Twilight 
Institutions: Public Authority and Local Politics in Africa’, Lund argues 
that, non-political situations may reveal themselves to be active sites 
of political negotiation and mediation over the implementation of 
public goals or the distribution of public authority in which local and 
regional identities and power relations are reshaped and recast.  This 
makes it difficult to ascribe exercised authority to the ‘state’ as a 
coherent institution; rather, public authority becomes the 
amalgamated result of the exercise of power by a variety of local 
institutions and the imposition of external institutions, conjugated with 
the idea of a state. As traditional authorities still enjoy a lot of 
legitimacy among the Ugandan populace, politicians on all levels are 
forced not to openly contradict positions held by such authorities.  As 
such, policy decisions are a hybrid of state and non-state actors’ 
opinion and interaction.  
  
In the context of development, contestation of legitimacy and 
authority may be counterproductive as, for instance, land is a factor 
in development, but as herein seen, this depends on how actors 
therein conceive development and/ or utilise their power towards it. If 
non-state actors hold on to their position of land, its contribution to 
development is tied to their interests. At the same time it 
demonstrates that although local government through the District 
Land Board is responsible for matters concerning land use and/ or 
distribution, it is clear that traditional institutions/leaders have more 
command in this area. In most cases, LG is subjected to negotiate 
with these non-state actors.  Denying women access to land limits 
their contribution to development using land. On the other hand, in an 
attempt to escape ‘gender discrimination’ homosexuals may migrate 
thus causing the country a loss in terms of labour and/ or skilled 
manpower.  
 
The Engagement of Non-State Actors in the Social Service 
Sector: Implications for Public Policy Decisions  
The provision of social services by non-state actors goes back to the 
colonial era where government partnered with religious institutions 
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that run health and educational establishments to provide these 
services. To many Ugandans, provision is seen to be a duty of the 
state. In the face of shrinking economic conditions on the side of the 
government, non-state actors who seem to have a strong resource 
base have rigorously filled in the gap. The involvement of non-state 
actors in the provision of social services symbolises an arrangement 
of welfare mix in which non-profit organisations gain formal 
recognition as partners in policy making. Such an arrangement 
grants non-state actors a margin of influence on policy decisions. 
Indeed, Karin Jenkins (1994) argues that ‘Christian churches—
catholic and protestant are not only preaching the gospel across 
Africa today, but also are funding and operating a myriad of 
development projects throughout the continent that are intended to 
improve the quality of life. They are important participants in African 
affairs contributing to socialisation of African citizens and thus 
affecting the prospects for democratic participation by those involved 
in church programmes’ (Jenkins, 1994 pp. 84-92). Jenkins adds that 
aid agencies like USAID have turned to the church to direct 
assistance to local communities due to the belief that the church 
provides a safer avenue for money considering the rampant misuse 
of aid funds. She further argues that the message of the gospel and 
the spiritual influences enables the church to speak out on social 
injustices, economic failures and political repression. Scholars such 
as Neubert (1997) argue that unlike other NGOs, the Catholic and 
the Protestant churches occupy a special position and have their own 
social base. According to Neubert (1997), religious institutions play 
an important role as creators of social order. Moreover, churches do 
not only have varying degrees of relevance and influence, but also 
rely on a highly committed body of followers and are often able to 
finance themselves and the services they provide for their members 
from their own resources. According to him, religious institutions 
have gained social importance through creation of social 
infrastructures, which also relieves the government of responsibility. 
This diffusion of religious institutions in politics and social welfare 
may threaten the legitimacy of government. My respondents were of 
the view that non-profit based organisations like hospitals owned by 
the church always offered better services compared to state 
hospitals: 
“We have a hospital called Naggalama,55 the first of part 
of it is that the drugs are available all the time, the other 
one is that the workers are more committed to work than 
those in the government community” (DCS1: 27.08.13 Tel 
Inter).  
                                                 
55
 Naggalama is part of Mukono LG; the hospital is owned by the Catholic Church. 
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Respondents also cited instances in which, although aiming at the 
same goal, the church and government had disagreements for 
instance:  
“One time we wanted to implement a certain project in one 
of the schools owned by the church. We also wanted to 
construct a classroom block, but we could not. The 
owners refused us. The project stalled because its design 
was not in line with the preference of the founding body. 
Besides, the school authorities argued that they were not 
consulted during planning and decision making process. 
The project only took off after the design was changed to 
fit what the founders wanted” (SCS2: 26.08.13 Kabarole). 
   
“Unlike this LG, the church has always been there with us 
and for us, so when you as LG are planning you should 
always have the church in mind. In fact those who try to 
avoid are risking” (AC1: 30.07.12 Kampala). 
 
This observation demonstrates an overlap between state and non-
state institutions but also construction of power dependence that 
contributes to what I call institutional hybridity. On the other hand 
AC1’s observation about the church suggests co-existence, that is, 
religious institutions have been custodians of service delivery even 
prior to public restructure and are more familiar with the needs of the 
local communities. His statement implies that even if decisions are 
made contrary to the church, the loyalty that the church commands 
makes people support it against the decision of LG. The Kabarole 
case illustrates that although legal instruments empower LG, their 
power to implement decisions is limited to the extent that 
implementation does not interfere with non-state actors interests and 
when it does, it calls for cooperation. Chand and Patterson (2007) 
report that contributions from religious institutions account for 55 per 
cent of social services provision in Uganda.56 It is against this 
background that respondents argued that non-state actors had 
become an engine of development. Similarly, there is equally a 
growing infusion of traditional institutions in politics and/ or social 
welfare. This is facilitated by well-structured development plans that 
these institutions have including committees which deal with issues 
that affect their subjects (Quinlan, Sharma & Clarke, 2011 p. 285). At 
the local level, traditionally legitimated authorities like chiefs or 
councils of elders claim regulatory authority with regard to justice and 
administration and regard themselves as representing the local 
                                                 
56
 See also UNPF (2008). 
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population in interactions with the state (Neubert, 2011). These 
institutions occupy political spaces left open by the state, and may 
see themselves as institutional alternatives to a system of centralised 
power. According to Neubert, this makes state-building in Africa a 
complicated process because the state has to cope with a multitude 
of decentralised socio-political structures which show great 
persistence and adaptability in everyday life. In the context of 
Uganda, this implies the involvement of non-state actors whose 
contribution in the social service sector enables them to compete 
with state actors and counter the state’s claim to exclusive power 
over policy decisions. 
   
Whereas LG is responsible for the provision of decentralised social 
services, its financial position limits their effective performance. On 
the other hand, non-state actors seem to have readily available 
resources and perhaps less bureaucracy compared to the 
government making it easy for them to provide services faster than 
government.  This also enables them win more public support as 
people slowly lose trust in government institutions. Respondents 
claimed that by involving themselves in the public sector, cultural 
institutions got the opportunity to advance their political interests and 
demand to play a role in public policy decisions (DCS1: 25.07.12 
Mukono). An example could be cited in one of the kingdoms’ 
(Buganda kingdom)57 position on the system of LG—“the health 
sector has been run down, the universal education programme has 
failed. With a federal system of government, the kingdom will 
concentrate on social service delivery as the [central] government 
concentrates on building the army and buying tear gas”.58 This 
statement does not only illustrate the ‘unfriendly’ kingdom’s 
relationship between the kingdom and the government, but also 
demonstrates that in positioning themselves in the public sector, 
traditional institutions have emphatically demanded to be involved in 
deciding the destiny of the country. Above all, it shows the 
willingness to co-exist. The prime minister’s message clearly shows 
how non-state actors have adopted the language of development 
and asserted their right to speak and decide their destiny thus 
shifting the debate beyond the initial parameters set by the state. 
Moreover, the real decision makers in LG are always individuals or 
collective actors who also subscribe to these institutions. Their 
influence on policy decisions may be realised during the 
implementation phase. Because implementation often takes place at 
                                                 
57
 Buganda kingdom is Uganda’s strongest traditional establishment and has a lot of 
influence on the country’s political landscape. 
58 Kitaata KS, 2013 ‘I have no time for useless talks, new Katikiro tells off Museveni’ 
The Observer 25.06.2013. 
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local level, it provides non-state actors the opportunity to foster, 
hinder or at least modify the administrative enactment of a specific 
decision. In line with this, a respondent cited a case in which the 
kingdom failed a LG project because it was not involved in planning 
and deciding on the project.   
“One time we were trying to construct an office block in a 
sub-county and Kabaka's agents came and chased away 
our contractor saying that, that land belongs to the 
Kabaka. So after that we agreed that we cannot compete 
over this land and they relocated the sub-county 
headquarters to another place, but that piece of land also 
belonged to the Kabaka again we could not go on with the 
project. We had to go on a round table” (DCS1: 25.07.12 
Mukono).  
 
This action undermines the mandate and power of LG to establish 
and build new LG unities. The District Land Board may have carried 
out the necessary legal procedures including land identifications and 
laid out plans for its development. However, the power overlap 
between traditional institutions and LG failed the latter’s plans. 
Although the sub-county was a public institution, meant to serve the 
local population. The people who pulled down the structure were part 
of the community, but more loyal to the kingdom than with LG as an 
institution. The elected leaders too could not use their authority to 
erect the structure because they had to choose between loyalty to 
the kingdom and political power. Moreover, disobeying the kingdom 
would be risking their political carrier. The act by traditional chiefs 
demonstrates the way in which the kingdom has positioned itself on 
the political agenda while the response by LG leadership shows their 
readiness to work together. The manner in which the situation was 
settled demonstrates hybridity in policy decisions. Since LG is 
charged with the responsibility of providing social services, a 
partnership with traditional leaders may enable the latter influence 
policy decisions, but also facilitate speedy and efficient delivery of 
social services.  
 
As seen in the above example, decisions concerning land were 
another area for non-state actors to position themselves. In the early 
2000 the country started the process of land reforms. Respondents 
recalled that the process met strong opposition from traditional 
institutions (AC1: 30.07.12 Kampala). AC1 added that Buganda 
kingdom did not only oppose it vehemently, but also influenced the 
position of LG within the kingdom. Buganda is only one example, in 
northern Uganda AC1 recalls that a proposal to start up a 
commercial sugar plantation had failed because locals were not 
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willing to give up their land insisting that it belonged to their cultural 
leader. This view was pointed out by several respondents especially 
members of parliament. They recalled that once LG decided to 
allocate land to a developer identified by government, Acholi59 
women undressed and demonstrated in front of LG offices while the 
men threatened to fight the developer with machetes (DPlt16; GRP4; 
DCS3).   
 
This shows that in any government structure, actors have different 
levels of command which necessitates collaboration. At a point 
where non-state actors command more influence, they can engage 
LG in a bargain from a position of strength.  As herein shown, the 
‘traditional’ roles of traditional leaders have been shifted. Other than 
being custodians of their heritage, they are becoming part of LG and 
their role in influencing policy decisions is more tangible. It once 
again shows how non-state actors organise public discourse and 
become part of the country’s politics. 
 
The Influence of Non-State Actors in Electoral Trends  
Scholars such as Stephen Ellis and Gerrie Ter Haar (1998, 2007) 
have extensively studied the relationship between politics and 
religion in Africa and argue that politics in Africa cannot be fully 
understood without reference to religious ideas that are widely 
shared in societies south of the Sahara. In Uganda, political divisions 
based on religion can be traced back to the independence era and 
the formation of the first political parties in the country (Young, 2000). 
Since then religion is one of the factors that shape Uganda’s political 
culture. It also plays a significant role in determining people’s political 
carriers. In this section I explore how religion plays into elections and 
voting patterns in Uganda. 
   
Many respondents were of the view that religion matters in Ugandan 
politics and that election period was the time for powerful religious 
institutions to ‘show their muscles’. According to them, this was the 
time when mainly traditional churches (Anglican and Catholic) 
exhibited their power by rallying behind a candidate from a given faith 
and also seen as a strong supporter of a given faith. It was during 
such times that religious leaders designed their sermons in line with 
the campaign manifestos of these candidates (SCS2: 26.08.13 
Kabarole; AC1: 0.07.12 Kampala). There are those instances where 
by religious leaders financially sponsored a candidate on an 
agreement that when this person won the election he/ she had to 
make sure to influence policy decisions in the direction of his 
                                                 
59
 Acholi is a region in northern Uganda. The act of women undressing is considered a 
taboo in most Ugandan cultures. 
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sponsors (SCS2: 26.08.2013 Kabarole). By endorsing or financially 
supporting a particular candidate these non-state actors are looking 
for a voice through which they can influence policy decisions at the 
different levels of government. At the same time politicians frequently 
discuss their religion when campaigning and many religious 
institutions and religious leaders are highly politically active. As 
important as religion is in politics, politicians use it to advance their 
interests. In this way non-state actors organise public voice and are 
part of politics and public discourse, contrary to constitutional 
provisions. Participants were of the view that this was due to 
increased feelings of marginalisation by some religious leaders with 
the feeling that they were not well represented in LG or in parliament  
(SCS2, 26.08.13 Tel Int; DCS3: 20.08.12 Wakiso). According to 
interviewees, this explains why political aspirants always campaigned 
along religious lines. Moreover this was backed by religious leaders 
whose message at such times was an indirect campaign for their 
endorsed candidates, thus voters are sometimes influenced by the 
message of the church. Religious influence was further facilitated by 
certain stereotypes whereby some Ugandans have always held the 
convictions that Catholics cannot make good leaders and this has 
implications on who they vote into power (SCS4: 07.09.12 Kabarole). 
This opinion was shared by the former prime minister who also said 
that some people just wanted to maintain the tradition that Uganda 
must always be ruled by a protestant (AC1: 30.07.12 Kampala). 
Right from independence Uganda has been ruled by protestant 
presidents and as such Catholics and Muslims have intensified their 
fight for political power. 
  
Many interviewees reasoned that that in countries like Uganda, one 
cannot separate cultural and religious institutions from politics 
because in most cases people tend to listen more to the views of 
these institutions.   
‘In Buganda you cannot ignore the importance of the 
Kabaka. Apparently we60 have lost a number of by-
elections so we should be cautious of what happens on 
the ground because if we continue to lose we shall not be 
able to influence any decisions on the ground. The 
problem is that sometimes, people tend to extoll the 
President more than their king, but you can’t blame them, 
they are lost. You know of a minister who lost his seat for 
saying that he does not kneel61 before the king, a 
candidate said to have been more loyal to the king was 
                                                 
60
 The professor (AC1) uses ‘we’ to imply the NRM party to which he is a member. 
61
In the Buganda culture all men and women kneel before the king and do not show 
him their backs. When walking away, they go backwards.  
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endorsed by the kingdom and he won the dejected 
minister. (AC1: 30.07.12 Kampala).  
 
In this statement, the former prime minister who is himself a 
Muganda acknowledged that non-state actors such as cultural 
institutions especially those located in monarchical regions were very 
significant in mapping political trends in the country. Despite the 
constitutional provision that prohibits traditional leaders from partisan 
politics, AC1 beliefs that they remain influential actors, whose power 
and impact on one’s political career cannot be undermined. AC1 
attributes NRM’s failure to win elections in constituencies within the 
Kingdom to NRM politicians’ turn to extoll the President at the 
expense of the King. This according to him explains why the minister 
lost his parliamentary seat to a candidate who was more loyal to the 
Kingdom. In this case, the kingdom acted as a filter to determine and 
subsequently endorse a candidate who represents their values. It 
also shows its ability to influence people’s choices especially those 
loyal to it. 
  
In Kabarole, the experience was that:  
“If a politician is not seen to be doing something for the 
kingdom or does not relate well with the kingdom, he may 
not win the next elections. Right now, we are preparing for 
empango, but I can tell you the chairman has already 
signed a check for the Kingdom” (SCS2: 26.08.2013 
Kabarole). 
 
This case was cited in lieu of the empango (coronation of the King of 
Tooro) celebration that was due in two weeks as I conducted this 
research. According to SCS2, despite the financial burden this 
placed on LG whose resources were already meagre, politicians did 
it because it earned them political mileage and could enable them 
win the next election. 
 
Conclusion   
This article has discussed the place of non-state actors in LG in 
Uganda in terms of their influence on development of formal 
institutions, penetration in the social service sector and its 
implications on policy decisions in LG and influence on electoral 
outcomes. The findings demonstrate the extent to which cultural and 
religious institutions have successfully created a diverging degree of 
social acceptance, which offers them a basic measure of legitimacy. 
They create known and accepted behavioural structures, which 
cannot be changed by specific individuals as evidenced above. In so 
doing, they can either be contributors or saboteurs of development. 
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Therefore by constitutionally prohibiting non-state actors from directly 
or indirectly getting involved in partisan politics and/ or carrying out 
any legislative, executive or judicial functions, the constitution fails to 
recognise the socio-political position of this actors. In an attempt to 
establish themselves, the works of these actors may counter some 
formal institutional provisions.  In the context of institutions and 
development, the paper argues development does not depend on the 
state and what its institutions can or cannot do, but on the prevailing 
social and political structures. Development depends on how well 
actors accomplish the roles that are conventionally assumed to be for 
the state. Formal rules ought to be firmly linked with social or informal 
norms for them to function well, since it is the latter that legitimises 
the former. Development demands the support of appropriate 
political institutions that enhance economic growth and stability. 
Therefore the assumption that institutions matter in fostering 
development needs to bear in mind the social fabric of any given 
society. This reality constitutes what I call institutional hybridity.  
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Notes 
List of Interviewees 
Code used  Categories  
1. AC   Academics  
2. NPlt   Politicians above LCV level (N- National) 
3. DPlt   Politicians at district & sub-county  
    (LCV,LCIII & councilors) 
4. NCS   Civil servants at ministry level 
- DCS   Civil servants at district level 
- SCS   Civil Servants at sub-county level 
5. Group discussion with councillors 
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Appendix 
National Politicians i.e. above LCV; Code used NP /MP/X 
 Code & Date/place of 
Interview 
Brief profile 
1. NPlt2 : 23.07.12 Kampala MP Burahya County - Kabarole district 
2. NPlt3: 13.08.12 Kampala MP Rukiga County Kabale district & 
chairperson of the Committee on LG 
Accounts. Member of the opposition 
3. NPlt4: 11.09.12 Kampala MP Agule county Pallisa committee 
member Finance, Planning & Economic 
Development 
4. NCS2: 29.05.13 Erlangen Permanent Secretary (PS) of Ministry of 
Works & Transport. Former PS of Ethics 
and Integrity at the time of the interview 
5. DCS1: 25.07.12 Mukono Chief Administrative Officer Mukono district 
Local Government 
6. SCS2: 07.09.12 Kabarole Town Clerk Kabarole Town Coucil Local 
Government 
7. AC1: 30.07.12 Kampala Former PM, professor of political science, 
published works on decentralisation. 
Member of the ruling NRM party and 
comes from a kingdom region 
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An Ethnography of Urban Land Holding and Housing  
in Bamako, Mali 
 
Lamine Doumbia 
 
 
Abstract 
The city of Bamako, the Malian capital has witnessed demographic change and 
spatial sprawl of its urban environment over the last 20 years. The population 
changes led to the emergence of the so-called “squatter settlements” due to the 
government’s inability to provide for the housing needs of the teeming mass of 
urban residents. Rather, the state and the local government attempted to regulate 
the “squatter settlement” phenomenon through bureaucratic policies and urban 
renewal projects. Yet, the challenge of managing urban land holding and the 
processes in the provision of housing space in Bamako remain problematic, 
conflictual and very often violent given the different claims of entitlement to the 
land. The aim of this paper is twofold: it first describes the chronology of the 
evolution of the land tenure system and second, from the legal anthropological 
perspective, provides a description and interpretation of the attitudes and the 
emical perceptions of actors (protagonists) involved in the policy and processes of 
urban land tenure in Bamako. Based on empirical case study in Bamako, the paper 
explores the dynamic factors that have shaped the processes of landholding and 
management from the last century to the present.  The global influences on local 
structures and the commoditization of land that leads to the discussion of usufruct 
and appropriation of property are discussed. 
  
Keywords: squatter settlements, slums, urban land holding 
 
Introduction 
This paper treats the issue of urban land management in relation to 
the politics of housing, renewal and rehabilitation plans as well as the 
displacement, compensations and conflict regulations in Bamako. The 
capital city of the Western Africa Republic of Mali witnessed a great 
demographic and spatial sprawl of the urban area during the last two 
decades. Some so-called “squatter settlements” emerged due to the 
fact that the government is economically unable to address the ever 
increasing problem of housing and therefore tries to regulate it 
through bureaucratic policies and urban renewal projects. These 
attempts have been made against a backlash of the competing 
struggle and interests between residents and the state which has 
aptly been captured by researchers as follows:   
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The problematic of managing urban land holding and the 
processes of housing space provision in Bamako often 
contains ‘lots of ink’ but also and sometimes ‘blood flows’ 
in Bamako (Hesseling, Djiré & Oomen, 2005).  
 
This paper has two aims: first, it briefly describes the chronology of 
the evolution of the land tenure system. Second, it focuses on the 
legal anthropological perspective to provide a thick description and 
interpretation of the attitudes and the emical perceptions of actors and 
protagonists who are involved in the policy and process of urban land 
tenure and management in Bamako. This discussion is based on an 
empirical case study in Bamako and the emphasis is to understand 
the factors of innovation and permanence that characterize the 
process but more so their dynamics from the last century to the 
present.  
 
An intriguing question about the land holding and tenure in Bamako 
is: Why is the issue of urban land management loaded with violence? 
While the issue about land holding and violence is very complex and 
not easily explicable, a critical view points to the fact that the core of 
land tenure in urban areas of Bamako is about power, violence, 
legitimacy and jurisprudences. There is a high degree of violence due 
to the plurality of actors and actors’ perceptions of the tenure systems 
which informs the competing narratives about ownership and the right 
to occupy specific places in the city. The essence of this paper is to 
empirically show that there is an urgent need to rethink, reshape and 
reorganize the institutional rules in the management of the land 
tenure system.  
 
“Le foncier est un fait social total” is an important argument by Marcel 
Mauss62 which has influenced many scholars on land ownership, 
tenure and the social relations around it. Seen as a total social fact, 
Étienne Le Roy elaborates further by arguing that land holding in 
general is the common denominator of all social relations existing 
between individuals.63  Therefore land management, according to Le 
                                                 
62
 For a detailed discussion on this concept see Etienne Le Roy’s (1997) work on La 
sécurité foncière dans un contexte africain de marchandisation imparfaite de la terre. 
63
 As Le Roy puts it (in French): Le foncier (F) est un rapport social (S) ayant la terre ou 
le territoire (T) comme assise et enjeu et où les variables économiques (E), juridiques 
(J), et techniques d’aménagement de la nature (A) sont pondérées par le facteur 
politique (P) aux différentes échelles locales (l), nationale (n) et internationale (i). See 
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Roy, is a social relation having land/ territory as the principal and 
common denominator whereas economic, legal and technical 
variables are balanced with the political factor that is somehow raised 
to the local, national and international powers. The social relation 
around land and its entanglement with economic and power issues is 
used in this study as an entry point to the legal anthropological 
perspective. Again, the diversity of agencies and actors who are 
involved in the management and holding of urban land in Bamako 
leads in a special way, it is believed, to the concept of semi 
autonomous social fields (Sally Falk Moore, 1978).  And within this 
complex dynamic of social interaction, the conflict is latent in diverse 
ways.64 
 
Problematic of the System of Land Tenure 
This section provides a brief history of the capital city of Mali where 
the fieldwork was conducted. Bamako almost appears to be a mega 
city nowadays. Like other capital cities in Africa, the population of 
Bamako has more than doubled since the 1970s.  The Malian capital 
traces its origin to 1640 on the left side bank of the Niger River. By 
the end of the 19th Century, Bamako had become first the provincial 
capital of the colonial French Sudan (Soudan français) before it 
became the economic and administrative capital. It finally gained the 
status of the capital city of the Republic of Mali in 1960. Although 
relatively small before colonial rule, compared with other settlements, 
the rise in the population of Bamako began when the city became 
both the administrative and economic center for the colonial 
administration. As, a booming center for trade and commerce, the city 
attracted migrants from within Mali and neighbouring West African 
countries (see Meillassoux, 1965).  Subsequently, as of 2012, the city 
had grown to include 2.5 Million inhabitants and stretches out over 
267km² of land surface (Mairie du district de Bamako, 2001).  Under 
the strong pressure from population growth, the city authority’s policy 
of providing space for residential buildings and urban housing has 
faced serious challenges. The city administration undertook measures 
to renew, rehabilitate and restructure parts of the capital, including 
Sabalibougou,65 where a specific social phenomenon of housing had 
emerged.  This phenomenon is called variously by state and city 
                                                                                                                            
Etienne Le Roy (1997) on La sécurité foncière dans un contexte africain de 
marchandisation imparfaite de la terre. 
64
 See Henry Hagen and Rusen Keles (2004) 
65
 The study area 
BIGSAS Working Papers 5/2015: Actors, Institutions and Change: Perspectives on Africa  84 
 
 
authorities as “Slum”, “illegal housing”, and “Squatting”.66 At the 
grassroots level people call it in the Bamanan language Sonsoribugu 
which translates literary as the area where people squat – as sonsori 
means squat. 
 
Before the advent of colonial domination, which introduced the state 
system in the administration and management of land, the land tenure 
regime was organized and institutionalized by the local communities 
or groups of individuals67 living and sharing together the same 
resources, identities, perceptions of life and nature, religion and, in 
short, cultures in the Malian context. Given this de facto social 
arrangement, it is obvious that the tenure system varied from one 
local community to another either in rural or urban areas. 
  
Historically, the current tenure system with the state as regulator of 
the matriculation draws its origin from the colonial regime. The 
techniques of matriculation for land holding under the colonial 
administration guaranteed only individual property rights. Therefore 
the proclamation of the code Faidherbe on March 11, 1865 stated that 
only the regular (individual) ownership title is recognized. This 
legislation excluded customary (communal) ownership of land which 
is the pre-colonial arrangement of land management for the 
population instead of what was mentioned in the Code Civil Français 
(see Diawara, 2002 p. 77). Subsequently, the “Afrique Occidentale 
Française (AOF)” introduced the matriculation as an obligatory 
document of individual ownership since July 24, 1906 (see 
Rochegude, 1982 p. 145) despite the persistence of customary 
regulations based on the communal ownership of land. Although the 
urban land and housing situation increased within the colonial and 
post-colonial system of state intervention, which operates with the 
Code domanial et Foncier68 (translated roughly as federal or national 
land code), the “Etatisation” (i.e. nationalization) attempt to fully 
monopolize the management of urban land holding is yet to be 
achieved.  The first article of the law in the national (federal) land 
code states:  
All estates that are matriculated in the register, all estates 
not yet matriculated as well as vacant and non-owner 
estates are properties of the State.69 
                                                 
66
 Quartier sponntané 
67
 Kassibo (1998); Oomen and Djiré (2005). 
68
 Code domanial et Foncier, 1986 
69
 Translated from the code domanial et foncier by the author 
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Thus far, references to and reliance on the housing provision policy 
for addressing the housing needs of the urban residents has not been 
very helpful since the state and city authorities could not catch up with 
the demographic pressure. The migration flow from rural to urban 
areas, especially to Bamako (which was informed by French colonial 
legacy of centralization of the state), has created a shortage of 
organized housing for residents. Given the problems associated with 
the housing system and its management, I employ a mix of existing 
scholarly works including the theory of James Scott. The 
phenomenon of city planning is seen by Scott as “social engineering” 
which is conditioned by the processes of legibility and simplification of 
the society. Concrete case studies are described by Scott to explain 
“How certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed” 
such as “the compulsory villagization in Tanzania” and “the 
construction of Brasilia, Brazil’s capital city. Social engineering is a 
measure of city planning in the sense of developing and renewing it 
that combines four elements in the implementation. The 
administrative order of the nature and the society is the first necessity. 
The second is the high modernist ideology with a belief in science and 
industrialization; the third element is the existence of an authoritarian 
state for the implementation and last but not least, the existence of a 
subordinated civil society that has no plans to control and defend 
another point of view.  
 
In fact, these elements lead to disaster, according to Scott, as 
implementing measures of city planning in terms of “social 
engineering” is about an arena within which state institutions, offices, 
administrations, city planners, investors, civil society organizations 
and other interested groups need the same resource. The state tries 
to make the nature and society legible and touchable through 
processes of simplifications and standardizations. 
  
State simplifications such as maps, censuses, cadastral 
lists, and standard units of measurement represent 
techniques for grasping a large and complex reality (Scott, 
1998 p. 77). 
 
In the mid 1970s the former president of Tanzania Julius Nyerere 
implemented the Ideology of “Ujamaa village”. According to Scott this 
Ideology is “large scale social-engineering” (Scott, 1998 p. 223). This 
was somehow for the purpose of setting up a revolution and socialist 
oriented restructuration of the housing situation und employment 
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provisioning for the people. Moreover the implementation of the “large 
scale social-engineering” aimed to basically change people’s habits 
and perceptions. in the beginning people had massively participated 
in the project but later they all turned to reflect on their forced 
displacement. People were expropriated and their points of views and 
knowledge were not considered. The argument in this paper is 
theoretically based on the work of other scholars (e.g. Kassibo, 1998; 
Hesseling, Djiré & Oomen, 200; Le Roy, 1997, 2006) and uses 
findings from the empirical case study to diagnose the nature of plural 
management of urban lands in Bamako. It is, however, important to 
emphasize that writing about housing or house holding in the Malian 
context implies a particular tenure of the plot/ land. So when one 
speaks of land holding and tenure, they assume that the tenant and 
holder is the same and this is related to social rules, rights, orders 
and not the least, actors. In addition, the actors and individuals are 
very heterogeneous and migrated originally from elsewhere in the 
country to Bamako. 
 
Research and Analytical Approach  
This section focuses on the ethnographic approach that was applied 
in conducting the fieldwork in Bamako and the analysis of the 
findings. As already stated, urban land holding and housing in 
Bamako is conceptually and in our understanding, conflictual (latent 
or open) and very dynamic. Thus it is likely tautological to apply the 
“actor-centered-approach”.70 This approach entails concentrating on 
different narratives of different individuals and actors regarding their 
degree of involvement, affections, and their identities to find out 
potential “basic narratives”.71 This concept is appropriate since the 
object of the research is related to governance and the political 
cultures which are current and mostly contested. In other words, the 
research on urban land management in Bamako requires a focus on 
narratives from the various actors who are involved in the process. 
The legal anthropological perspective is employed in this paper 
because of the need to properly situate the pluralistic logic of land 
management and dispute settlement in the Malian context. This 
approach thus marks a departure from the positivist-modern 
institution of jurisdiction which was introduced and implemented by 
the colonial state. The central question is “what is law?” That is to 
say, in a context where there co-exist multiple institutional rules, what 
                                                 
70
 Herz and Schwab-Trapp (1997) 
71
 Trutz von Trotha (2007). 
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could legitimately be considered as the law?  The difference between 
‘law’ and ‘custom’ elaborated in the classical works of Radcliffe-Brown 
(1952), and upon which much of the later discussions of legal 
anthropology (Maine, 190672; Bohannan, 1963; Gluckman, 1955) 
were based, traces its origins to the eighteenth century definition of 
“law as a contract” between individuals. The general consensus was 
a focus on societal arrangements for enforcing sanctions and not 
necessarily the form they take. Subsequently, the legal anthropology 
framework has sought deeper understandings to the dispute-order 
connection by exploring actors and institutions with authority to make 
norms that are legally binding and the social processes that mediate 
their persistence and change. This paper thus sets out, as its 
objective, to analyze the pre- and post-history of land dispute 
settlements within and beside the state (leviathan).73 This includes the 
reflection on what kind of label could be given to custom vis-à-vis law 
in the positivist sense and the one most important in understanding 
urban land tenure. Moreover, the paper explores the influence of 
global challenges on local structures in Bamako in terms of 
commoditization of land that leads to the discussion of ‘usufruct’ i.e. 
land appropriation and property rights.  
 
From the Suburban to Town Centre: Sabalibougou 
Bamako is, as the capital and largest city, divided into six (6) 
administrative communes (i.e. municipal administrative entities). This 
classification was informed by the so-called decentralization program 
which has constitutionally been implemented since 1992. The case 
study areas, Sabalibougou is one of seven (7) quartiers within the 
administrative jurisdiction of commune V as presented in Table 1. 
Commune V is one of the border communes of Bamako because to 
its north there is the Niger River and to the south is the zone of the 
International Airport. The rural commune of Kalaban Coura is located 
south-west to Commune V while to the east, we have the commune 
IV and again the River Niger.74 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
72
 See Sir Henry Sumner Maine’s 1861 book: Ancient Law, its connection with the 
early history of society and its relation to modern ideas. 
73
 Spittler (1980); Klute (2011). 
74
 Plan de développement économique social et culturel de la commune V – Période : 
2005-2009, KGM, Août 2004, Bamako - Mali 
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Table 1: 
Areas in the Commune V of Bamako by Population 
No. Quartiers Population 
Male 
Population 
Female 
Total 
1 Badalabougou SEMA I 10,480 13.195 23.675 
2 Daoudabougou 25.003 26.140 51.143 
3 Quartier Mali 7.785 8.171 15.956 
4 Torokorobougou 7.106 6.836 13.942 
5 Kalaban Coura 28.843 30.038 58.881 
6 Baco-Djicoroni 18.208 18.750 36.958 
7 Sabalibougou 25.165 24.027 49.192 
Total  122.617 127.110 249.727 
Source: Plan de développement économique social et culturel de la 
commune V (2004). 
 
 
Area Description 
The “La Bande des 140m”75 is located in the eastern part of 
Sabalibougou on the west side of the ECOWAS Avenue (see Figure 
1). This is one of the most important avenues of Bamako because it 
crosses the capital city from the Presidential Palace on the left bank 
of the River Niger to the International Airport on the right bank of the 
Niger river and vice versa. Given the strategic location, Sabalibougou 
became the area with the highest population density at the end of the 
1980s. The area became populated initially as suburb and somewhat 
not ‘officially’ belonging to Bamako but its present location in the inner 
city makes the plots of land over there rather very expensive. Due to 
its location, Sabalibougou “la bande des 140m” has become the most 
attractive place for investors (politicians, traders, banks, NGOs, etc).  
These agencies, the government and the municipalities on the one 
hand, view the land (i.e. the plots in the area) more as a commodity in 
terms of capital investment for profit making76. On the other hand, 
some of the inhabitants (both individuals and households) most of 
often perceive the area as their basic place of existence.  
 
 
 
                                                 
75
 140 meters is the total size of the area in question.  
76
 See Georg Klute & Raul M. Fernandes (2011). 
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Figure 1: Map of Bamako showing the Case Study Area “La 
Bande des 140m” 
 
 
 
These competing notions about the utility of urban land holding 
among the different actors also reflect the general debate about 
space in urban studies. An important argument in this line of thought 
is set out by Henry Lefebvre (1991).77 In his seminal work on the ‘right 
to the city’, Lefebvre posits that the state’s construct of urban space is 
conceived around abstract dimensions – size, width, area, location, 
                                                 
77
 Henry Lefebvre, a French philosopher wrote on how urban working class in Paris in 
the 1960s could be empowered to participate in the production and use of the urban 
space in which they lived and shaped. His work influenced the contemporary critical 
thinking about the uses of urban space.  
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etc and thus qualitatively different from how residents’ construct it. 
Inhabitants, on their part, construct urban space based on its social 
utility i.e. a space to live. Lefebvre argued that the state’s abstract 
conception of urban space and its uses was starkly different from the 
uses to which residents’ put it. The state’s abstract conception and 
planning was often influenced and promoted by real estate 
development which resulted in conflicts between residents and the 
state. To ensure that residents did not surrender their citizenship 
rights to the pressure from the state, Lefebvre therefore pointed out 
the agency citizens have and could employ. He highlighted their 
central role to influence the decisions of the municipal administration 
as well as their right to physically occupy, live in, and shape the 
central areas of the city. This participation and shaping of the urban 
space by residents in the current case study is mostly driven by the 
competing narratives about the institutional rules that govern 
ownership and the right to stay on the land.  
 
The topic around urban holding and the multiple institutional rules 
governing it especially in sub-Saharan Africa is still interesting to 
researchers. Indeed, the phenomenon has been studied in Guinea 
Bissau (see Klute & Fernandes, 2011) and a similar fieldwork has 
been conducted in Addis Ababa.78  Basically the commoditization of 
land refers to Karl Polanyi. The reference to Polanyi is important in 
the sense that he employed and promoted the substantialistic system 
of economy. This theory refers to transactions that are determined by 
values of ‘give-and-take’ (i.e. reciprocity). The transactions of specific 
commodities that are characterized by Polanyi as “fictive” are the 
following: land/ ground, work and money. The substantialistic market 
system is embedded in the economic social environment which 
emphasizes a regulation that is not only exclusively economic 
(Polanyi, 1983 p. 111) but rather embedded in socio-cultural domains.  
Empirical findings from the current case study are discussed in the 
next section. 
  
Litigation - Ethnography 
The issue of land management in Sabalibougou Est, also called “La 
Bande des 140m” has endured for more than 20 years. An 
association of inhabitants of the area keeps struggling for their rights. 
                                                 
78
 For a detailed discussion, see Doumbia, L. (2013): Addis Abeba, eine echte 
„Neue Blume“? - Eine anthropologische Kritik am Masterplan und an den 
Prozessen der Stadtplanung von Addis Abeba. 
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In the framework of parceling the land and area improvement, the 
municipal council of the “Commune V” of Bamako cleared off the 
“Bande des 140m” with a Bulldozer destroying the houses of low-
income inhabitants in 2002. The displaced persons were however not 
passive observers; they subsequently founded an Association namely 
“Association des habitants de Sabalibougou Est” and claim for the 
resettlement and reinstatement of their right enshrined in the 1994 
ruling of the Supreme Court of Mali.  The Association incriminates the 
municipal council of the “Commune V” to have attacked them despite 
their right to stay on the land issued by the Supreme Court with 
decision No. 80 of June, 1994.   The parceling / allotting of 
Sabalibougou in the Commune V of Bamako is part of a general 
governmental project of rehabilitation. Since 1987 it has been legally 
planned that the eastern and western parts of Sabalibougou would be 
zones of resettlement. The parceling and improvement of the western 
area of Sabalibougou took place without any serious problems. But 
the inhabitants of the eastern part of Sabalibougou opposed the 
Project which led to the founding of the association.  
 
The resistance to the plans of the municipal government is partly due 
to the fact that the ruling of the court, according to the residents of 
Sabalibougou, was not applied properly. According to the above 
stated decision No. 80 of the Supreme Court:  
“The rehabilitation of ‘Sabalibougou Est’ is a legal 
requirement. However it does not necessarily mean a 
systematic breaking/demolition of all existing houses in 
the area. The Plan of rehabilitation of 1987 foresees the 
opening up of roads and the structural improvement of the 
area which is necessary for the people.”  
Thus the Court requested the municipal authorities to redo the 
operation according to the plan and include the affected persons in 
the implementation of the project.79  
 
Actors and their Motivation to struggle for their Concerns 
Famory Kamissoko is an affected person by the rehabilitation project.  
He sees himself as a victim of the project and is the president and 
one of the founders of the “Association of the Inhabitant of 
Sabalibougou Est”.   
                                                 
79
 Translated by the researcher. 
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“This is a legally registered association that got the 
objective to be resettled with their right to stay on the 
‘Bande des 140m’” (Interview with Kamissoko, 2013).  
 
The ‘clearing-off’ of the area affected around 282 low income 
households, as was pointed out by Kamissoko in the interview.80 But 
it should be noted that more people could have been affected given 
that a Malian household is not the nuclear type as those in Western 
countries. In Bamako, a household has more or less 25 to 30 
persons. It is possible to find three generations living in a house either 
permanently or temporary especially when some members commute 
between the household in town and the other in the village. As stated 
above, migration inflames the life in Bamako. 
  
In pursuing their agenda, the members of the association act based 
on their understanding of the causes and conditions of 
implementation of the rehabilitation project by the municipal 
government.  The clearing-off took place in 2002 as the first of a 
number of steps following a municipal decision and technical support. 
The municipal government of the Commune V made an 
announcement via radio to notify and warn the households in the area 
of their decision to clear off their homes. Subsequently, this decision 
has been executed although most of the residents of the area had 
refused to move out of their homes for them to be destroyed. Against 
the backdrop of the judicial decision No. 80 of 1994 from the Supreme 
Court, the residents had not taken the municipal decision of the 
Commune V seriously. The demolition operation has created 
enormous material, physical, mental and socio-economical damages 
for these forced displaced persons. It is interesting to know, however, 
that despite its resources and ability to use force, the municipal 
government has not been able to prevent the displaced residents 
from still accessing their plots of land and making some form of living 
out of it. These points not only to the limits of state power but also 
questions about the functioning of formal institutions. 
Kassim Sangaré, a former lorry driver, is one of the affected persons 
and member of the association. He argues that:  
Since the clearing-off in 2002 I lost my home, I lost 
everything: I have no family life. My family has been 
dislocated between friends and relatives. But I’m still here 
                                                 
80
 Municipal office of Commune V. 
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struggling for my rehabilitation from the respective 
authorities. 
 
Mr. Sangaré now spends his day on his initial plot where his straw 
shed, the jar and the tree still hold their positions in his demolished 
compound. His family members visit him regularly. He lays hold onto 
his plot and confections mud bricks there for sale.    
The shed of Mr. Sangaré is the weekly meeting point of the 
association. Since the demolition of the area, the forced displaced 
persons meet every Sunday evening in front of Sangaré’s shed 
regardless of the weather. The heads of displaced households are 
automatically at the weekly meeting. It is often male-dominated as the 
women often have to take care of the children. But when they are 
free, they too take part.  
 
Interestingly, “la Bande des 140m” has been razed down by the 
municipal government because it does not look well structured and 
wealthy. The area, according to the municipal authority, is informally 
settled but it is still used by many of the people to generate income. 
For instance, Sangaré makes bricks and sells them to other 
developers; his wife gathers gravel from the area and sells to 
builders. There are people who make straw walls to sell; others work 
as mechanics in an automobile garage. Furthermore there is a big 
bus enterprise and a huge cattle and livestock market. Thus 
economically, the place is very informally exploited. As the residents 
attest to, they are aware of the litigious character of “la Bande des 
140m” but since they do not have any secure economic insurance 
they will have to do anything possible to stay on the land in order to 
be able to cater for their families.   
The “Association des Habitants de Sabalibougou-Est” (ASHE) is 
member of an umbrella coordination called “Union des Assosiations 
et Coordinations pour la Défenses des Droits de Déminis” 
(UACDDDD) which covers all associations that claim their lawful right 
in the country. There is another coordination called “Coordination des 
association pour le déveleppement de la commune V” to which ASHE 
adhered as well as to many worldwide networks. Because, as 
Kamissoko said, “unity is strength” (that is to say “united we stand”). 
“Especially when you have a common concern it is easier for the 
Malian state officials to deal with a group of persons than with single 
individuals”. 
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At the meeting of the association held weekly, several strategies are 
devised; they include reports of the members about what they 
gathered in terms of useful information for the people, different 
possible solutions, professional help, writing letters to be sent to the 
governor of the city, the mayor, the President of the Republic, the 
interior minister, the minister of justice, the advocates, etc. While 
there is no meeting during the week some members frequently lie 
down under the shed and talk about other things. What is important 
here is that they usually act as some kind of watch dogs; once they 
see ‘foreign’ people visiting the area with members of the municipal 
government, they would confront them by blatantly saying: The 
“Bande des 140m” is not for sale! The activities and strategies of the 
displaced residents reveal that they are very determined to hold on to 
their claim of ownership to the land until their rights are reinstated.  
 
In contrast, members of the municipal government especially, the 
elected mayor and the municipal council as well as the general 
secretary of the municipality, who is a civil administrative servant, 
recognize neither the claims nor struggles of the association and not 
even the judicial decision they received from the Supreme Court. The 
municipal government rather relies on the fact that the forced 
displaced persons do not have the “Titre Foncier” to justify their claim 
to the land that they got their plots legally through state rules and 
regulations. Accordingly, the municipal authority sees the residents as 
squatters and that they must move out to another peripheral zone. 
The “Titre Foncier” is considered by the land legislation of Mali as the 
uncontestable evidence of property. The matriculation is a priori 
essentially incorporated in it.81 So this legal framework is obviously 
the working tool of the state and its representatives because it 
guarantees the intangibility and the regularity of the issued “Titre   
Foncier”, “lettre d’attibution” or/and “Permis d’occuper”. Intangible 
means absolutely untouchable. In other words the legal framework of 
land management in Mali prohibits the so-called “lotissements 
coutumiers”, because only the state controls the matriculation 
(Rondeau, 2000, 2006 p. 4).  
 
Given the claims over ownership of land tenure in urban Bamako and 
the different norms governing entitlement to land, it seems imperative 
                                                 
81
 See Djiré (2006)  Colloque international “les frontiers de la question foncière – At the 
frontier of land issues.  
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to reorganize the system of land tenure and it has to include 
individuals because as Moore states: 
The law (in the sense of state-enforceable law) is only one 
of a number of factors that affect the decisions people 
make, the actions they take and the relationships they 
have (Moore, 2000 p. 78).  
 
This means that the concept of “semi autonomous social fields” 
cannot be ignored in the discussion of the issues of urban land 
management and housing in Bamako. The concept helps to describe 
the existence of legal pluralism as a process that is incorporated 
within social interactions. It is the art of analyzing how to understand a 
social field and how to identify complex norms that can be generated 
in the field as well as the way they can be implemented. Legal 
anthropology attempts to identify forms of governance in societies 
especially bearing conscientiously in mind that governance exists only 
in plural (von Trotha, 2006 p. 31).  It is beyond doubt that there are 
multiple forms of governance and no culture or society can pretend to 
be the ideal.  Using the neologism of “Juridi-cité”, Le Roy thinks that 
the management of land and especially urban land holding/ use must 
be better understood and reshaped by interested actors. 
 
Outcomes 
The case study, Sabalibougou which is known as “la Bande des 
140m” has seen many years of litigation between competing 
institutional rules and their actors all laying claims to who must and 
who must not stay on the land. The intriguing question is:  why is it 
loaded with violence? As we see, there is a big challenge of state 
organization in the matter. It is obvious that there is a legal framework 
for the management of land tenure system in Mali which is the ‘Code 
Domanial et Foncier’. But at the same time, one could notice a deficit 
of capacities in the implementation of this legislation. As we know, 
naturally people have societal habits and the ability to organize and 
be organized in the framework of rights and regulations they identify 
for themselves and treat as law.82 This framework of rights that 
individuals put together tends to become a formidable force for 
resisting the force of the state. 
 
On the one hand, the inhabitants of the “Bande des 140m” are, 
according to their understanding, no illegal squatters because they 
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 See also Tanahama B., 1963 
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got their plots around the 1970s from traditional land owners of 
Kalaban Coro and Sabalibougou when the capital city had 
administratively not stretched out over Sabalibougou. Therefore, 
Sabalibougou was an urban village or, at most, an immediate suburb 
of Bamako at that time. On the other hand, the municipal executive 
incriminates the inhabitants of the “Bande des 140m” by standing 
behind their legislation and regulations of their urban planning and 
renewal programs. In addition, the conflict between the judicial 
decision of the Supreme Court and the municipal decision of the 
Commune V deprive the forced displaced persons, who have been 
struggling to hold on to their claims to the land for over twenty years, 
their rights to be rehabilitated.  
 
This impasse critically questions the bureaucratic functioning of 
different state organs in Mali. How coherent are the legislative, judicial 
and the executive organs? The forced displaced people of the “Bande 
des 140” tend to wonder what the decisions and regulations made 
and taken by the state are meant for.  They sometimes claim not to 
be part of the contemporary Republic of Mali because they are being 
systematically excluded when they83 hinted in the interviews in 
Bamanankan: 
“Dugukolo ka kan ka di bEE ma Manden fo mògò min b’a 
fE k’a bila a jufa la ka taa n’a ye” meaning that every 
inhabitant of Manden (country/region of the Mande 
people) has the right of access to a plot of land except the 
individual who wants to take it away in his pocket.  
“Feere fEn tE – jama jE don” it is not for sale – it is a 
patrimony.84 However, if one is issued a “Titre Foncier” he 
is going to put it into his pocket forever whether they need 
it or not. Is that ownership or usufruct?” 
 
This discussion thus far raises the question of legal pluralism which 
begins already with different notions of properties, legitimizing 
authorities of use and managements and conflicts. Having understood 
how these persons came to settle in Sabalibougou in the 1970s, we 
can infer that their access to the plots of land was conditioned by the 
type of social entry the actors possessed. This is very important for us 
in order not to reify the concept of land law or land regulation. The 
nature of social relations existing between the actors is the de facto 
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 Association des Habitants de Sabalibougou Est (2013) 
84
 Translated by the author 
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determinants of access to land than the laws and regulations per se85. 
The term household that was used in the discussion as statistical unit 
to describe the case of litigation of the “Bande des 140m” was 
observed in the field. Nonetheless, it showed the plurality and the 
heterogeneity within the association itself. However, because the 
diversity is much more complex, it became necessary to analyze 
narratives within the households in order to understand the issues in 
more details. It is interesting to observe how the individuals, the 
associations, the different offices of the municipality and the public 
interact. Beside the state’s existing norms and regulations, the 
individuals through their struggles in their associations and 
coordination contribute massively to the improvement and reshaping 
of land management. Thus, despite the state’s claim and 
classification of the inhabitants as “squatters”, “slums-dwellers”, and 
“illegal occupants”, the latter are able to show that they are not 
passive but rather active players in managing and shaping the urban 
space.   
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Development Discourse and Practice: Female 
Education, the Law and the Place of Polygyny 
 
Evam Kofi Glover 
 
“Yɛnndi aponkyerɛni, na sɛ yɛbɛdi mpo a, ɛwɔ sɛ yɛ di deɛɛsoso” 
(Even though we eat no toads, if we have to eat them, we choose the fat and 
juicy ones)  
Ghanaian proverb 
 
 
Abstract 
Development practice over recent years prioritized empowerment of women 
through education for instrumentality and capacity building. In Ghana, diverse 
strategies including encouraging tertiary education and leadership in women were 
to ensure balance in nation building. However, much as this intervention promises 
great prospects, there is hardly any systematic study about its significance in 
relation to implications for the cultural goal of marriage and/or child birth. I contend 
that the persistence of polygyny among the middle-class is, among other things, 
due to its relevance for stabilizing the society in relation to the latent functions of 
higher formal education and professional training that inadvertently introduce 
marriage squeeze among middle-class women. Development discourse treats the 
situation as a phase and ‘transitional cost’ expected to fade away with institutional 
dynamics. Its effect on women may be open to debate but its persistence among 
the middle class registers a dimension that needs critical analysis. In some cases, 
its practice verges on practical implications for law enforcement against bigamy. In 
the circumstance where the law is seen as pliable, the situation engenders a 
number of blurred and confusing effects that deepen the sense of ambiguity and 
sometimes outcomes become contradictory.  
 
Keywords: polygyny, female education, marriage squeeze, Ghana   
 
 
Introduction 
The debate over marriage type specifically polygyny86 and the law 
has a very long history in Ghana. Even though polygyny is legal, it is 
generally frowned upon especially among the middle-class (Zeitzen, 
2008 p. 8). The literature shows that theoretical insights by social 
scientists discussing polygyny in Africa have been shifting over time 
in line with the social dynamics in marriage and family studies. During 
the 1960s and 1970s for example, modernization theorists espoused 
the model of an evolutionary transition from a 'pre-modern' or 
'traditional' to a 'modern' era. In this, teleological accounts were given 
of a progressive, upward movement from “tradition to modernity” (cf. 
                                                 
86
Marriage here is used to mean a union between a man and a woman sanctioned 
through rites by payment and acceptance of some form of bride-wealth. Polygyny is 
where a man is married formally (some form of bride-wealth paid) to more than one 
wife simultaneously. 
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Alber & Bochow, 2011).87 The major prerequisite for this ‘progress’ 
was the removal of specifically targeted cultural and social barriers 
that were regarded as impediments in the smooth running of the 
social system (Geschiere, Meyer & Pels, 2008 p. 1). Development 
discourse assumed generally, for example, that polygyny was rooted 
in poor formal education and lack of economic emancipation of 
women (Goode, 1963, 1964). Arguments were therefore advanced 
concerning the trends of polygyny in Africa and the prediction that 
with more women in higher education and professions, as well as 
increasing ‘urbanization’, polygyny was to disappear (Goldthorpe, 
1984; Goode, 1963; Kerr, et al., 1973; Lewis, 1982). It presupposes 
that even where polygyny continues to exist among middle-class 
women, it could be glossed over as ad-hoc ‘interim’ occurrence, a 
‘phase’ in the process and therefore a systemic ‘transitional cost’ on 
the path to the ultimate goal. 
 
Current scholarship however debunks this argument for post-
modernist concerns that point to an increasingly fluid, dispersed and 
discursively created world (Alber & Bochow 2011 p. 19). 
Notwithstanding this however, a casual overview shows that the 
unilinear view has not completely waned within current development 
thinking. Dominant development discourse today continues to see 
polygyny specifically as one of those ‘backward’ internal structures 
that cause underdevelopment (see WiLDAF/FeDDAF 2006). In 
feminist rhetoric in Ghana, for example, polygyny is couched in 
discriminatory and oppressive assumptions as against the ‘dignity of 
women’, double-standards of society, injustice and seen to “increase 
women’s insecurity and vulnerability in married life” 
(WiLDAF/FeDDAF, 2006). In the general recommendations of the 
United Nations committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women (UN, 2000), this notion is formally endorsed. The Convention 
states under General Recommendation (Para.24) that: 
“(…) equality of treatment with regard to the right to marry implies that 
polygamy88 is incompatible with this principle. Polygamy violates the 
dignity of women. It is an inadmissible discrimination against women. 
Consequently, it should be definitely abolished wherever it continues 
to exist. (UN 2000 Para. 24). 
The UN (2000 Para. 39) therefore directs that the registration of all 
marriages should be enforced “…thereby ensure compliance with the 
                                                 
87
 For a comprehensive review on family change in Africa, see Erdmute Alber and 
Astrid Boschow (2011). ‘Changes in African Families: A Review of Anthropological and 
Sociological Approaches towards Family and Kinship in Africa.’ In Ana Marta Gozalez, 
Laurie F. DeRose, and Florence Oloo; Frontiers of Globalization; Kinship and Family 
Structures in Africa. Africa World Press, Trenton. 
88
 Used here to mean polygyny 
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Convention and establish equality between partners (…), prohibition 
of bigamy and polygamy (...).” In the Human Rights perspective 
therefore, polygyny is a misfit in the world. Its existence is an 
anomaly, an indication of ill-conceived laws that create bias against 
women and a form of institutional failure. Contrary to this notion, other 
scholarly works, however, observe that polygyny in wider African 
setting may not be declining as anticipated but rather 
metamorphosing to fit the demands of the emerging ‘modern’ society 
(Clignet & Sween, 1974; Karanja, 1994; Locoh, 1994; Mann, 1994; 
Notermans, 2002). My aim in this paper is to explore the meaning of 
polygyny to middle-class women who practice it and to gauge its 
implications from an institutional perspective. The paper therefore 
takes as its point of departure the assumption that social institutions 
exist for framing a functioning society (Bettinger, 1996 p. 851) but in 
exerting this control, social institutions adapt to social realities to 
maximize their dynamic role. 
 
The general study89of which this paper is an excerpt was based on 
multi-local ethnography in Ghana. It was a 12-month long fieldwork 
between 2010 and 2011. Informants were selected in relation to the 
criteria of being middle-class, marriage into polygyny and willingness 
to share experiences irrespective of the geographical location. 
Empirical data for the paper were generated through life histories, 
chains of conversations, focus group discussions, and interviews with 
middle-class women and men. 
 
The Law and Polygyny in Ghana 
The records show that despite pressure from both internal and 
international forces that seek to uproot polygyny, Ghana continues on 
the path of a plural legal system which sees this form of marriage as a 
legitimate choice. The Ghanaian Law recognizes three forms of 
marriage (Daniels, 2009 p. 142), namely: Marriage celebrated under 
the Marriage Ordinance (Cap.127); marriage according to the rules of 
customary law; and marriage contracted under the Marriage of 
Mohammedans Ordinance (Cap. 129). Marriage under the Marriage 
Ordinance is monogamous, usually performed either by religious rites 
in Church (under Cap. 127) or by civil rite before a registrar (cf. 
Daniels, 2009 p. 145). Marriage under the Ordinance means that 
unless in the death of a marriage partner or where the marriage is 
legally terminated, neither party can marry another person. It also 
means that a man married under the Marriage Ordinance may not 
marry another woman (whether under the Marriage Ordinance or 
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The research was carried out between April and October 2010 followed by a 
second field visit between August 2011 and January 2012 as part of my PhD 
programme. 
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customary law). Indeed, the law points out that the offence for 
marrying a second wife under the Marriage Ordinance while being 
married by customary law (bigamy) carries a penalty. Additionally, the 
law states that the case of contracting a customary marriage to a third 
party, while being married under the Ordinance (bigamy) also carries 
a penalty (cf. Daniels, 2009). On the other hand “marriage under 
customary law in Ghana, however, is (...) generally potentially 
polygamous90 in the sense that a man is entitled to marry as many 
wives as he wishes, whilst a woman is prohibited from marrying more 
than one husband” at the same time (Daniels, 2009 p. 145). In 
practice, Ghana’s pluralistic legal system offers different systems of 
law in relation to marriage which “apply concurrently (…) without 
spatial separation within a single territorial jurisdiction” (Allott & 
Woodman, 1985). The legal system in Ghana therefore allows a level 
of fluidity in the choice of marriage. According to the provisions of the 
law of Ghana, marriage under the Marriage Ordinance (Cap. 127) 
permits marriage under customary law to be converted from a 
customary marriage into a statutory monogamous marriage under the 
law if so desired (Daniels, 2009 p. 145). At the same time people 
married under customary law and the rites of Islamic Law can also 
change their status from monogamy to polygyny. The criss-cross 
between monogamy and polygyny in some cases is a matter of time 
as people move in and out of physical, political, ethnic, religious, and 
language boundaries, enforcing fission and fusion of individuals as 
members of groups, families, or as married couples.  
 
The records show that the overwhelming majority of marriages in 
Ghana (over 80%) are contracted under customary law (Ardayfio-
Schandorf 2006; Awusabo-Asare 1990). This presupposes that 
“marriages are potentially polygamous”91 (Daniels, 2009 p. 145) with 
seemingly wide discretionary powers inadvertently given to male 
decision regarding polygyny. In the matter of men being allowed to 
have other wives however, women reserve the option to opt for 
divorce if they disapprove. One would therefore expect that middle-
class first wives (highly educated/career professionals and 
economically capable individuals) who feel cheated by polygynous 
husbands would seek divorce.  
 
The Ghana Demographic and Health Survey (GSS, 2010) indicates 
generally that the dominant marital arrangement in Ghana is 
monogamy. The survey shows that the overwhelming majority of 
married women (82%) aged 15-49 were married to men who have 
only one wife. Even though data specific to middle-class is not readily 
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available, the general notion gleaned from studies (Amevor, 2010; 
Dolphyne, 2005; Zeitzen, 2008) is that among the middle-class in 
Ghana, polygyny is generally frowned upon and therefore largely a 
somewhat hidden phenomenon. Assimeng (1999 p. 92) observes that 
although many Ghanaians might condemn polygyny “at verbal level”, 
they might also be prepared “to indulge in this arrangement, or 
variations of it, in secrecy.” Dolphyne (2005), in discussing what 
women's emancipation means to women in Africa observed that it is 
common that some of the key challengers to any legislation banning 
polygyny in Ghana are women, including in some cases, “highly 
educated women”. She reports further that many women in Ghana 
find polygyny a suitable arrangement because it is useful as support 
for women who seek to pursue further education, have professional 
training, and enhancing their self-determination. In this sense, 
polygyny contributes to increased female status and economic 
freedom (see also Amevor, 2010 p. 83; Steady, 1987). Such apparent 
social ambivalence towards polygyny raises a set of issues. Revisiting 
the implications of the law and the shifting, multiple representations 
and challenges a plural legal system seemingly provides in the matter 
become crucial for my analysis. The question this paper attempts to 
answer is: How do middle-class prerequisites, especially long years in 
school for females, engender polygyny and what is the implication for 
law enforcement in the case of bigamy?  
 
Pathways and the Meaning of Marriage  
Within the context of the Ghanaian society, marriage and child 
bearing is a cultural goal (Nukunya, 2000). It is held as the basic 
premise for being alive, being happy, self-worth and a sign of health. 
The relevance of marriage is generally seen not just at the personal 
but also at the social plane. No matter the level of economic and 
social independence of the individual in Ghana, marriage largely 
remains for both male and female culturally prescribed. The basic 
normative prescription to marry and have children irrespective of 
economic and social status has been widely documented (Little, 
1973; Dinan, 1983; Bleek, 1987). Against this background, my 
informants noted variously that by age 24 single young women 
become more and more conscious of the need to search for ‘Mr. 
Right’. In the middle-class92 environment and especially in cities 
where the influence of extended family is relatively weaker, faith-
based groups play a central role as family in this pursuit. Interviews 
with young single middle-class women reveal that the major concern 
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I use the concept ‘middle-class’ to include individuals with a minimum of college 
education: nurses, teachers, civil service workers, professionals, politicians, 
paramedics, physicians, engineers, professors, civilian contractors and also educated 
Ghanaian migrants living in the Diaspora. 
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relates to when, who and how to identify the ‘right’ suitor for marriage. 
The general consensus is that marriage and child birth are crucial for 
personal fulfillment, self-esteem, dignity and a great booster to the 
ego. The views of some informants93 were as follows: 
 
“Marriage means a lot and especially to well educated 
women as role-models. It brings respect from society and 
sets you on a higher level in the eyes of everyone. No 
matter your age, you’re seen as mature, wise, and 
balanced. One is accorded the esteem that goes with 
achievers. It is one social position all secretly want to 
reach” (Sedem: female, 27 year-old, graduate teacher). 
 
“You cannot easily ignore the pressure to be married 
eventually. Education or no education, one is pushed 
around so hard to get married. You may choose to have 
children outside marriage and many do so. But family 
members and especially church members never give up 
pushing for marriage” (Grace: female, 23 year-old Civil 
Engineer). 
 
“People persistently put you on edge (…) so much 
restlessness. Relatives, friends, colleagues, neighbors 
and even strangers with very short acquaintance may 
pose the question within greetings (…) but they mean well 
(…) after all, who wants you to live in perpetual pity, 
ridicule and suspicion? Marriage is fulfilling, and adds to 
our self-respect, wholeness and self-esteem as capable 
members of the family (…)” (Zina, female, 26-year-old 
Banker). 
 
My informants also intimated that even though young middle-class 
women postpone marriage until later, it is not necessarily because 
they are not sexually active or that they do not want marriage. Single 
middle-class women may be sexually active and the middle-class 
work environment is said to be prone to liaison. Examples often cited 
relates to jobs and careers that make middle-class men and women 
‘globe-trotters’. On-the-job residential in-service training programmes, 
conferences and workshops have become part and parcel of the work 
schedule especially in NGOs, in both local and international agencies 
generally. This has initiated new frame of professional relationships 
and working life. It introduces new liaison patterns that are in many 
ways different from the patterns that existed primarily from the 
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conditions within family businesses in the agrarian traditional 
economy. The boundaries that once separated the sexes are being 
removed at a faster rate now than ever before. Because it is 
unprecedented, the situation carries with it fluidity in which the old 
normative order between the sexes crumples. In the short run the 
situation evolves with new meanings and a vibrant culture. As a social 
current, informants noted that it lacks any concrete cultural normative 
system to cushion the jolt that comes with such abrupt social change. 
In general terms therefore, this fluidity creates avenues that are 
exploited by some middle-class men and women for extra marital 
liaisons.94 Informants pointed out how group interaction in coed 
workplaces, frequent business travels and long hours outside the 
home create new opportunities that are exploited by individuals for 
extramarital affairs.  
 
Young middle-class people interviewed said they weigh the timing of 
marriage against their personal advances in acquiring a desired level 
of career development and economic independence. What is 
important for my analysis is that, at this stage, sexual activity by 
unmarried women may have little or no bearing on marriage or child 
bearing. In the view of informants, the paradox is that long stay in 
school promotes the situation where young people become 
biologically mature and want sex but are regarded as socially 
immature to afford marriage. Young women at this stage are thought 
of as preferring already married men for two reasons. First a man, 
who is already married, especially given the heavy stigma attached to 
polygyny among the middle-class, may want a mistress for just the 
thrill and not for marriage. Although my informants acknowledge the 
centrality of marriage in the Ghanaian society, they often made a 
distinction between intimacies as survival strategy, and committed 
relationships for marriage. The general opinion is that young women 
who accept to date married men do it for varied ulterior motives 
including the adventure, social capital of exploiting relationships for 
good placement, economic capital for supporting a good lifestyle, 
cultural capital in deriving support for higher education, training 
opportunities and benefits.  
 
                                                 
94
The story of Dr Richard Anane (Ghanaweb, 2008) illustrates this phenomenon quite 
vividly. During his tenure as Health Minister in Ghana, Dr. Anane attending an 
international AIDS conference in the United States of America allegedly engaged in 
unprotected sexual encounter with a fellow participant (an American woman) during 
the AIDS conference. The woman became pregnant as a result, later gave birth and 
sued Dr. Anane for child support. The sex cum corruption scandal leveled against Dr. 
Anane saw his resignation from the government. 
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Findings show that in some cases, what begins as a relationship for 
fun or meant to gain social capital is eventually routinized into 
marriage (i.e. polygyny). Circumstances may push the young woman 
to marry an already married man who she comes to see as her best 
option in fulfilling the cultural goal. It is a relational choice that 
individuals make depending on a number of other considerations. The 
path to polygyny is very diverse. This fluidity is manifest in the routine 
daily struggle of many of my young middle-class informants seeking 
to meet their aspirations within the confines of a social system that is 
harsh and unrelenting especially for young women. 
It was generally agreed among informants that the choice of potential 
marriage partners has gone out of the control of especially the 
extended family, and also the era of betrothals or arranged or forced 
marriages are past. Yet still, middle-class women feel they are unduly 
put under subtle pressure within society to get married and have 
children. The concern of especially women I interviewed was about 
timing of marriage and the process for reaching this goal. To Efia, 
(female graduate, about 40 years, administrator, separated from 
husband, having one child): 
“It is not like you have a choice anyway (marriage and/or 
child birth). It is complex. Disappointments are common 
and false steps here and there. One is always reminded 
that it must be done and done within the time frame. That 
is what makes a woman anxious”.  
 
Indeed, anxiety over timing of marriage and\or child birth among 
middle-class women interviewed was widespread. Their male 
counterparts hardly mentioned pressure of marriage timing as an 
issue. But the common opinion gleaned from informants suggests that 
young women are conscious of the balance between years spent 
schooling, their personal objective of marriage, marriage timing and 
the challenge of a biological clock that is persistently working against 
them. But there is also another source of pressure. Efia, like many 
other young women I interviewed, observed that even though things 
are gradually changing, generally Ghanaian men still shy away from 
marrying their female contemporaries. She observes that: 
“Some middle-class men feel intimidated by successful 
women. I have many married female friends who suffer 
because despite their qualifications, being married means 
they must always bend over backwards to please their 
husbands. Men still like to marry girls below their status 
and age; girls they can control, take care of, or as they 
often say, shape to their taste” (Efia, female graduate, 
about 40 years, administrator, separated from husband, 
having one child). 
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The female informants said they were conscious of the challenges in 
marriage - especially in relation to its limitations. They pointed out 
implications for their personal autonomy, competitive career building, 
and aspiration to climb the heights by merit, strength and character 
rather than measured in relation to differential male or female 
standards. But despite the many misgivings, the desire to marry 
continues to be very strong among middle-class women. Kumi (male, 
29 years old) thinks that as a rallying point, the moral society is highly 
suspicious of any infiltrations from anywhere that seek to destabilize 
the concept of family values – heterosexual marriage and parenting. 
Sustaining marriage occupies a prominent place in religious groups, 
making marriage and child bearing a ‘religious and cultural’ obligation 
that individuals work towards. In this wise, individuals who delay 
marriage too long or choose not to marry are generally stigmatized. 
Efia tells about her own experience. She noted that because she was 
separated from the husband, she was under immense subtle 
pressure from family and society. She complained that a middle-class 
woman who lives without a man may have more social cost and 
burdens to fight against than when she goes by the name of 
marriage. Divorced women who want to avoid unwanted attention and 
male intruders may still keep the ex-husband’s name and wear the 
marriage ring as a sign of protection against insult and assault. Efia 
observed that among other reasons, some unmarried women also 
tend to wear ‘fake’ engagement rings as a common strategy to avert 
especially malicious pity from members of society.  
 
On the other hand, informants point out that more and more middle-
class women seek ‘polycoity’ in which there is a loose arrangement 
between sexual partners. In this arrangement, the middle-class single 
woman lives alone with the male partner visiting intermittently. There 
are also middle-class single women with series of men they date 
simultaneously. In both cases, the discretion is completely in the 
hands of the woman. Informants also noted a trend among young 
middle-class women who have devised ‘innovative’ ways of reaching 
the cultural goal of having their own children without commitment to a 
man as a wife. Informants noted that some economically viable young 
middle-class women ‘seduce’ specific men of status they fancy for 
pregnancy. The purpose of this strategy is for such women to have 
children of their own without responsibilities towards the genitor of the 
child. In this case, the stories demonstrate female coercion. Middle-
class women do not entirely lack alternative reproductive strategies. 
 
Two principal reasons were adduced for the practice. It is said that 
there are middle-class women who seek their freedom and autonomy 
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because they want to invest in careers for security, or they feel 
marriage is much too complicated. Many in this segment want to 
satisfy the cultural goal of having children but not through marriage. 
The second group of single women is those who want to get married 
but are choosy about seeking partners within or above their social 
and economic status. Some informants noted that with more and 
more men seeking marriage partners of lower age and status than 
themselves, there is the phenomenon whereby not all eligible middle-
class women who want to marry have the opportunity. Some of these 
women use polygyny as a means to this cultural goal. In this situation, 
one female informant reflecting on her own experience as second 
wife observes that: 
“Even though it sounds odd for the career woman, my 
experience is that it is quite easy to adjust in polygyny 
when you know what you want. Respective wives usually 
live far apart in different suburbs of the same city, in 
different cities or even in different countries. They are 
independent in their homes with flexible arrangement for 
the to-and-fro of the husband. Rivalry is minimized when 
they hardly cross one another’s path. I see much flexibility; 
freedom and the personal choice for a woman to pursue 
her dreams, career, and have family at her own pace” (Eli, 
43 year-old female civil servant).  
 
Notwithstanding this, there were dissenting voices among my 
informants:  
“For me it is bizarre, unromantic, unchristian, uncivilized 
and completely unacceptable. It is no marriage at all 
because of its make-shift arrangements where the 
husband is absent when the family needs him most. How 
do you plan your life on such ad-hoc basis?” (Grace, 38 
year-old female Army officer). 
 
Repeatedly, however, a number of informants, especially first wives 
married under the Marriage Ordinance but drawn into polygyny by 
‘recalcitrant husbands’ see enforcement of the law related to bigamy 
as problem. The opinion of Lucy (45 year-old Nurse-Practitioner) 
represents the common view expressed by many first wives in diverse 
ways:  
“Hmm! (...) I think the situation is worse because of poor 
law enforcement. There is virtually no certainty for a 
married woman against the man marrying another. Even 
under the Marriage Ordinance, the married woman is still 
not secure because enforcing the law may take forever, 
and the family may swing to the side of the man anyway. 
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She has no certainty except the option of divorce. But 
even for that the church says no. It is a really difficult 
situation” (45 year-old Nurse-Practitioner, first wife, 
Roman Catholic with three children). 
Other female informants, however, repeatedly attribute polygyny 
among the middle-class to the gap created through marriage squeeze 
facing especially middle-class women.  
 
Husband snatching is quite common now. It involves especially young 
female graduates who hunt specifically for already married men of 
good standing for pregnancy. Because most young men their age 
prefer younger girls, some women become seriously desperate. To 
save the situation they become deliberate gatecrashers after the long 
sacrifice for career development. Sometimes the goal is attained at 
the expense of the dream of a monogamous marriage. It is not fair to 
married women but somehow, their air of being relatively younger and 
sometimes seemingly more daring and increasingly more and more 
sophisticated appeal very much to older men who are often already 
married but still crave for young women.  
 
My findings suggest that the expressed opinion of seeking first to 
achieve academic laurels before marriage is the ideal shared by the 
generation of younger unmarried people. It is important to consider 
this in the context of new reforms in the academic programme that 
creates the possibility of the younger generation of Ghanaians 
accomplishing their educational dreams at far younger age than 
before. Within this new dispensation, however, there are those who 
want to achieve higher qualification at their own pace through an 
installment approach. Interviews with especially unmarried females 
above 30 years of age as well as married career women suggest that 
in practice, there is some generation gap. Much as older women want 
to combine marriage and further education, younger women (below 
30 years) seem to think otherwise. But the lines are not so clear since 
it is a common phenomenon for women to break their pursuit of 
education for marriage and childbirth before resuming. Many have 
combined marriage, childbirth, formal education and work 
concurrently even as low as at the senior secondary school level 
(private students and at the workers’ college). It is particularly in 
vogue especially for women at the tertiary level of education in 
Ghana.  
 
This is, however, an ambiguous situation for most women. Zina 
(female aged about 30, two children and married), a Banker explains 
that even though she successfully combined further education with 
marriage and child bearing, circumstances make it difficult for some 
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wives to pursue further education. Resources may be lacking, 
pressure to cope especially with children’s routine care and schooling, 
estate development and paying for modern living which becomes an 
obsession after marriage. Informants also cited experiences of friends 
who delayed further education for marriage with promises of 
continuing like Zina but unfortunately met with strong resistance from 
husbands and even families when they tried to resume. In a number 
of cases, informants noted that the emerging situation in which some 
have to balance schooling and living away from their husbands and/or 
children have been implicated in the offshoot of divorce as well as 
polygyny among the Ghanaian middle-class. Zina concludes that 
“whatever way you turn it, there are challenges.” 
 
As noted already, Efia’s observation that “men still like to marry girls 
below their status and age” meant that many middle-class women 
who spend years without marriage in order to achieve professional 
career and independence have some challenges in the marriage 
market. Despite public disapproval, the general notion is that 
polygyny is an avenue that offers opportunity for latecomers into the 
marriage market and for negotiating the cultural goal of marriage 
and/or child birth. 
 
Discussion  
A very central concern about the effect of modern career 
development prospects on the social system is the latent function of 
long period of formal education that has inadvertently introduced a 
new challenge into the lives of women. Even though women have 
long been balancing multiple roles through history, the insertion of 
career development introduces a completely new phase. This new 
dimension has been seen as creating marriage squeeze especially for 
the middle-class woman. Indeed, the asymmetric fecundity horizon 
between men and women is a major hidden challenge largely 
influencing marriage market behavior generally (Rose, 2001). The 
comparative shorter fecundity horizon for females (a biological 
constraint) is peculiar to women specifically in the relationship 
between age and fertility decline. Long years in school therefore 
engender imbalance. Thus marriage, which hitherto was largely a 
‘social given’ and a family imperative to ensure that daughters were 
‘given into marriage’ through any of the diverse avenues – family 
betrothals, early marriage after puberty, arranged marriage, forced 
marriage, elopement – have witnessed drastic retractions and 
renunciations because of the combined effects of formal education 
and acculturation. 
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The situation in Ghana is further aggravated by the fact that for most 
middle-class women the norm of homogamy where a potential mate 
is expected to have socio-economic characteristics similar to the 
woman’s own or far above poses further threat (Takyi et al., 2003). 
Paradoxically however, middle-class men, unlike their female 
contemporaries, tend to seek first marriage partners from the 
segment of women who are below their age and status but who have 
the potentials of social mobility through further education. These 
differential inclinations introduce marriage squeeze that puts the 
middle-class woman into a potential deficit. For Merton, this 
engenders "an acute disjunction between the cultural norms and 
goals” of having children through marriage and the socially structured 
means to realize this goal. Merton argues that the discontinuity 
between culture and structure has the dysfunctional consequence of 
promoting deviance within society (cf. Ritzer, 2007). The implication 
of this in the life of middle-class women is vividly captured by Aidoo 
(1993) in her novel - Changes. The novel depicts the trajectory of a 
Ghanaian middle-class woman through various stages of her 
experiences - monogamy, divorce, and then the choice of remarriage 
as a second wife in a polygynous union. Among other things, the 
novel challenges the stereotypical notion of coercion of women by 
men into polygyny. It alludes to the idea that middle-class women 
have a choice and to a large extent, middle-class women have the 
agency of exerting the right to choose what type of marriage appeals 
to them as individuals.  
 
The issue of marriage squeeze facing high achieving women who 
spent much of their lives pursuing career goals at the expense of 
having children is not peculiar to Ghana. The current global debate 
over the alternative offered by Apple and Facebook’s "social egg 
freezing" (Conrad, 2014) for female employees (for non-medical 
reasons) show that the situation is global. What is obvious, though, is 
that approaches to meeting this challenge may differ from society to 
society depending on resources available, as well as legal and 
cultural tenets of respective societies. It is a relationship between 
people and their institutions and because culture is dynamic, 
institutions built on it are perpetually in the process of change to fit 
concerns. In this pursuit, the role of the plural legal system in Ghana 
especially regarding its significance for marriage has become a major 
topic for debate. The literature (Amevor, 2010; Assimeng, 1999; 
Dolphyne, 2005; Zeitzen, 2008) shows that there is a general divide in 
public opinion on the matter. On the one hand, some middle-class 
women hail it as necessarily flexible and resilient enough in allowing 
choices including polygyny to accommodate the challenges women 
face. Other middle-class women see it as a threat to order, a 
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challenge that brings anomie. The latter group feels vulnerable 
especially because of poor enforcement of the law on bigamy. For 
them such a failure reinforces the perception of a broken system. Like 
Merton (Ritzer, 2007) argues, not all ideals enshrined works for 
everyone in a given society. Indeed, in accepting polygyny, the law is 
functional for some single middle-class women dealing with 
deprivation and seeking for opportunity to achieve their cultural goal 
of marriage. But the same law has consequences that are generally 
dysfunctional for others who are married into monogamy and seeking 
protection from husbands straying into polygyny. In other words, even 
though all may subscribe to the cultural goal, the ways in which 
individual middle-class people go about obtaining the goal are not the 
same because not everyone has the same opportunities.  
 
A very remarkable observation by Nukunya (2000, p. 21) explains the 
situation more pointedly. During a debate on the law on bigamy in 
Ghana, Nukunya noted that a judge was said to have observed that 
the law on bigamy is a legal provision in the law books of Ghana but 
not made to be enforced. The statement shows the power 
configurations within the social setting emerging out of the social 
processes that make difficult the strict enforcement of the law on 
bigamy in Ghana. For the common person, the situation introduces a 
level of protracted ambiguity and mistrust for law enforcement.The 
ambivalence that the law itself is weakly enforced has forced many 
women to look to the Church as an institution to prevail against 
polygyny. Yet, the Church is but a voluntary organization and its 
enforcement of such a code is limited to professed faith of individuals. 
The situation is further related to the plural legal system itself 
fostering uncertainty. For Britwum et al. (2004 p. 5), the situation 
creates a level of “complex legal problems such as the need to decide 
which particular rules apply to a particular transaction: how to 
determine membership of a particular group and how an individual 
can change the law applicable to him/her as a member of a group; 
what choice of law/ rules must exist for issues between people of 
different groups and the determination of whether a particular system 
of law applies in a certain geographical area.” Notwithstanding the 
fact that “final judicial power is vested in the state judiciary” (Britwum 
et al., 2004 p. 5), the pluralistic nature of the legal system means in 
practice that the customary laws “wield immense powers, and 
especially in places where the impact of formal state structures and 
their laws is not that significant, what holds sway is the customary 
law” (Britwum et al., 2004 p. 5). In this situation, some cultural 
practices generally take precedence over legal norms, just as legal 
institutions can fail to account adequately for traditional systems and 
social institutions in design and implementation (cf. Amuzu et al., 
BIGSAS Working Papers 5/2015: Actors, Institutions and Change: Perspectives on Africa  115 
 
 
2010 p. 14). This is especially the case where the predicament of 
women especially is aggravated by the fact that even though divorce 
is accepted by law, it is largely unaccepted to some religious faiths95 
and frowned upon in customary marriage in Ghana. This situation 
further hems-in the limited freedom of choice available for women and 
creates a protracted predicament. 
 
Indeed, the fluidity of the law on marriage also creates some level of 
ambivalence. However, some middle-class women also see this 
situation as an advantage in coping with the divergent expectations 
that they face. On the one hand, the cultural goal of having children 
looms large irrespective of marriage squeeze that some high 
achieving women face. It is in this context that the Ghanaian plural 
legal system, to a large measure affords leverage by allowing choices 
in relation to polygyny or monogamy. For some middle-class women, 
polygyny offers the alternative arrangement for meeting the cultural 
goal of marriage and/or child birth and at the same time creating 
personal space to contradict the stereotypes of pliability and 
submissiveness as wives. The middle-class woman who decides to 
stay back in polygyny instead of divorcing may use the situation in 
varied ways. On the one hand, findings show how the situation brings 
dejection and varied challenges to some women who accept to be 
drawn into polygyny. On the other hand however, there are women 
who turn the situation around, dexterously engaging the normative 
order for creating space to their advantage. In this sense, middle-
class women are conscious of the intentional allocation of their 
sexuality: sex, fertility resources as well as time and career needs. 
They seek in diverse ways to maximize their autonomy and to better 
their lives, which stem from being adept at negotiating and navigating 
diverse paths for fulfilling goals they deem important. Polygyny, in its 
diverse forms therefore remains the ‘niche-filler’ in many cases.  
 
Conclusion 
Many young middle-class women face difficult choices between 
striving for higher levels of academic achievement and protecting their 
place in society as responsible individuals. This raises the issue of the 
relationship between change and persistence in the underlying values 
that drive society. In this wise, it can be concluded that polygyny may 
never wholly disappear among middle-class women despite the 
dishonour attached, as long as the specific collectivistic cultural goal 
of marriage and having children continue to be a priority. I contend 
                                                 
“(…) it is essential that the entire Catholic community continue to stress the importance 
of the monogamous and indissoluble union of man and woman, consecrated in holy 
matrimony. For the Christian, traditional forms of marriage can never be a substitute for 
sacramental marriage" (Benedict XVI 2006). 
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that both social structures and human agency are critical in 
understanding the decision of the individual middle-class woman into 
polygyny. The proverb – “if you have to eat toads, choose the fat and 
juicy ones” elucidate “intentionality” and “contextual choice” 
associated with women’s agency in polygyny. The findings suggest 
that middle-class women are not always victims in relation to the 
‘choice’ of polygyny and indeed, in some cases, middle-class men 
could be victims of ‘choices’ women make. I argue that the modern 
educational system has inadvertently failed to consider the 
implications of higher education for women on the cultural goal of 
marrying and having children. Actors therefore improvise from the 
pool of diverse social leanings even in cases like bigamy where the 
law could conveniently be side-stepped if enforcement is deemed to 
be weak.  
 
My thesis is therefore that ‘social development’ is a complex 
phenomenon with its own latent functions within which the 
contradictions of meaning about what is important in life continues to 
be defined, shifted, contested and realigned to fit the needs of people. 
In this sense, one dilemma for development actors remains how to 
reconcile the challenge of long years demanded by formal education 
on marriage squeeze especially for middle-class women. 
Development discourse treats the challenge as a phase and therefore 
‘transition cost’ that would fade away with institutional dynamics. But 
the records suggest that it remains a challenge not only in developing 
countries like Ghana but also in Western societies. Perhaps, polygyny 
is as practical for middle-class women in technology-challenged 
Ghana as ‘social egg freezing’ (oocyte cryopreservation) is for Apple 
and Facebook that pay for female employees to have eggs frozen for 
pregnancy later in life. Moral undertones aside, the essence for either 
is the same; giving ‘stranded’ career female employees the hope and 
undeniably the opportunity to concentrate on their careers first and to 
have children later in life. Unless we consider the social and cultural 
underpinnings of a given environment, it will be difficult to appreciate 
the law allowing polygyny in Ghana as a dynamic institutional 
provision. In a society where the old and the new ways of life are 
intrinsically locked in an ever changing concert, the challenge of 
sustainable-development arises from the social costs of negotiating 
new paths and the management of its latent functions. In this sense, 
polygyny as choice remains an ally in women’s struggle for 
‘emancipation’ and invariably contributes towards enhancing well-
being for those who see it as important.  
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